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“The bill . . . did not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature, and pass
unobserved. Its principle was completely understood, and was opposed with
equal zeal and ability.”
– Chief Justice John Marshall1
INTRODUCTION
After a contentious partisan process, Democratic majorities in both houses
of Congress succeeded in passing dramatic national reform, which became law
upon the President’s signature. Opponents quickly filed suit, claiming, among
other deficiencies, that the law exceeded congressional authority under the
Spending Clause. In a divided opinion, the Supreme Court wrote: “The
question is not what power the Federal Government ought to have but what
powers in fact have been given by the people.”2 Otherwise, the Spending
Clause “would become the instrument for total subversion of the governmental
powers reserved to the individual states.”3 The case was United States v.
Butler, and the law struck down was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.4
Until the 2011 Term, no Supreme Court decision since the New Deal had
struck down an act of Congress as exceeding the federal spending power.5 The

1

M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936).
3 Id. at 75.
4 Id. at 78.
5 See Virginia Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1355 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J.,
dissenting) (“I recognize that the Court has not invalidated an Act of Congress under the
Spending Clause since United States v. Butler, over half a century ago.” (citation omitted)),
2
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question of unconstitutionally coercive conditions was also novel. Indeed, no
federal court had ever found any legislation to be an unconstitutionally
coercive exercise of the spending power6 until the Court decided National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) on June 28, 2012.7 The
only two previous Supreme Court cases mentioning the spending power
coercion doctrine found it inapplicable, upholding the federal laws in question:
the unemployment-compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935
in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis8 and the drinking-age condition on highway
funds in South Dakota v. Dole.9 In each case, the Court recognized the
theoretical possibility of a federal-spending program unconstitutionally
coercing states, but found no coercion on the facts presented. Accordingly,
until NFIB, coercion had been relegated to the realm of dicta and theory.10
Most of the vast legal and political commentary on the Healthcare Cases,11
which challenged the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the
Affordable Care Act or ACA),12 centered on the individual health insurance
rev’d en banc, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997); accord Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d
1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Most of the treatment given the [coercion] theory in the
federal courts has been negative.”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“The coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law,
and never in favor of the challenging party.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1430-32 (1989).
6 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“THE CHIEF JUSTICE therefore – for the first
time ever – finds an exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”).
The panel decision in Riley, 86 F.3d at 1346-47, is not a counterexample as the majority
denied Virginia’s coercion claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed en banc, adopting Judge
Luttig’s panel dissent but ultimately deciding the case on grounds other than coercion. Riley,
106 F.3d at 561, 569 (“[I]nterpret[ing] section 1412(1) of IDEA so as not to impose upon
the States the condition that they provide private tutors and other alternative educational
services to handicapped students . . . [the court] need not resolve the Tenth Amendment
issue that is presented upon the contrary reading of the statute.”).
7 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality opinion). Notably, NFIB did not strike down any
provision of the Affordable Care Act, but merely held that an existing statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1396c, constitutionally could not be applied to cut off existing Medicaid funds if states
refused to implement the mandatory Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act. Id.
at 2607 (“In light of the Court’s holding, the Secretary cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw
existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the
expansion. That fully remedies the constitutional violation we have identified.”).
8 301 U.S. 548, 585-93 (1937).
9 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987).
10 See infra Part III.
11 The litigation that culminated in the NFIB decision included dozens of cases and even
more opinions in federal courts. We refer to this litigation collectively as the Healthcare
Cases.
12 The law we commonly refer to as the “Affordable Care Act” was actually two separate
Acts of Congress: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
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mandate’s prospects under the Commerce Clause.13 But a few of us, familiar
with Medicaid, were focused on a much more fundamental challenge to federal
power that threatened not only Medicaid but also a host of other federal
spending programs.14 NFIB presented a prime opportunity for the Roberts

Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.), and the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Public Law 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, which
amended Public Law 111-148. Amendments related to Medicaid are found in three
locations: Title II of Public Law 111-148 (the core provisions); Title X.B of Public Law
111-148 (a later amendment to Title II); and Title I.C of Public Law 111-152 (Medicaid
amendments made in reconciliation).
13 The literature is voluminous, but two works that provide a useful introduction are
EINER ELHAGUE, OBAMACARE ON TRIAL (2012), and Wendy K. Mariner, Leonard H. Glantz
& George J. Annas, Reframing Federalism – The Affordable Care Act (and Broccoli) in the
Supreme Court, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1154 (2012). Two symposia offer an introduction to
the recent legal academic literature on the ACA. Symposium, American Right to Health:
Constitutional, Statutory, and Contractual Healthcare Rights in the United States, 38 AM.
J.L. & MED. 243 (2012); Symposium, Everything But the Merits: Analyzing the Procedural
Aspects of Healthcare Legislation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 691 (2012).
14 Brief of Amici Curiae Health Law & Policy Scholars and Prescription Policy Choices
in Support of Respondents on the Constitutional Validity of the Medicaid Expansion,
Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400)
[hereinafter Health Law Brief]; see also John D. Blum & Gayland O. Hethcoat II, Medicaid
Governance in the Wake of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius:
Finding Federalism’s Middle Pathway, from Administrative Law to State Compacts, 45 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 601 (2012); I. Glenn Cohen & James F. Blumstein, The Constitutionality
of the ACA’s Medicaid-Expansion Mandate, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103 (2012); Charlton C.
Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion,
and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91 (2012); Mark A. Hall, The Factual
Bases for Constitutional Challenges to the Constitutionality of Federal Health Insurance
Reform, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 457 (2011); Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The
Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413
(2008) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle]; Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for
Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Programs,
86 N.C. L. REV. 441 (2008) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Clear Notice]; Nicole Huberfeld,
Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431 (2011) [hereinafter Huberfeld,
Federalizing Medicaid]; Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court:
Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513 (2012)
[hereinafter Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid]; Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical
Federalism: The Role of State Resistance in Health Care Decision-Making, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 73 (2011); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State Challenges
to the Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781 (2012); David G.
Oedel, Health Care Reform, the Spending Clause, and Dole’s Restrictions, 62 MERCER L.
REV. 623 (2011); Kevin Outterson, Briefing for the Supreme Court Cases, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Nov. 14, 2011, 12:48 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/briefi
ng-for-the-supreme-court-cases/. For recent commentary on the NFIB decision, see Michelle
Biddulph & Dwight G. Newman, Comparativist-Structural Approaches to Interpretation of
the Post-Obamacare Spending Power, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2012); James F.
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Court to revive the Rehnquist Court’s “Federalism Revolution”15 in the context
of the Tenth Amendment.
Justice Cardozo long ago warned that enforcing the coercion doctrine would
“plunge the law in[to] endless difficulties.”16 Nevertheless, the Court held that
the expansion of Medicaid to include a new category of beneficiaries17 was
unconstitutionally coercive because the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) could theoretically withdraw all (or part) of
federal Medicaid funding in response to a state’s failure to comply with federal
Medicaid laws.18
Seven Justices, including two liberal members of the Court, held the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion to be an unconstitutionally coercive exercise of the
spending power, the first such holding in the history of the Republic.19 While
these Justices agreed on this result, however, they fractured into a three-vote
plurality authored by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Breyer and
Kagan) and a four-vote joint dissent signed by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito. It was particularly surprising that Justice Kagan, President
Obama’s appointee and former Solicitor General, thought the Medicaid
expansion was unconstitutional.20
In the remedy phase, the Roberts plurality did not strike down any part of
the Affordable Care Act. Instead, the Court held that an existing statute, on the
books for almost eight decades, constitutionally could not be applied to

Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion:
The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, 2011-2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67;
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Affordable Care Act Largely Survives the Supreme Court’s
Scrutiny – But Barely, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1659 (2012); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sara
Rosenbaum, The Supreme Court and the Future of Medicaid, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 983
(2012); Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy M. Westmoreland, The Supreme Court’s Surprising
Decision on the Medicaid Expansion: How Will the Federal Government and States
Proceed?, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1663 (2012); Tonja Jacobi, Strategy and Tactics in NFIB v.
Sebelius (Aug. 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p
apers.cfm?abstract_id=2133045); and Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Five Takes (Aug. 17, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133669).
15 See infra Part III.A; see also Nicole Huberfeld, After the Health Care Ruling:
Medicaid, But Not Medicaid, JURIST (July 27, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/07/nicolehuberfeld-nfib-medicaid.php.
16 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937).
17 See infra Part I.
18 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“What Congress is not free to
do is penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their
existing Medicaid funding.”).
19 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
20 Politics aside, after the tough questions at oral arguments from Justices Kagan and
Breyer, it is indeed surprising that they joined the Roberts plurality on the Medicaid
coercion issue.
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withhold states’ Medicaid funding for failing to implement the Medicaid
expansion.21 Effectively, the Court allowed states to opt in or out of the
expansion22 without jeopardizing their existing Medicaid programs. This
severability holding, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan joined the Chief Justice, saved the Medicaid expansion from the joint
dissent’s preferred disposition to declare the entire ACA unconstitutional. The
Medicaid expansion thus remains in the U.S. Code but states that opt out
cannot be penalized with a reduction in existing Medicaid funds. We will call
this state of affairs the “Red State Option.”23
The Court has now decisively determined that the Tenth Amendment
operates as a limit on Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare when
conditions are placed on states’ acceptance of that spending. NFIB invites a
host of new coercion challenges to federal conditional spending programs, but
the Court has crafted little guidance for lower courts, while complicating
matters by misstating the facts upon which the decision relies. Accordingly, the
resulting difficulties for lower courts attempting to decide coercion challenges,
legislators drafting new conditional spending programs, and federal agencies
administering existing Spending Clause programs are profound. For every
federal spending program since the Great Society, this case signals the
beginning of a new era of litigation challenges.24
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the Affordable Care Act’s
Medicaid expansion in the context of the history and purpose of the Medicaid
Act, paying particular attention to facts about the Medicaid program the Court
misunderstood. Part II summarizes the litigation from the lower courts up to
the NFIB decision, and examines the Medicaid coercion opinions in NFIB in

21

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1396c).
Id. (“[W]e determine, first, that § 1396c is unconstitutional when applied to withdraw
existing Medicaid funds from States that decline to comply with the expansion.”). Chief
Justice Roberts also wrote: “The Court today limits the financial pressure the Secretary may
apply to induce States to accept the terms of the Medicaid expansion. As a practical matter,
that means States may now choose to reject the expansion; that is the whole point.” Id. at
2608.
23 Kevin Outterson, The Scope of the Red State Option, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (July 20,
2012, 1:44 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-scope-of-the-red-state-opt
ion/. Of course, the option is available to any state, but in the current political climate only
“red” states are likely to exercise it.
24 See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, NFIB v. Sebelius, the Spending Clause, and the Future of
Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2013); Frederick M. Hess,
Edu-implications of Yesterday’s Supreme Court Medicaid Ruling, AEIDEAS (June 29, 2012,
1:18 PM), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/06/edu-implications-of-yesterdays-supreme-courtmedicaid-ruling/ (assessing the impact of the Supreme Court’s Medicaid coercion ruling on
federal education funding of state and local educational institutions). But see Andrew B.
Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending Paradox, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
(forthcoming Apr. 2013) (manuscript at 63-66) (predicting that the NFIB spending power
doctrine will be short lived).
22
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detail. Part III first considers NFIB in the context of the Federalism
Revolution,25 and then discusses three weaknesses in the new coercion doctrine
with an eye toward predicting difficulties of application.
These three weaknesses bear brief mention at the outset. First, although
Florida and the other litigating states did not base their Medicaid challenge on
any of the four Dole limits, the Court’s coercion analysis was heavily informed
by two of the four spending principles set forth in Dole.26 Specifically, the
Court considered whether Congress had given sufficiently clear notice of the
condition and whether the condition was sufficiently related, or germane, to the
federal program.
With respect to clear notice for Medicaid expansion, Congress warned the
states from the inception of the Medicaid program that it reserved the “right to
alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the Act.27 This provision of the statute
has troublesome implications for the suggestion that conditional spending
programs be treated as contracts between the federal government and the
states. Congress did not need this language at all because subsequent
Congresses always retain the power to amend legislation. Moreover, a
document with an unlimited unilateral amendment provision is hardly a
contract. The NFIB Court’s failure to give controlling effect to direct language
disclaiming the applicability of contract principles bodes ill for the federal
government’s ability to meet the clear notice standard in future cases.
On the question of relatedness, the germaneness test articulated by the Court
in Dole, the Court determined that the Medicaid expansion was not adequately
related to the pre-ACA Medicaid program. To reach that conclusion, the
Roberts plurality artificially separated the existing Medicaid program from the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion, treating them as two distinct federal programs.
The expansion, per Chief Justice Roberts, was no longer limited to the
“neediest among us” because single and childless adults with incomes below
$15,415, 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL),28 would now qualify for
25

See infra Part III.A.
Formulating what was to become the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of
conditions placed on federal funding, Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized prior caselaw to
create an enumerated test. That four-part test was: (1) spending must be for the general
welfare; (2) conditions must be unambiguous; (3) conditions must be related to federal
goals; and (4) conditions cannot themselves be unconstitutional. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). Aside from these four limits, the Court then noted, “Our
decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by
Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
27 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (originally enacted as Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L.
No. 74-271, § 1104, 49 Stat. 620, 648).
28 The FPL for a single adult in the forty-eight contiguous states in 2012 was $11,170.
After the 5% income disregard, which is allowed by the ACA provisions regarding
calculation of income eligibility, the 133% standard effectively becomes 138%, which was
used to calculate this number. For discussion of the income-disregard provisions of the
26
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assistance. If relatedness becomes a meaningful element of a coercion claim,
one can imagine a host of federal programs that would be vulnerable to similar
challenges.29
Second, both the Roberts plurality and the joint dissent expressly declined to
articulate any test or rubric for deciding whether a Spending Clause program
crosses the coercion line. Instead, the Roberts plurality and the joint dissent
offered slogans, suggesting that a federal condition is unconstitutionally
coercive if it is a “gun to the head,” “conscripts states,” or is “economic
dragooning.”30 Those formulations are conspicuously fact specific and provide
little guidance to future courts and litigants. Moreover, the Court’s conclusion
that the Medicaid expansion qualifies under all three formulations transforms
what earlier Courts had called difficult political choices into unconstitutionally
coercive conditions. So transformed, the Court effectively forbids certain
arrangements between the federal government and states.31 When considering
this weakness in depth, we also evaluate the various statistical indicia of
coercion, the role of political accountability, and “coercion in fact.”32
Third, in the remedy phase, the Roberts plurality forbade the Secretary from
using § 1396c of the Medicaid Act as codified33 to cut off existing Medicaid
funding, effectively making the Medicaid expansion optional for states.34 It
ACA, see infra note 55.
29 See infra Part III.B.1.
30 See infra Part III.B.2.c.
31 By way of analogy, consider common law courts’ refusals to enforce certain contracts
when parties are deemed to possess unequal bargaining power and the nature of the contract
is particularly important for personal safety or the public interest, among other factors. See,
e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 441-42 (Cal. 1963) (refusing to
enforce a charity hospital’s exculpatory clause, signed by patient upon admission to the
emergency room).
32 See infra Part III.B.2. Glenn Cohen analyzed NFIB’s coercion doctrine from the
perspective of ethics, concluding that states had not been coerced. I. Glenn Cohen,
Conscientious Objection, Coercion, the Affordable Care Act, and U.S. States, 20 ETHICAL
PERSP. (forthcoming Mar. 2013) (manuscript at 16-17) (on file with authors) (describing the
NFIB opinion as containing an unsophisticated philosophical analysis and constituting an
example of “personification confusion,” improperly treating states like individual persons
for the purposes of coercion analysis).
33 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006) (originally enacted as Social Security Amendments of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 351).
34 Another way to think about the remedy is that the Medicaid expansion has become an
unenforceable mandate. See E-mail from Sara Rosenbaum, Professor of Health Law &
Policy, George Washington Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health & Health Servs., to Nicole Huberfeld,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Kentucky Coll. of Law (Aug. 16, 2012) (on file with authors).
The characterization of mandatory-but-unenforceable versus optional, while not key to the
constitutional analysis of the case, may be very important for understanding how HHS will
approach implementation of the expansion. This is because “mandatory” and “optional” are
terms of art for the Medicaid program, indicating certain degrees of flexibility and
sometimes negotiating leeway for HHS.
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remains to be seen whether future decisions will, under the guise of the Tenth
Amendment, similarly invoke a narrow severance remedy to reformulate
existing conditional spending programs into optional state programs. The
remedy, although effective in terms of salvaging the ACA from being struck
down in its entirety, presents a host of unanticipated challenges and future
questions.35 If the Medicaid coercion was something of a sleeper issue, the
question of coercion severability was almost entirely off the radar – barely
raised and thinly briefed before the Court. Any attention the argument received
was largely due to the political instincts of the Chief Justice and a key
concession at the end of oral arguments by Mr. Clement, counsel for the States.
But our analysis in Part III concludes that perhaps the Red State Option is
exactly what sound principles of constitutional federalism require, a solution
uniquely crafted for Tenth Amendment coercion cases.
Finally, in Part IV, we examine the post-NFIB struggles to administer the
Medicaid expansion, including challenges to the “maintenance-of-effort”
requirements and the question of the legality of tax credits in federally created
exchanges. This historic decision undoubtedly will continue to surprise.
I.

MEDICAID EXPANSION UNDER THE ACA

To appreciate the congressional design underlying the Medicaid expansion
and the Court’s factual missteps in NFIB, background on the Medicaid
program is necessary. The Medicaid Act is one part of the Social Security Act
(SSA), a venerable and notoriously complex statute, which “is among the most
intricate ever drafted by Congress. Its byzantine construction . . . makes the
Act ‘almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.’”36 The SSA is both intricate and
interconnected: “Medicare and Medicaid are enormously complicated
programs. The system is a web; a tug at one strand pulls on every other.”37
Judicial confusion over government healthcare programs is notorious.38
Even the Supreme Court can fall victim to the challenge of fully grasping
the intricacies of federal healthcare legislation. This Part will demonstrate how
the Roberts plurality mischaracterized the Medicaid expansion and failed to
appreciate several fundamental features of the program. To the ACA drafters,
the Medicaid expansion was a philosophically significant but statutorily
35

See infra Part III.B.3.
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547
F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also id. at 43 n.14 (“The District Court in [Friedman]
described the Medicaid statute as ‘an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant
to attempts to understand it.’” (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1226
(S.D.N.Y. 1976))).
37 Stephenson v. Shalala, 87 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1996).
38 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 19:11, Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research
Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_8
3_276. During these oral arguments, one Justice infamously said: “Suppose there were a
provision in the Medicaid or Medicare Act, I get the two of them confused . . . .” Id.
36
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incrementalist amendment to the existing program. To the Roberts plurality, it
was “a shift in kind, not merely degree,”39 transforming Medicaid into
something that “is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us.”40
This suggested distinction matters greatly in the decision itself and the
discussion of coercion in Part III. By providing history and context for both the
ACA and Medicaid, this Article illuminates that the Medicaid expansion was
not a dramatic “shift in kind” but instead fits comfortably into familiar patterns
of prior amendments to Medicaid.
A.

The ACA’s Path to Expanding Coverage

Due to public preferences and political realities, the ACA did not radically
overhaul the U.S. healthcare system. Single-payer health care was never on the
table, and the so-called “public option” received only nominal consideration.41
Instead, the ACA built upon the United States’ existing path-dependent,
public-private healthcare system, which is premised on the assumption that at
least some individuals should not be left to fend for themselves in the private
market for health care. Resulting forms of government assistance and
beneficiaries have evolved through often-contentious debate over many
decades. The ACA’s expansion of Medicaid eligibility and other government
subsidies, as well as its creation of premium-assistance tax credits and health
insurance exchanges, are the latest iterations.
Before the ACA was enacted, roughly 16% of the U.S. population was
uninsured.42 Close to half the country, 49%, was covered by employersponsored health insurance, and about one-third was covered by publicbenefits programs, primarily Medicare (12%) and Medicaid (17%).43 Only 5%
was insured in the private, non-group health insurance market.44 From that

39

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2606.
41 See generally M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 389, 443 (2009) (discussing the possibility of single-payer or public-option
approaches); James Brasfield, The Politics of Ideas: Where Did the Public Option Come
from and Where Is It Going?, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 455, 457-58 (2011); Brendan
S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1750 (2011) (“In
America, the current political environment suggests no epic expansion of the [healthcare]
benefit as entitlement approach is in the foreseeable future.”); N. Gregory Mankiw, The
Pitfalls of the Public Option, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at BU5; The End of Private Health
Insurance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at A14.
42 Fast Facts: Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S., 2010, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://
facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=477 (last visited Oct. 8, 2012); see also CARMAN DENAVASWALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-239, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 23 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf.
43 Fast Facts: Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S., 2010, supra note 42.
44 Id.
40
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baseline, the ACA sought to close the gap by increasing each of the other
pieces of the pie: employer-based health insurance; private, non-group health
insurance; and public health insurance programs.
The biggest piece of the pie is employer-based health insurance. In a nod to
behavioral economics, the ACA implements default-enrollment requirements
for large employers,45 meaning that employees are automatically enrolled in an
employer-based plan and must actively opt out. Large employers also are
subject to limited penalties for failing to provide affordable health plans to
employees.46 The ACA offers generous tax credits to small employers to
encourage them to offer health insurance to employees47 and creates a new
Small Business Health Options Program.48
Strategies to expand coverage in the private, individual health insurance
market include health insurance exchanges, the Minimum Coverage Provision
(the individual mandate), and insurance-underwriting reforms. Lacking the
advantages of large risk pools, individual health insurance plans have long
been more difficult and expensive to obtain.49 The ACA addresses known
dysfunctions in the individual health insurance market by prohibiting preexisting condition exclusions50 and discriminatory pricing based on health
status.51 The minimum essential coverage provision52 and the exchanges53
support those reforms by expanding risk pools and minimizing medical
underwriting.54 Those provisions simultaneously create strong incentives for
45

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1511, 29 U.S.C. § 218a (Supp. IV 2011)
(applying to employers with more than 200 full-time employees).
46 Id. § 1513(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4980(H)(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2011)).
These penalties are applicable to employers with fifty-one or more full-time equivalent
employees. Id.
47 Id. § 1421 (codified at I.R.C. § 45R(g)). A small employer is defined as an employer
with “no more than 25 full-time equivalent employees for the taxable year.” Id. (codified at
I.R.C. § 45R(d)(1)).
48 Id. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2011)).
49 See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 51-53 (2010); Amy B. Monahan,
Health Insurance Risk Pooling and Social Solidarity: A Response to Professor David
Hyman, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 325, 327-28 (2008).
50 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-3).
51 Id. § 2701 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Prescription
Policy Choices et al. in Support of Petitioners on the Minimum Coverage Provision, Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) (describing the
ACA’s approach to addressing dysfunctions in the existing health insurance system).
52 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A
(Supp. IV 2011)).
53 Id. § 1311 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
54 See generally Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011); Mark A. Hall, The
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individuals to purchase health insurance and prohibit insurers from refusing to
cover or charging higher premiums to perceived high-risk individuals.
The ACA also expands public insurance, primarily through Medicaid. After
the expansion, all citizens and legal residents earning below 133%55 FPL are
now eligible for Medicaid.56 This approach won out over other proposals,
including raising Medicaid eligibility to 150% FPL,57 offering a public option
in the health insurance exchanges,58 and providing tax subsidies for all lowincome, uninsured individuals to purchase private health insurance.59 The
policy compromise was based on the idea that extremely low-income
Americans should be provided public health insurance while slightly less
impoverished individuals should be given federal tax credits to support private
purchasing in the exchanges.60

Three Types of Reinsurance Created by Federal Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1168
(2010).
55 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C §
1396a). The original language established an income threshold of 133%, but that was
effectively increased to 138% through a 5% income disregard in section 1004(e) of the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1004(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14) (originally enacted as
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2002(a)) (adding to the Social Security Act a
provision requiring a 5% income disregard for certain qualified individuals); see also
Medicaid Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 77 Fed.
Reg. 17,144, 17,146 (Mar. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 457); Sara
Rosenbaum, A “Customary and Necessary” Program – Medicaid and Health Care Reform,
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1952, 1953 (2010) (citing Congressional Budget Office estimates
that the new income-calculation methods will effectively raise the Medicaid eligibility
threshold to 138% FPL). We use 133% because that is the language of the statute, even
though the practical effect of the income disregard is to raise the standard to 138%.
56 This equates to an annual income of $31,809 for a family of four after the 5% income
disregard. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4035
(Jan. 26, 2012) (stating that the 2012 poverty guidelines for the forty-eight contiguous states
and the District of Columbia is $23,050 for a family of four).
57 JOHN HOLAHAN, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, ALTERNATIVES FOR
FINANCING MEDICAID EXPANSIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 3 (2009), available at http://www.kff
.org/healthreform/upload/8029.pdf.
58
Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Reject Pair of Public Option Proposals, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/health/policy/30health.html.
59 See Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Rethinking Medicaid in the New
Normal, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 127, 130 & n.18 (2011) (suggesting that a
proposal to cover all low-income adults through the exchanges was rejected because the
federal government would have assumed the full cost, as compared to Medicaid, under
which states and the federal government share the cost); see also Leighton Ku & Matthew
Broaddus, Public and Private Health Insurance: Stacking Up the Costs, 27 HEALTH AFF.
w318, w318 (2008).
60 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1401, 10105 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 36B (Supp. IV 2011)) (providing premium assistance tax credits for the purchase
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The Medicaid Program
1.

Medicaid and the “Deserving” Poor

Medicaid has historically provided health insurance coverage to the
“deserving” poor,61 including women (widows in particular) and their children,
the blind, the disabled, and impoverished elderly.62 This normative
classification, derived from the Elizabethan Poor Laws, was expressed in state
welfare policies deeming the working poor and those considered “blameless”
in their poverty to be deserving of assistance, while the non-working poor, or
paupers, were not.63
The SSA of 1935 provided the statutory basis for both Medicare and
Medicaid.64 As part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, the SSA
effectively codified the historical categories of deserving poor, deeming them
eligible for government assistance through income-security payments.65 With
of qualified health plans).
61 See Sara Rosenbaum, Anne Markus & Colleen Sonosky, Public Health Insurance
Design for Children: The Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL
L. 1, 7-8 (2004); Sandra Tanenbaum, Medicaid Eligibility Policy in the 1980s: Medical
Utilitarianism and the “Deserving” Poor, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 933, 933-34
(1995).
62 The very concept of the “deserving” poor is contested as racialized. See KHIARA M.
BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF
RACIALIZATION 212-20 (2011). Despite criticism of the category, it is common in Medicaid.
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 80 (2003) (listing the beneficiaries of federal
and state public-assistance programs); ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE
MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 6-7 (1974) (identifying traditional
groups that were the target of special-assistance programs during the early twentieth
century); Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 439 (“Certain categories of
blameless or ‘deserving’ poor have been assisted by local, state, or federal government since
the turn of the twentieth century and consistently have included women (widows) and their
children, the blind, the disabled, and impoverished elderly.”); Rosenbaum, Markus &
Sonosky, supra note 61, at 8-10 (discussing Medicaid’s coverage of low-income children
and pregnant women).
63 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 62, at 11 (describing the clear division between
contributing work-related social insurance to workers and giving to the “poor”); Huberfeld,
Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 439 (“Starting in the colonial period, states
provided various forms of welfare assistance to so-called deserving poor based upon that
state’s colonial policy as adopted from Elizabethan Poor Laws.”).
64 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 441; Elizabeth A. Weeks,
Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform: The Medicare Part D “Clawback”
Example, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 83-84 (2007) (“Congress enacted
Medicaid at the same time as Medicare, intending Medicaid to be a welfare program to
provide healthcare to the needy, including individuals impoverished by staggeringly high
medical expenses.”).
65 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 441 (“The SSA adopted and
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the exception of limited, open-ended federal grants to states,66 however,
Roosevelt put the goal of government health insurance aside due to political
objections, including widespread fear of socialized medicine and fragile
political support for other reforms built into the SSA.67 Health care was not
added to the SSA until the 1960s.68
After 1935 there were modest expansions of public assistance for health
care, focused on hospital infrastructure, provider payments, and ensuring care
for especially deserving groups, including the very elderly.69 During the 1950s
the elderly poor exercised more political power and pushed for health
insurance benefits mirroring the workers’ insurance program in the SSA.70
Those efforts resulted in the Kerr-Mills Act, a 1960 amendment to the SSA
designed to assist the impoverished elderly71 by supporting existing state
programs through a limited federal grant-in-aid program.72
In 1965, Congress enacted comprehensive, fully federal health insurance for
the elderly in the form of Medicare.73 Unlike Medicare, Medicaid was almost
codified states’ categories of deserving poor into federal law by protecting the elderly,
children, widows and widowers, blind, those otherwise disabled, and the unemployed
through income security.”).
66
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 270 (1982);
Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 442.
67 See STARR, supra note 66, at 266-69; Robert I. Field,
Regulation, Reform and the
Creation of Free Market Health Care, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 301, 308 (2011)
(“When he proposed Social Security in 1935, Roosevelt chose to leave health insurance out
because of its political sensitivity. . . . [The Roosevelt] saw a threat that charges of
socialized medicine would be resurrected, which could paint the entire package as too
radical for the public to accept.”).
68 See STARR, supra note 66, at 371.
69 JOST, supra note 62, at 80 (discussing the birth and growth of public assistance
healthcare programs in the 1950s and 1960s); STARR, supra note 66, at 270-71 (describing
limited government healthcare programs, including poor farmer subsidies); Huberfeld,
Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 443; see also, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (expanding the FDA’s regulatory
role); Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040
(funding new hospital construction and expansion).
70 See Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 443 (“While the elderly
pushed for health insurance benefits that would mirror the SSA workers’ insurance program,
a political willingness to assist impoverished (if not all) elderly emerged and became the
program that immediately preceded Medicaid, referred to as Kerr-Mills.”).
71 Kerr-Mills Act, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 601, 74 Stat. 924, 987-91 (1960) (providing
federal assistance to the very poor elderly); see also JOST, supra note 62, at 81 (explaining
how the Social Security Act Amendments of 1960 created the Kerr-Mills program and its
expanded coverage of the “medically needy”).
72 See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 27-30 (2d ed. 2000)
(describing limited government assistance under the Kerr-Mills Act); STARR, supra note 66,
at 368-69.
73 See Weeks, supra note 64, at 83.
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an afterthought74 and, essentially, designed to extend the existing Kerr-Mills
program.75 Congress created Medicaid as a means-tested welfare program,76
offering unlimited federal funding to the states so long as they complied with
broad federal requirements under the Medicaid Act.77 The carrot was the offer
of federal funds; the stick was § 1396c, permitting the Secretary to limit some
or all Medicaid funds if a state failed to comply with conditions imposed by
federal law.78 Medicaid was well received by the states, with the vast majority
electing to participate within a few years.79 Today, every state operates a
Medicaid program supported by federal matching dollars.
Medicaid is a paradigmatic cooperative-federalism program,80 which is one
reason the NFIB decision is so troubling. Financial contributions by both the
states and the federal government provide the “cornerstone of Medicaid.”81
74

See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 62, at 47-51 (describing Medicaid as “illdesigned” compared to Medicare).
75 Id. at 51 (“[T]he section of the Senate report dealing with Title XIX was entitled,
‘Improvement and Extension of Kerr-Mills Medical Assistance Program.”’); Sara
Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 9-10 (2006) (“An outgrowth of the
earlier Kerr Mills grant-in-aid program, which assisted states in meeting the health care
costs of the elderly poor, Medicaid reflected Congress’s decision to ‘liberalize and extend’
this system of federal grants to states for specific health care purposes.”).
76 STARR, supra note 66, at 369 (describing how President Johnson signed three
programs into law: first, “the Democratic plan for a compulsory hospital insurance program
under Social Security” which is now Part A of Medicare; second, “the revised Republican
program of government-subsidized voluntary insurance to cover physicians’ bills” which is
now Part B of Medicare; and third, Medicaid, which “expanded assistance to the states for
medical care for the poor”); see also Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981)
(describing the enactment of the Medicaid program); Brogan v. Miller, 537 F. Supp. 139,
142 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 61, at 7-8 (characterizing
Medicaid as “an afterthought to Medicare, and a relegation to states of responsibility for
insuring the poor” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77 Efforts to metamorphose Medicaid into a capped block grant have failed. See, e.g.,
Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program: An Analysis of the
Implications of Past Proposals, 83 MILBANK Q. 41, 46-47 (2005) (outlining the efforts of
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and President George W. Bush, among others, to make
a capped block grant part of federal Medicaid funding).
78 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006) (originally enacted as Social Security Amendments of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 351).
79 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 445 n.69 (“Arizona and Alaska
were holdouts, with Arizona joining Medicaid in 1982 and Alaska joining in 1972.”).
80 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Medicaid is a prototypical example of federal-state cooperation in
serving the Nation’s general welfare.”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (stating
that Medicaid fosters cooperative federalism and describing the program); Huberfeld,
Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 14, at 419; Weeks, supra note 64, at 114.
81 Harris, 448 U.S. at 308 (“The cornerstone of Medicaid is financial contribution by
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Through a federal offer of open-ended matching funds, states are incentivized
to provide generous public benefits, receiving additional federal financial
support for every state dollar spent.82 Medicaid is entirely voluntary for
states.83 They do not have to participate and could refuse federal dollars,
establish their own indigent healthcare programs, or elect not to provide any
medical assistance for low-income individuals.84
As originally enacted, Medicaid targeted the now-familiar categories of
deserving poor.85 The groups originally entitled to Medicaid were elderly,
blind, and otherwise disabled persons receiving welfare under federal cashassistance programs, and dependent children and their caretaker relatives
receiving assistance through Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC).86 The goal expressed in 1965 was to provide a broad package of
medical assistance to these categories of individuals whose incomes were
“insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.”87 Congress later
replaced the cash-assistance programs for disabled adults and children and the
impoverished elderly with Supplemental Security Income (SSI); but these
groups continued to qualify for Medicaid on the basis of SSI eligibility.88
Congress also later replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) but retained the historical AFDC eligibility requirements for
Medicaid.89 Prior to the enactment of the ACA, Medicaid covered seven
discrete categories of individuals.90 The ACA added an eighth category: all

both the Federal Government and the participating State.”).
82 Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to
Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 134-35 (2010); see also Abigail R.
Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice
Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 861-64 (2009).
83 Harris, 448 U.S. at 301 (“Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely
optional, once a State elects to participate, it must comply with the requirements of [the
Medicaid Act].”).
84 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 857, 860 (1990). Both the Roberts plurality
and the joint dissent discounted the political ability of states to realistically take these
actions. See infra Part III.B.2.
85 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 445-46 (explaining that the
Medicaid Act originally covered medically indigent individuals who fell within a traditional
“welfare category”).
86 SARA ROSENBAUM & DAVID M. FRANKFORD, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 503 (2d ed. 2012).
87 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 343-44
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006)) (adding § 1901 to the Social Security Act
of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620).
88 ROSENBAUM & FRANKFORD, supra note 86, at 503.
89 Id. at 503 n.*.
90 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)-(VII).
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citizens and legal residents with incomes up to 133% FPL who are not
otherwise eligible through another mandatory Medicaid category.91
2.

The Scope of Medicaid Benefits and Coverage Prior to the ACA

Beyond the broad statutory outlines, states have considerable discretion over
Medicaid eligibility requirements and program benefits.92 States can expand
beyond the mandatory groups and services93 and will receive unlimited federal
matching dollars for those optional elements of their programs.94 To receive
federal funding, states must submit to the Secretary of HHS a “State Plan,”
which explains how the state will comply with the Medicaid Act.95 Once the
State Plan is in place, states administer Medicaid with little federal oversight.96
If the Secretary determines, after reasonable notice and opportunity for
hearing, that a State Plan has fallen out of compliance with federal
requirements, the Secretary has discretion under § 1396c to withhold federal
funding due to the noncompliance until the plan is corrected.97 Typically, the
Secretary negotiates a correction plan. Not once in the nearly fifty-year history
of the program has the federal government withdrawn all federal funding from
a noncompliant state.98 Section 1396c, which figures prominently in the NFIB
decision, has been present in the Medicaid Act since its inception.99

91

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. IV 2011)). A ninth category was also added by the ACA,
effective in 2019, covering children leaving foster care. Id. § 10201(a)(1) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(IX)(cc)).
92 See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981) (describing “categorically”
and “medically” needy beneficiaries); Kinney, supra note 84, at 857 (“Because states have
great flexibility . . . the Medicaid program is really 50 very different programs serving
different populations and providing different benefits.”); Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 1213 (describing Medicaid eligibility and coverage); Weeks, supra note 64, at 84 (“As long as
states comply with certain broad federal requirements, they receive federal matching dollars
to support their state Medicaid programs.”).
93 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (2006). Additional services also can qualify for
matching funds. See id. § 1396d(a) (defining services that qualify as “medical assistance”
and can therefore receive funding).
94 Id. §§ 1396b(a)(1), 1396d(b) (setting out a formula for calculating the amount of
federal matching funds due to a state for medical-assistance expenditures without including
a specific monetary cap or maximum expenditure).
95 Id. § 1396a(a) (defining compliance requirements necessary to create and run a State
Plan); Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 447 (discussing how State Plans
are administered with little federal oversight, despite the federal government paying a large
portion of the plans’ administrative costs).
96 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 447.
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (giving the HHS Secretary the ability, after appropriate notice
and hearing procedures, to cease making payments to a state “until the Secretary is satisfied
that there will no longer be any such failure to comply [with 1396a(a)’s requirements]”).
98 For this reason, the Health Law Brief argued that the states’ question was not ripe, but
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Each dollar a state spends on federally approved Medicaid programs,
whether required or optional, is matched by federal funds.100 The basic federal
match ranges from 50% to almost 75%, based on the amount of money the
state spends on Medicaid and the state’s per capita income, with poorer states
receiving a more generous match.101 In addition, states receive a federal match
of at least 50% for administrative costs.102
Prior to the ACA, State Plans were required to cover seven groups
(collectively, the “categorically needy”) modeled on the traditional deserving
poor who earn less than specified amounts.103 States could also extend benefits
to “optional categorically needy” beneficiaries.104 States could further elect to
cover the “medically needy,” meaning individuals who are categorically
eligible (aged, disabled, blind, or families with dependent children) and who
have high medical expenses despite enjoying incomes in excess of the financial
eligibility levels,.105 Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia currently
cover these optional groups.106

the Court did not accept that view. Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 21 (“Petitioners’ fear
of total funding loss . . . is not cognizable, as the Secretary has never exercised this power in
forty-seven years of Medicaid administration.”).
99 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 351. The
language derives from section 4 of the original SSA. See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub.
L. 74-271, § 4, 49 Stat. 620, 622 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 304).
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (listing the percentage of state spending that the federal
government will match, depending on the type of expenditure); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 308 (1980) (describing the “cooperative federalism” approach enacted in order “to
provide federal financial assistance for all legitimate state expenditures under an approved
Medicaid plan”).
101 Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage (FMAP) calculations are published in the
Federal Register each year. See, e.g., Adjusted Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
(FMAP) Rate for the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11), 76 Fed. Reg. 5811, 5812-13
(Feb. 2, 2011) (calculating the adjusted FMAP for the first quarter of fiscal year 2011).
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(2)(B).
103 Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).
104 Recipients considered “categorically needy” include certain children in foster or
adoptive homes, pregnant women, and certain gainfully employed individuals with
disabilities. 42 C.F.R. § 435.201 (2011) (covering pregnant women and blind, aged, or
disabled persons); id. § 435.227 (covering adoptive and foster-care children). In 2000
Medicaid coverage was also extended to certain low-income women screened for breast and
cervical cancer under a federal early detection program as an “optional categorically needy
group.” Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention Treatment Act of 2000 § 2, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396(aa), 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 410.34(b), 410.56(a).
105 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C).
106 Income Eligibility Requirements Including Income Limits and Asset Limits for the
Medically Needy in Medicaid, 2009, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.statehealthfacts.org/c
omparereport.jsp?rep=60&cat=4 (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
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Nationwide, children represent close to 50% of the total Medicaid
enrollment.107 The elderly and disabled comprise 25%,108 and the remaining
approximately 25% are non-elderly, non-disabled adults, usually caretakers of
covered children.109 Before the ACA’s passage, the income eligibility tests
varied among categories (based on federal requirements) and states (based on
states’ optional coverage). For example, pregnant women were required to be
covered up to 133% FPL, and states could opt to cover them at higher income
levels.110 Federal law did not require states to cover non-pregnant caretakers or
childless adults, but states could opt to do so, typically up to a much lower
percentage of FPL. Children ages zero to five had to be covered up to 133%
FPL, while children ages six to eighteen had to be covered only up to 100%
FPL.111 States could opt to cover higher-income children, often in combination
with the separate federal block grant Children’s Health Insurance Program.112
Medicaid coverage is also limited to citizens and qualified aliens (with a
limited exception for emergencies).113
Once a state decides which groups will be eligible, it must determine which
services it will provide. The Medicaid Act mandates the provision of seven
forms of medical services, including inpatient hospital, outpatient hospital,
laboratory and x-ray, nursing-facility, physician, nurse-midwife, and nurse-

107

Distribution of Medicaid Enrollees by Enrollment Group, FY2009, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=200&cat=4&sub=52&yr=90
&typ=2 (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (reporting that, as of fiscal year 2009, children
represented forty-nine percent of Medicaid enrollees nationwide).
108 Id.
109 Id. (stating that adults constituted twenty-six percent of Medicaid enrollees in fiscal
year 2009).
110 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(III)-(V), (l)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (requiring coverage for
pregnant women at or below 133% FPL, but giving states discretion to fund coverage up to
185% FPL).
111 See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) § 302, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i), (l); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 4601, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(l)(1)(D), (2)(C) (establishing coverage for children between six and nineteen years of
age, up to 100% FPL).
112 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b), (u)(1) (allowing for the “optional use of state child health
assistance funds” as part of an “enhanced Medicaid match” for low-income children); id. §§
1397aa-jj (adding Title XXI to the SSA, thereby establishing the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP)). See generally Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 61
(discussing the similarities and differences between Medicaid and SCHIP as dual programs
targeting the health care of low-income children).
113 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (stating that payment will be made for care of aliens only
for emergency services); see also Sana Loue, Access to Health Care and the Undocumented
Alien, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 288-89 (1992).
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practitioner services.114 States may also elect to cover “optional” services,
including such fundamental items as dental care and prescription drugs.115
Moreover, the state may not deny services solely because of a beneficiary’s
diagnosis, illness, or condition.116 Beneficiaries are entitled to relatively
prompt services with no waiting periods.117 Healthcare providers are not
required to participate in the Medicaid program, but states are required to
provide reimbursement sufficient to ensure provider participation equal to nonMedicaid patients in the geographic area.118 This “equal access” provision was
also at stake during the Court’s 2011 Term in Douglas v. Independent Living
Center of Southern California, Inc., in which the Court declined to decide a
Supremacy Clause challenge to a state Medicaid reimbursement
methodology.119
C.

Previous Medicaid Expansions

Medicaid has never been a static program.120 Congress has repeatedly
expanded Medicaid with both mandatory and optional features,121 often as part

114

42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i), 1396d(a)(1)-(5).
Id. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)-(ii), 1396d(a) (listing twenty-eight categories of medical
assistance and mandating coverage for seven of those categories, while allowing states the
option of covering some or all of the additional twenty-one).
116 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (2011) (“The Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or
reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible
recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”).
117 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (requiring that State Plans provide “all individuals wishing to
make application for medical assistance under the plan [the] opportunity to do so,” and
ensure “such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals”); Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 12 (“Unlike private health insurance, Medicaid
contains no pre-existing condition exclusions and no waiting periods.”).
118 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (requiring states to adopt reimbursement procedures
“sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan
at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area”).
119 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207-08 (2012);
Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid, supra note 14, at 515-27, 534 (discussing the Douglas
decision and juxtaposing it with Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.).
120 Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 635, 635 (2002) (“Over the years
Medicaid has served as the legislative vehicle for an extraordinary range of reforms . . . .”);
Sidney D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: Consumer-Directed Medicaid and CostShifting to Patients, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 403, 405 (2007) (“Medicaid has grown to finance
an astonishing range of safety net health insurance expansions, public health initiatives, and
state health reform initiatives.”).
121 Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments, 1965-2009, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://
www.kff.org/medicaid/medicaid_timeline.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (providing an
interactive timeline tracking Medicaid’s expansion over time); see also Rosenbaum, supra
note 75, at 18-19.
115
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of broader policy initiatives.122 The NFIB plurality fundamentally
misunderstood this history, leading it to overemphasize discontinuities between
the existing Medicaid program and the Medicaid expansion. The plurality
artificially split Medicaid into two programs: old and new. It was then a short
step to find that the condition linking those “two” programs was coercive. In
addition, the NFIB plurality minimized consideration of the previous
mandatory amendments to Medicaid, leaving open the question of why
mandatory amendments in 1967, 1972, 1988, and 2003 were not also coercive.
In each case, all Medicaid funding for non-cooperating states was theoretically
at risk under § 1396c.
Only two years after Medicaid was enacted, Congress expanded the program
to address nationwide concerns regarding children’s health, including rampant
poor health among preschool children and young draftees persistently failing
Army physical exams.123 Congress enacted a suite of reforms124 that included a
dramatic expansion of mandatory Medicaid coverage requirements, including
Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT). EPSDT is a
set of services and benefits for Medicaid beneficiaries under age twenty-one.125
EPSDT expanded coverage for children to a level unparalleled in public or
private health insurance at the time.126 Since 1967 Congress has strengthened
EPSDT several times, sometimes over states’ political objections.127 In keeping

122

Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 17-18 (explaining, for example, Congress’s use of
Medicaid expansions to address healthcare access for displaced persons after Hurricane
Katrina and to ensure the community integration aims of the Americans with Disabilities
Act).
123 SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH &
HEALTH SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH POL’Y, NATIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. CHILD HEALTH
POLICY: THE ORIGINS AND CONTINUING ROLE OF MEDICAID AND EPSDT 6-11 (2005),
available at http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/chpr/downloads/mil_pr
ep042605.pdf.
124 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, §§ 301-302, 81 Stat.
821, 921-29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-731, 1396d (2006)) (implementing a
major expansion of Medicaid coverage concerning the healthcare needs of children under
twenty-one, including early screening and prevention measures to ensure continued health).
125 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (requiring “early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and
treatment services” for youth, including physicals and vision, dental, and hearing tests); see
also Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433-34 (2004) (describing the purpose of the EPSDT
program).
126 Sara Rosenbaum & Paul H. Wise, Crossing the Medicaid-Private Insurance Divide:
The Case of EPSDT, 26 HEALTH AFF. 382, 383-84 (2007) (describing the “importance,
power, and breadth” of the EPSDT program in ensuring the availability of diagnostic,
“developmental, and ameliorative services” for children).
127 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6403(a),
103 Stat. 2106, 2262-63 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)) (delineating further the scope of
EPSDT benefits, including an express mandate that states cover “[s]uch other necessary
health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures . . . to correct or ameliorate
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with general practice, continued Medicaid funding for states was conditioned
on compliance with the new EPSDT requirements.
In 1972 Congress again amended Medicaid coverage requirements to reflect
a change in traditional eligibility categories. With these amendments, Congress
ended the federal-state cooperative welfare program for the aged, blind, and
disabled, and replaced it with federal SSI.128 Accordingly, Congress revised
Medicaid and required states to either extend Medicaid to all individuals
eligible for SSI or, under the “209(b) option,” allow those with incomes above
the prior program’s eligibility limits to qualify for Medicaid by deducting
medical expenses from income.129 Although the 1972 Amendments gave states
two options to comply with the new national policy, Congress did not afford
states the option to forgo the Medicaid expansion entirely.130 By all
appearances, the NFIB Court misunderstood this point. In oral arguments,
when Mr. Clement, counsel for the States, incorrectly suggested the 1972
Amendments were “totally voluntary” and did not put existing funds at risk,
neither the Court nor Solicitor General Verrilli corrected his error.131 In the
Roberts plurality opinion, the 1972 Amendments are misleadingly described as
“extending Medicaid eligibility, but partly conditioning only the new
defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening
services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan”); Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6044(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 4, 88 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7) (requiring states to preserve EPSDT coverage in benchmark
packages); Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-3, § 611, 123 Stat. 8, 100 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7) (clarifying the
requirement to provide EPSDT in benchmark packages); Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2201, 124 Stat. 119, 289-90 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396w-3 (Supp. IV 2011)) (preserving EPSDT as part of the newly reconfigured
benchmarks); Alice Sardell & Kay Johnson, The Politics of EPSDT Policy in the 1990s:
Policy Entrepreneurs, Political Streams, and Children’s Health Benefits, 76 MILBANK Q.
175, 186, 190-92, 197-98 (1998) (cataloging states’ expressions of concern during EPSDT
expansions and explaining the National Governors Association’s strong opposition to
EPSDT as an infringement of state autonomy).
128 Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 201, 301, 86 Stat.
1329, 1370, 1465 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
129 Id. § 209(b) (allowing for the calculation of income-based eligibility after the
subtraction of medical expenses); id. § 301, amended by Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-66, § 212, 87 Stat. 152, 155-58 (defining mandatory SSI coverage); Brief for
Respondents (Medicaid) at 5-6, Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-400) (explaining how previous Medicaid amendments mandated that states
either expand SSI coverage or enact the “209(b) option”).
130 Brief of National Health Law Program et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents (Suggesting Affirmance on the Medicaid Issue) at 14-15, Florida v. HHS, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-400) [hereinafter National Health Law Brief] (rejecting the argument
that the 1972 SSA amendments gave the states a “take-it-if-you-want-it option” because
even states choosing not to adopt the SSI expansion had to comply with section 209(b)).
131 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Florida v. HHS, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-400).
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funding.”132 The 1972 Amendments did not impose conditions only on “new
funding”; both old and new funding were at risk. The only unique feature of
the 1972 reform was that it gave states the additional option of complying
through section 209(b).133
Further reforms came in 1988, when Congress completely delinked
Medicaid eligibility for children and pregnant women from AFDC (later
renamed TANF).134 Instead, Congress created uniform mandatory eligibility
categories: up to 133% FPL for pregnant woman and children from birth to age
five, and up to 100% FPL for children ages six to eighteen.135 These reforms
greatly expanded the number of persons eligible for Medicaid. Again,
Congress did not offer states a choice about whether to extend coverage; it
became a condition of continued participation in the Medicaid program.
Congress added another significant mandatory requirement in 2003, as part
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003 (MMA).136 The MMA created coverage for outpatient prescription drugs
in the Medicare program, called Medicare Part D.137 The MMA was a response
to the urgent need to extend affordable prescription-drug coverage to Medicare
beneficiaries, including 8.9 million individuals covered by both Medicare and
Medicaid (dual eligibles).138 At the time, all fifty states provided outpatient
132 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) (plurality opinion). This is not the only example
of the Court getting it wrong when engaging in appellate-court factfinding. See Brianne J.
Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1,
25-37 (2011).
133 See Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 4-6.
134 MCCA of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 302, 102 Stat. 683, 750-51 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i), (l) (1988)) (requiring Medicaid coverage for pregnant women
and young children).
135 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6401, 103
Stat. 2106, 2258 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i), (l)) (mandating eligibility for
pregnant women and children under six up to 133% FPL); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-166 to -167 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i), (l)) (setting eligibility for children between six and eighteen
years of age at 100% FPL). These eligibility categories are still the law today and will
remain so after the ACA Medicaid expansion’s implementation in 2014, with income
eligibility standardized at 133% FPL through the addition of the eighth category of
coverage. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
136 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
137 See Thomas R. Barker, The Low-Income Subsidy in the New Medicare Drug Benefit,
1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 49, 50-53 (2005) (summarizing historical Medicare drug
coverage); Susan A. Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003: Will It Be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 14 ELDER
L.J. 237, 241 (2006) (remarking on Medicare’s historical lack of an outpatient drug benefit).
138 KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, DUAL ELIGIBLES: MEDICAID’S
ROLE FOR LOW-INCOME MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 1 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/4091-08.pdf.
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prescription-drug coverage to beneficiaries as an optional Medicaid service.139
The MMA displaced states’ Medicaid prescription-drug-coverage programs for
dual eligibles and required those beneficiaries to enroll in Part D.140 To keep
the new Part D within President George W. Bush’s promised $400 billion
limit, Congress financed the program in part with compulsory state
contributions toward the cost of Part D (known as the “clawback”).141 If states
failed or refused to pay, the MMA authorized the federal government to extract
the amount due through an automatic offset against federal Medicaid funds to
which states were otherwise entitled.142 The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimated that states would pay $138 billion in clawback payments
between 2006 and 2016.143 Several states unsuccessfully challenged the
clawback in an original-jurisdiction action in the Supreme Court,
characterizing the new set of requirements as “an unprecedented intrusion into
each State’s sovereignty.”144 States have since adapted their Medicaid
programs to comply with Part D’s requirements.
In summary, the Roberts plurality was historically inaccurate when it
suggested that prior Medicaid amendments were voluntary or did not put
already-existing program funds at risk. These changes have not been mere
tinkering but significant expansions in both kind and degree.

139 See Huberfeld, Clear Notice, supra note 14, at 445 (“[S]tates historically have
covered drug expenses for dual eligibles through Medicaid . . . .”); William G. Weissert &
Edward Alan Miller, Punishing the Pioneers: The Medicare Modernization Act and State
Pharmacy Assistance Programs, 35 PUBLIUS 115, 118 (2005) (“Although it is an optional
benefit, all states have elected to provide at least some level of pharmaceutical coverage
under Medicaid.”); Richard Cauchi, State’s Rx for Medicare Gaps, ST. LEGISLATURES, Mar.
2006, at 28, 28 (describing states’ programs to fill the prescription-drug gap in the federal
Medicare program).
140 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act § 103 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5 (2006)).
141 Id. (defining state contribution requirements and allowing for the HHS Secretary to
automatically withhold funds otherwise due to a state in response to a failure to pay);
Weeks, supra note 64, at 103 (explaining the “clawback” provision).
142 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (“The amount so owed and applicable interest shall be
immediately offset against amounts otherwise payable to the State . . . .”).
143 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2007
TO 2016, at 59 box 3.2 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ft
pdocs/70xx/doc7027/01-26-budgetoutlook.pdf.
144 Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (mem.) (denying review under the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction); Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs at 1, Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (No. 135). The United States was
represented in this case by the then-Solicitor General, Paul Clement. See Brief for the
Secretary of Health & Human Services in Opposition at 29, Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (No.
135).
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The ACA Medicaid Expansion

The ACA represents another instance of congressional use of the Medicaid
program to address national healthcare needs. Most notably, Congress added a
new category of individuals eligible for Medicaid, standardized incomeeligibility thresholds, modified the mandatory-benefits package, and agreed to
pay the lion’s share of the additional costs of covering the newly eligible
individuals. Chief Justice Roberts pointed to these changes in support of his
characterization of the ACA as creating a “new” Medicaid program. For their
part, the states were required to maintain existing voluntary program
expansions during the transition period – the “maintenance of effort” (MOE)
requirement – and to contribute a small amount for the costs of the expansion
population. Each of these changes will be explored briefly.
First, as with prior amendments, the ACA expands Medicaid – in particular,
by extending coverage to all citizens and legal residents with incomes up to
133% FPL.145 Justice Roberts highlighted the additional adults covered by this
provision in support of his argument that the ACA changed Medicaid “in kind,
not merely degree,” because unlike pre-ACA Medicaid, the Medicaid
expansion does not “care for the neediest among us.”146 In short, Chief Justice
Roberts asserted that the eighth mandatory Medicaid category does not
represent the deserving poor and enrobed this distinction with constitutional
significance. Each of the pre-ACA categories were both impoverished and
shared a common characteristic: poor and elderly, poor and disabled, poor and
pregnant, and so forth. The only difference with the categories created by the
new ACA provision was that the recipients were poor adults.147
Second, the ACA standardizes the income-eligibility threshold across all
categories, replacing Medicaid’s variable income-eligibility levels for different
groups of categorically eligible beneficiaries. Under the ACA, income for
purposes of Medicaid eligibility will be determined based on modified adjusted
gross income, which uses a 5% income disregard, effectively raising the
income threshold to 138% FPL.148 The expansion is especially significant for
non-elderly, non-disabled, low-income single adults or couples without
children, who previously were excluded from Medicaid because they did not
qualify as “deserving” poor. Coverage is also extended to 133% FPL (or
138%, taking into account the 5% disregard) for all children, not just those
under age six, instead of the previous 100% FPL requirement for children
between the ages of six and eighteen. States were allowed to begin covering
these newly eligible individuals as early as April 1, 2010 and must cover them

145

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. IV 2011).
146 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-06 (2012) (plurality opinion).
147 For more discussion on the coverage of poor children under this particular expansion,
see infra Part IV.A.
148 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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by January 1, 2014.149 This set of changes is significant but apparently did not
strike Chief Justice Roberts as fundamental enough to present constitutional
problems – at least for now.
The third significant amendment to Medicaid under the ACA pertains to the
mandatory-benefit packages. Again, for Chief Justice Roberts, this change
marked a new form of Medicaid. But the amendment actually just extends
flexibility that Congress had already allowed states since 2005. For the newly
eligible population, states may provide the traditional Medicaid-defined benefit
package or benchmark-equivalent coverage,150 as defined in a prior
amendment to Medicaid.151 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 afforded states
“unprecedented flexibility,”152 allowing them to modify their State Plans to
provide “benchmark coverage”153 or “benchmark equivalent coverage”154 to a
large portion of the Medicaid population, with some exceptions.155
Benchmark-equivalent coverage is less comprehensive than the traditional
defined-benefits package.156 Instead of statutorily designed care and services,
states can pay a private insurer who does not have to comply with the
Medicaid Act.157 Benchmark coverage is a departure from Medicaid’s
signature “defined benefits” package that is uniform across all beneficiaries
within a state,158 instead permitting states to enroll some Medicaid
beneficiaries in non-Medicaid managed-care plans.159 The ACA extends the
DRA-benchmark and benchmark-equivalent-plan options to the Medicaidexpansion population.
The ACA also revises the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 definitions in
several important respects. First, benchmark and benchmark-equivalent
149

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
1396a(10)(A)(i)(VIII)).
150 Id. §§ 1302(a)(1), 2001(a)(2)(A), (c)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u7(b)(5), 18022(b)) (requiring that states cover this new population with benchmark or
benchmark-equivalent coverage, providing at least the defined “essential benefits” package).
151 42 C.F.R. § 440.330 (2011) (defining benchmark coverage); id. § 440.335 (defining
benchmark-equivalent coverage).
152 Medicaid Program; State Flexibility for Medicaid Benefit Packages, 73 Fed. Reg.
9714, 9715 (Feb. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 440).
153 See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6044, 42 U.S.C. §1396u-7(a)(1) (2006) (giving
states the option of providing only “benchmark benefits” to certain populations).
154 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1)-(2), (b)(2)).
155 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(2) (listing categories of eligible beneficiaries); 42 C.F.R. §
440.315 (listing exemptions to mandatory benchmark-equivalent coverage).
156 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2)(A) (listing services mandatorily included in benchmarkequivalent coverage).
157 Id. § 1396u-7(b)(2).
158 Id. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(A) (allowing states to provide “alternative” benefits for eligible
populations).
159 Id. § 1396u-7(b)(1) (listing managed-care provider plans that “shall be considered to
be benchmark coverage”).
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benefits must include at least the package of “essential health benefits” (EHB)
that the ACA requires for private-individual and small-group insurance
plans.160 The ACA broadly defined ten categories of services that must be
included in EHB,161 and delegated rulemaking authority to HHS to further
define the set of health services and items in EHB.162 The ACA further
specifies that benchmark or benchmark-equivalent plans that provide medical
and surgical benefits must comply with federal mental-health and substanceabuse parity laws.163 In addition, benchmark-equivalent packages now must
cover prescription drugs and mental-health services,164 and both benchmark
and benchmark-equivalent packages must cover family-planning services and
supplies.165
Fourth, the federal government will provide most of the funding for the
Medicaid expansion.166 For the first three years of Medicaid expansion, the
federal government will pay 100% of the cost of covering newly eligible
individuals in all states.167 Thereafter, the federal percentage phases down
gradually, from 95% in 2017 to 90% in 2020 and thereafter.168 The more

160 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5)
(Supp. IV 2011) (requiring, after 2014, that all benchmark or benchmark-equivalent
packages cover pre-defined “essential health benefits”); id. § 1302 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
18022) (defining essential health benefits package).
161 Id. § 1302(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)) (listing “essential health
benefits”).
162 Id. § 1302(b)(2), (4) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 18022(b)(2), (4)) (providing guidelines to
the HHS for assessing and approving benchmark coverage).
163 Id. § 2001(c)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(6)(A)) (requiring benchmark and
benchmark-equivalent plans, excluding those offered by Medicaid managed-care
organizations, to comply with federal mental health parity laws).
164 Id. § 2001(c)(2) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2)(A) (2006)) (increasing the
categories of care mandatory under benchmark-equivalent coverage to include prescription
drugs and mental-health services).
165 Id. § 2303(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(7) (Supp. IV 2011)) (mandating
coverage of family-planning services).
166 See JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND
STATE-BY-STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 2 (2010), available at http:/
/www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/Medicaid-Coverage-and-Spending-in-Health-Reform-Na
tional-and-State-By-State-Results-for-Adults-at-or-Below-133-FPL.pdf (estimating that
95% of new spending will be by the federal government).
167 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
168 Id. (decreasing the amount of the federal medical assistance percentage on a gradual
basis from 100% in 2016 to 90% in 2020 and beyond); see MARTHA HEBERLEIN ET AL.,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FINANCING NEW MEDICAID COVERAGE UNDER HEALTH REFORM:
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES 2 (2010), available at http://www.kff.
org/healthreform/upload/8072.pdf.
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generous federal match applies only to the newly eligible population.169 States
that previously expanded their Medicaid plans to cover any portion of the
newly eligible population will also receive the enhanced match, meaning that
some of those states may actually experience savings as a result of the
Medicaid expansion.170 Overall, the federal government will fund 93% of the
expansion, according to the CBO.171 The 7% state share represents less than a
3% increase in state Medicaid spending.172
Finally, Congress was concerned that states might reduce voluntary
expansions before the Medicaid expansion phases in on January 1, 2014. For
states that opted to cover a portion of the newly eligible Medicaid population
under State Plans in effect before the ACA was enacted, the ACA requires
them to maintain those current levels,173 pending implementation of the
Medicaid expansion and establishment of health insurance exchanges, both in
January 2014. Compliance with the MOE provision is “a condition for
receiving any Federal payments” under the Medicaid Act for calendar quarters
between March 23, 2010 and establishment of a health insurance exchange in
the state.174 MOE provisions are typical of prior Medicaid expansions.175 In

169

Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 451 (“The supermatch applies
only to the newly covered population . . . .”).
170 See JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE
COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION: NATIONAL AND
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8384
.pdf (stating that eight states are expected to experience savings under the Medicaid
expansion); HOLAHAN & HEADEN, supra note 166, at 4 (citing Massachusetts as a state that
will experience savings).
171 Peter Orszag, Big Subsidies Will Push States to Expand Medicaid, BLOOMBERG (July
10, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-10/big-subsidies-will-push-s
tates-to-expand-medicaid.html; see also Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief
Actuary, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act,” as Amended, at 3 fig. (Apr. 22, 2010), available at
https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf (estimating financial and coverage effects of certain provisions of the ACA through the year 2019).
172 See HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 170, at 3 & fig.ES-1; Orszag, supra note 171 (“The 7
percent state share would generate less than a 3 percent increase in total state Medicaid
spending over that time . . . .”).
173 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)
(Supp. IV 2011) (requiring states to maintain eligibility standards, methodologies, and
procedures in place as of March 23, 2010); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid,
CHIP & Survey & Certification, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid
Directors 1 (Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter MOE Letter], available at http://downloads.cms.gov
/cmsgov/archived-downloads/SMDL/downloads/SMD11001.pdf.
174 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)(1); see also id. § 18031 (assistance to states to establish
American Health Benefits Exchanges); id. § 18041(c)(1) (providing that the federal
government will establish exchanges in states that elect not to accept federal funding to
establish their own).
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fact, the ACA’s MOE provision is very similar to the MOE provision in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,176 to which states were
subject before the ACA was passed.177
States may receive waivers of the MOE through an administrative
process178: noncompliance is excused if “the State certifies to the Secretary
that, with respect to the State fiscal year during which the certification is made,
the State has a budget deficit, or with respect to the succeeding year, the State
is projected to have a budget deficit.”179 Once states have fully operational
exchanges, the MOE provision is largely waived, meaning that states can at
that time vary their optional Medicaid coverage in accordance with their
approved State Plan.180
The Medicaid expansion was significant. But on closer examination, it was
just another step in a regular process of incrementalist modification to the
existing program, akin to prior amendments over the past half century. Each of
the prior coverage expansions, redefinitions of eligibility, and funding
adjustments have changed the terms of the cooperative arrangement between
the federal government and participating states. The ACA’s Medicaid
amendments were no more dramatic than these earlier changes. The Court’s
claim that the expansion was an entirely new program does not square with the
historical record.
II.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS

The litigation surrounding the ACA is voluminous and ongoing.181 But the
present concern is the Medicaid coercion issue that ignited before the Supreme
Court.

175 See Mark Greenberg, HHS Policy Guidance on Maintenance of Effort, Assistance,
and Penalties: Summary and Discussion, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 315, 315-18
(1997) (discussing MOE provisions related to the use of state funds under TANF).
176 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, § 5001(f)(1), 123
Stat. 115, 499 (defining temporary MOE provisions for Medicaid during the financial
crisis).
177 See MOE Letter, supra note 173, at 1; see also Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at
34-36.
178 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(gg)(3)); see also Memorandum from Legislative Attorney, Cong. Research Serv., to
the Senate Finance Committee 1 (Mar. 3, 2011).
179 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
1396a(gg)(3)); see also MOE Letter, supra note 173, at 5-6 (explaining how states may
waive MOE requirements).
180 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
1396a(gg)(1)) (defining MOE requirements applicable until the “Secretary determines that
an Exchange established by the State . . . is fully operational”).
181 Professor Brad Joondeph maintains a useful website containing a comprehensive
record of litigation concerning the ACA. ACA LITIGATION BLOG, http://acalitigationblog.blo
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Officials representing twenty-six states, two private plaintiffs, and the
National Federation of Independent Business challenged the Medicaid
expansion on federalism grounds.182 In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the
ACA’s requirement to expand Medicaid exceeded federal conditional spending
power and amounted to unconstitutional coercion.183 The federal district court
struck down the ACA in its entirety after holding the individual mandate
unconstitutional,184 but rejected the States’ Medicaid challenge.185 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s Medicaid ruling,186 holding that
because states continue to have a real choice whether to participate, the
Medicaid expansion did not amount to coercion.187
On this issue, the circuits were entirely in agreement. No lower court had
declared the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court reached out for the issue of coercion and granted the petition for
certiorari on the Medicaid question. By almost all accounts, the Medicaid
challenge was a sleeper issue.188 A few commentators, however, aptly noted
that a decision striking down the Medicaid expansion would have a greater
impact on constitutional law and health-reform implementation than a decision
on the individual mandate.189 This Part briefly describes the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding, the arguments presented before the Supreme Court, and the Court’s
highly fractured Medicaid opinions.

gspot.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). For an organized treatment of the Supreme Court
briefing, see Kevin Outterson, Obamacare Briefing Almost Finished, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2012, 11:09 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/obama
care-briefing-almost-finished/.
182 Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1240, 1262-64 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012). Only the states had standing to make this particular argument.
183 Id. at 1261-62 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2006)). In Dole, the Supreme Court stated
that “[o]ur decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion.’” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
184 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1304-05 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011).
185 Florida v. HHS, 780 F. Supp. at 1267 (“[T]here is simply no support for the states’
coercion argument in existing case law.”).
186 Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d at 1268.
187 Id. at 1267-68.
188 See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, Why the Supreme Court Probably Isn’t About to Declare
Medicaid Expansion Unconstitutional, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 14, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://thi
nkprogress.org/justice/2011/11/14/367728/why-the-supreme-court-probably-isnt-about-to-d
eclare-medicaid-expansion-unconstitutional/?mobile=nc.
189 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Florida v. United States Department of Health and Human Services

The plaintiff states in Florida v. United States Department of Health and
Human Services190 did not allege that Medicaid expansion violated any of the
four limits on conditional spending power articulated in South Dakota v.
Dole.191 Rather, their coercion challenge derived from the Tenth
Amendment.192 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had
considered coercion in previous cases, namely Dole and Stewart Machine Co.
v. Davis,193 but declined to strike down the laws in question because “‘the
enactment of such laws remain[ed] the prerogative of the States not merely in
theory but in fact.’”194 Even though the choice might be politically difficult,
when states “have a real choice, there can be no coercion.”195
The Eleventh Circuit offered five reasons for finding that the Medicaid
expansion was not unconstitutionally coercive. First, states were warned from
the beginning of the Medicaid program that “Congress reserved the right to
make changes to the program,” a right that Congress exercised several times in
succeeding years.196 Second, except for “incidental administration costs,” the
federal government will cover virtually all of the costs of expansion up to
2020, and thereafter never less than ninety percent.197 Third, states were given

190

648 F.3d 1235. In the Healthcare Cases, the Court granted certiorari on three cases,
including Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, which was docketed as No.
11-400. On the Medicaid issue, certiorari was granted only under this case. See Florida v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (mem.) (granting certiorari on the
Medicaid question).
191 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (listing the four limitations on
federal government spending power: spending must be (1) “in pursuit of the general
welfare”; (2) in a manner “reasonably related” to Congress’s policy goal; (3) in an
“unambiguous” manner that allows states to “knowingly exercise their choice”; and (4)
without requiring the states to act in violation of the Constitution).
192 Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d at 1264 (reiterating the plaintiffs’ argument that the
limitation on Congress’s spending power derives from the Tenth Amendment).
193 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
194 Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d at 1265 (emphasis added) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 21112).
195 Id. at 1268.
196 Id. at 1267 (“‘The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of [the Medicaid Act]
is hereby reserved to the Congress.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006))). This provision
was mentioned in the briefs and at oral arguments. See, e.g., Brief of State Petitioners on
Medicaid at 41, Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (11400); Brief for Respondents at 9, supra note 129; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
131, at 48. This point, however, was dismissed summarily by the plurality. See infra Part
II.D.1.
197 Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d at 1267-68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. IV
2011)). The parties essentially did not dispute this fact, but they drew very different
conclusions from the federal generosity. To the federal government, generosity was a virtue;
to the states, a vice.
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four years notice to determine whether to “deal with the expansion” or
“develop a replacement program.”198 Fourth, the states’ independent power to
tax gives them the ability to fund healthcare programs of their own.199 Fifth,
the states did not stand to lose all Medicaid funding even if they did not agree
to ACA’s eligibility expansion because HHS has “the discretion to withhold all
or merely a portion of funding from a noncompliant state,” which the court
likened to South Dakota’s potential loss of five percent of federal highway
funds in Dole.200
The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion was well supported by previous
challenges to Medicaid and similar conditional spending programs.201 Even so,
and despite the absence of a circuit split, the Court agreed to hear the plaintiffs’
coercion challenge.202
B.

The States’ Merits Brief

Language from the States’ brief shines through both the plurality and joint
dissent’s opinions in NFIB.203 The States acknowledged “[t]hat the line
between coercion and persuasion may not be bright”204 but insisted that
judicially enforceable limits on the spending power are necessary because
Congress uses the Spending Clause to reach beyond its other enumerated

198

Id. at 1268.
Id.
200 Id. (emphasis added) (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211(1987)).
201 See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22 (1980) (finding
that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act created shared
responsibilities between the federal and state governments); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 640 (1937) (explaining the concept of conditional spending power); Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-95 (1937) (rejecting the claim that the Social Security Act’s tax
collection and unemployment benefits distribution infringed on state sovereignty); see also
Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d at 1267 & n.66 (discussing the history of Medicaid Act
amendments); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Medicaid is a
voluntary program in which states are free to choose whether to participate.”); California v.
United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding an additional Medicaid
requirement to cover emergency medical care to illegal immigrants); Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the pass-through provision
of the Social Security Act was a “conventional and appropriate” use of congressional power
under the Spending Clause). In Texas v. Leavitt, the plaintiffs requested that the Supreme
Court assert original jurisdiction to review the Medicare Part D clawback which required
states to pay a portion of the new Medicare prescription-drug benefit. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief
at 1, Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (No. 135). The Supreme Court was unwilling
even to hear the challenge, denying the states’ petition for original jurisdiction. Texas, 547
U.S. 1204 (mem.); see supra note 144.
202 See Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (mem.).
203 The States were the petitioners in No. 11-400.
204 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 30.
199
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powers. According to the States, if this Medicaid expansion did not cross the
line into coercion, “no Act of Congress ever will.”205
In support of their coercion argument, the States contended that Congress
never even considered the possibility of states opting out.206 By failing to
provide an alternative method for those below the poverty line to comply with
the individual mandate, other than Medicaid, and “threatening to withhold all
funds from States that were unwilling or unable” to expand Medicaid,207
Congress crossed the line from pressure to unconstitutional coercion. In short,
Congress failed to provide a safety net beneath the safety net.
One possible alternative to Medicaid expansion through the cooperative
federal-state program would be for states to provide health care to the needy
within their own borders, on their own terms. States undeniably have the
independent power to tax and raise revenues from their citizens. But the States
rejected that alternative because “[f]ederal funding is overwhelmingly
composed of tax dollars collected from the States’ own residents.”208
Accordingly, the suggestion that states could “pay[] for medical care for the
indigent through new [state] taxes” was an “illusory” choice209 that would
effectively result in double taxation of state citizens.
The States also argued that the sheer size of the Medicaid program
supported their coercion claim. While acknowledging that Congress has
discretion in setting conditions for new funds, the States asserted that creating
new conditions for existing conditional spending programs constitutes coercion
when Congress uses states’ “dependency on existing funding streams to coerce
compliance with new conditions.”210 Congress’s statutory “right to alter,
amend, or repeal”211 the Medicaid Act could not make the ACA constitutional
because the states did not “ced[e] to Congress the power to expand the
program unilaterally and coercively” and because Congress does not have the
power to “hold States hostage to Congress’ later demands.”212 Thus, the States
argued that “[n]o amount of notice will render a coercive choice any less
coercive.”213
Recognizing that the Court had not previously struck down a federal
spending program on coercion grounds, the States analogized the Medicaid
expansion to other cases recognizing federalism-based limits on federal power.
205

Id. at 21.
Id. at 35 (“[A] State’s failure to participate in Medicaid was . . . inconceivable to the
drafters of the ACA.”).
207 Id. at 37 (emphasis omitted).
208 Id. at 43.
209 Id. at 44. Note that Florida’s constitution prohibits personal state income tax. FLA.
CONST. § 5(a).
210 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 40.
211 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
212 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 41-42.
213 Id. at 45.
206

34

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

In particular, the States likened the Medicaid expansion to the federal law
struck down as impermissible commandeering in New York v. United States
because both required the state government to take regulatory action.214 The
ACA “effectively order[s]” states to comply with the Medicaid expansion or
“assume full responsibility for all medical assistance to the needy
themselves.”215 The States distinguished Dole because the funds at stake with
Medicaid expansion are “more than 1000 times” greater than the highway
funds in dispute in Dole.216
C.

The United States’ Merits Brief

The United States’ brief began by noting that Congress traditionally has
broad authority to exercise the spending power and to “‘fix the terms on which
it shall disburse federal money to the states.’”217 The brief acknowledged
Dole’s limits on federal spending power218 but urged that the Medicaid
expansion was certainly constitutional and related to the goals of the federal
program because the challenged conditions “define the Medicaid program,
going to the very core of the offer of federal financial assistance that Congress
has extended to the States.”219 Invoking Justice Cardozo’s admonishment, the
United States warned that applying the coercion doctrine would “‘plunge the
law in[to] endless difficulties’”220 and confuse “‘motive or temptation’” with
coercion.221
The United States highlighted the Medicaid program’s history and prior
expansions, observing that the Medicaid Act “always has mandated coverage
for various categories of individuals and benefits,” and that these categories
have been expanded numerous times.222 Applying the coercion doctrine to
federal-state cooperative arrangements would require courts to “delv[e] into
essentially political questions about States’ differing policy choices and
budgetary priorities.”223 Cooperative federalism programs have been criticized
for obscuring political accountability; the federal government enacts the
programs but leaves states bearing the brunt of any political opposition to
program operations and costs. Turning the political accountability argument on
214

Id. at 52 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-75 (1992)).
Id. Of course, the states already failed at this option in the early twentieth century,
which is the reason that Medicaid exists today.
216 Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted).
217 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 20 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1980)). The United States was the respondent in No. 11-400.
218 Id. at 21.
219 Id. at 24.
220
Id. at 32 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937))).
221 Id. at 32 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
222 Id. at 26.
223 Id. at 35.
215
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its head, however, the United States suggested that the States sought to avoid
the political accountability of rejecting the generous federal funding for
Medicaid expansion by seeking judicial intervention.224
The United States challenged the logic of the States’ claim that coercion can
be established based on the quantum of Medicaid money put on the table
because that would mean “the Act’s Medicaid eligibility expansion would have
been even more coercive [had] Congress chosen to fund indefinitely 100% of
all its costs.”225 That suggestion cannot be squared with the Court’s contract
analogy for federal-state cooperative arrangements because it essentially
indicates that the federal program is unconstitutional because “the other
party . . . is offering too much consideration.”226
In response to the States’ suggestion that the Medicaid expansion must be
coercive because Congress failed to provide an alternative means of covering
low-income adults, the United States noted that the States misinterpreted the
structure of the ACA and the role of the Medicaid expansion. The Medicaid
expansion population will not be “‘forced’” to obtain minimum essential
coverage because they could choose instead to pay the tax penalty.227
Moreover, many Medicaid-eligible individuals would be statutorily exempted
from the individual mandate.228 It is not surprising that Congress did not
include a “contingency plan” for Medicaid expansion because all fifty states
have long participated in Medicaid and have complied, sooner or later, with
every previous expansion.
Almost as an afterthought, the United States pointed out the “separability”
clause in § 1303,229 providing that should any provision of the Act be declared
invalid, the remainder should remain unaffected.230 Based on that provision,
the United States suggested that the appropriate remedy, should the Court find
the Medicaid expansion coercive, would be to “enjoin the ‘application’ of the
[Medicaid expansion] to unconsenting States,”231 but otherwise enforce the
ACA as written. The federal government urged the Court to recognize that

224 Id. at 36 (“[W]hat they seek is the ability to use the courts to tailor federal spending
programs to their preferred specifications, and thereby avoid political accountability for the
consequences that would follow from rejecting federal aid on the terms offered.”).
225 Id. at 41.
226 Id. at 42.
227 Id. at 49 (quoting Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 35).
228 Id. at 49-50 (citing I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)-(2), (5) (Supp. IV 2011)).
229 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006) (originally enacted as Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L.
No. 74-271, § 1103, 49 Stat. 620, 648).
230 Id. (“If any provision [of the SSA], or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the [Act], and the application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”).
231 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 53.
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Congress would prefer a weaker Medicaid expansion to no Medicaid
expansion, or no ACA, at all.232
D.

The NFIB Opinions

June 28, 2012 was full of surprises.233 First, a majority of the Court upheld
the individual mandate as an exercise of the General Welfare Clause power to
tax, even though no lower court had previously endorsed that theory.234 A
majority also found the mandate unsustainable under the commerce power.235
This discussion was arguably dicta, though Chief Justice Roberts insisted it
was necessary to the holding.236 Of particular importance for this Article, a
plurality limited Congress’s power to expand Medicaid under the Spending
Clause by judicially enforcing the Tenth Amendment. Though the Medicaid
expansion itself was not struck down, expansion became optional for states,
with no risk to their existing Medicaid funding.237 No one predicted these
peculiar outcomes. The three principal Medicaid opinions238 are described in
the following Sections; analysis of the opinions begins in Part III.
1.

The Roberts Plurality

Chief Justice Roberts authored the controlling decision on Medicaid
coercion, joined only by Justices Breyer and Kagan as to Part IV on
Medicaid.239 This plurality opinion is controlling because it is the narrowest
point of law; the joint dissent also found the Medicaid expansion to be
unconstitutionally coercive, but refused to join the plurality and would have
struck down the ACA in its entirety.240 Plurality opinions are notoriously
difficult to interpret, and NFIB does not disappoint.241

232 Id. (“There is no basis to believe Congress would have preferred no Medicaid
eligibility expansion at all to an eligibility extension that applies only to consenting
States.”).
233 For an account of the day’s events by a key observer, see Tom Goldstein, We’re
Getting Wildly Differing Assessments, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 7, 2012, 10:04 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2012/07/were-getting-wildly-differing-assessments/.
234 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., joined on this issue by Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.).
235
Id. at 2593 (Roberts, C.J., joined on this issue by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito,
JJ.)
236 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Legal Effects of NFIB v. Sebelius and the Constitutional
Gestalt 13 (Oct. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p
apers.cfm?abstract_id=2152653) (discussing subsequent lower court opinions that seem to
treat this part of the opinion as dicta, but suggesting it is not).
237 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2608 (Roberts, C.J., joined on this issue by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
238 Justice Thomas also filed a brief opinion which this Article does not discuss.
239 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577 (plurality opinion). Justice Ginsburg’s opinion concurred
only in Part IV-B, the remedy. See infra Part II.D.2.
240 Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“The Act before us
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Chief Justice Roberts began: “There is no doubt that the [ACA] dramatically
increases state obligations under Medicaid.”242 He then noted that the ACA
requires states “to cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes
below 133 percent of the federal poverty line”243 and to provide “a new
‘[e]ssential health benefits’ package” to Medicaid recipients.244 The opinion
acknowledged that Congress may exercise its spending power to encourage
states to regulate according to federal policy and to influence state policy.245
Chief Justice Roberts also invoked the familiar contract analogy for
conditional spending power, noting that states must voluntarily and knowingly
accept the terms of the federal offer.246
Chief Justice Roberts’ limits on conditional spending power were grounded
in the notion that “‘freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments,
not one.’”247 To protect individual liberty, therefore, the Court must enforce
limits on both direct commandeering and indirect coercion of states.248 The
plurality observed that those concerns have twice led the Court to strike down
federal legislation that “commandeers” states.249 The same federalism values
should prohibit Congress from using the spending power “to exert a ‘power
akin to undue influence.’”250 When congressional “‘pressure turns into
here exceeds federal power . . . in denying nonconsenting States all Medicaid funding.”).
241 See generally John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality
Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59. Davis and Reynolds describe some of
the problems that arise from plurality opinions:
First, the fact that an opinion is supported by only a plurality of the Court may
compromise its professional and public acceptance. Second, within the Court itself, a
no-clear-majority decision will carry less precedential weight. Third, a plurality
opinion often fails to give definitive guidance as to the state of the law to lower courts
– both state and federal – as well as to the legislative, administrative, and executive
agencies charged with implementing the standards so ambivalently articulated by the
Court. Thus, there results a collective confusion as to what has been held by the Court
in the plurality case.
Id. at 62.
242 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion).
243 Id.
244 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u-7(b)(5), 18022(b) (Supp. IV 2011)).
245 Id. at 2601-02 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
246 Id. (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)); see also Brief of James F.
Blumstein, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Medicaid Issue) at 7-12, 25-38,
Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400)
[hereinafter Blumstein Brief] (developing further the contract analogy for the Medicaid
coercion argument).
247 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion) (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999))).
248 Id.
249 Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at
174-75).
250 Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
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compulsion,’” the statute “runs contrary to our system of federalism.”251 Both
federal commandeering and coercive spending “threaten the political
accountability key to our federal system.”252 The constitutional design is clear
that states do not have to “yield[]” to federal policy, but the ACA crossed the
line to coercion by issuing an implicit threat “to withhold . . . States’ existing
Medicaid funds” if they rejected the Medicaid expansion.253
The opinion provided two reasons why the threat of losing all Medicaid
funding constituted impermissible coercion. First, rejecting the federal
government’s argument that the Medicaid expansion was merely a
modification to an existing federal program,254 it claimed that the ACA
transformed Medicaid, such that the expansion was “a shift in kind, not merely
degree.”255 Two programs were at issue: “old” and “new” Medicaid.256
Artificially slicing Medicaid in two allowed the plurality to determine that
funds for “old” Medicaid are not related to the ACA’s “new” Medicaid
expansion.257 In Chief Justice Roberts’ view, “new” Medicaid “is no longer a
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.”258 He described “new” Medicaid as being characterized by (1) the
new category of eligible individuals, (2) the more generous federal-funding
provisions in the Medicaid expansion, and (3) the less-comprehensive
minimum-benefits package that states may offer to newly eligible
individuals.259
Second, the Chief Justice held the Medicaid expansion coercive because it
operated as far more than “‘inducement’” or “‘relatively mild encouragement’”
of states.260 Medicaid expansion, read along with § 1396c – which allowing the
Secretary to withhold payment to states for noncompliance with Medicaid

251

Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
Id.
253 Id. at 2603 (internal quotation marks omitted).
254 Id. at 2605.
255 Id. at 2605-06 (distinguishing the ACA amendments from previous Medicaid
expansions found to be non-coercive).
256 Id. at 2605 (“We cannot agree that existing Medicaid and the expansion dictated by
the Affordable Care Act are all one program simply because ‘Congress styled’ them as
such.” (quoting id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))); id. at 2606 (characterizing the
Medicaid expansion as “a new health care program”); id. at 2607 (“What Congress is not
free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking
away their existing Medicaid funding.”).
257 Id. at 2605-06 (concluding that while “[p]revious amendments to Medicaid eligibility
merely altered and expanded the boundaries,” the ACA so fundamentally changed the
nature of Medicaid as to create a “new health care program”).
258 Id. at 2606.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 2604.
252
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requirements – coerced state governments. With Medicaid spending
representing twenty percent of the average state’s budget, “[t]he threatened
loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget” was deemed “economic
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the
Medicaid expansion.”261 The coercion holding was further supported by the
fact that states have, over the decades of Medicaid’s existence, formed
“intricate statutory and administrative regimes . . . to implement their
objectives under existing Medicaid.”262 Because states face considerable
practical difficulties walking away from the substantial funding and
disentangling their existing Medicaid programs, the Medicaid expansion
operated as a “gun to the head.”263
Just as the Court in Steward Machine declined to “‘fix the outermost line’”
where persuasion becomes coercion, the NFIB plurality opinion saw “no need
to fix a line” to determine when Congress’s use of the spending power
becomes coercive.264 Chief Justice Roberts simply stated, “wherever that line
may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”265 Citing the Court’s anticommandeering precedents, he observed that “Congress may not simply
‘conscript state [agencies] into the national bureaucratic army,’” and concluded
that was precisely what Congress was attempting with Medicaid expansion.266
Thus, Roberts avoided creating any kind of rule, test, standard, method, or
other framework for understanding coercion beyond the facts of NFIB.
Having concluded that the Medicaid expansion constituted coercion in
violation of the Tenth Amendment’s limit on federal spending power, the
Court next considered the remedy. One option, advanced by the joint dissent,
would have been to strike down the entire ACA based on the
unconstitutionality of one provision.267 The plurality, however, held the
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional only to the extent that it “penalize[s]
States that choose not to participate in [the] new program by taking away their
existing Medicaid funding.”268 On this remedial issue, Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor joined the plurality, thus creating a unique five-vote majority to
preserve the ACA from being struck down in its entirety.269 Relying on the

261 Id. at 2604-05 (“Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average
State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”).
262 Id. at 2604.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 2606 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937)).
265 Id.
266 Id. at 2606-07 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
267 Id. at 2667 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (calling invalidation of
the entire ACA “[t]he most natural remedy”).
268 Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion).
269 Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with
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SSA’s “separability” clause in 42 U.S.C. § 1303, the Court “follow[ed]
Congress’s explicit textual instruction to leave unaffected ‘the remainder of the
[Medicaid] chapter.’”270 Accordingly, the only modification necessary to
render the Medicaid expansion constitutional was that “the Secretary [of HHS]
[]not apply § 1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply
with the requirements set out in the expansion.”271 The Medicaid expansion
thus became optional for dissenting states, the aforementioned “Red State
Option.”272
The plurality accepted the arguments from the United States and amici that
§ 1303 demands a narrow remedy.273 The Chief Justice concluded that
Congress “would have wanted to preserve the rest of the Act” because some
states desire the Medicaid expansion and because the rest of the statute will
still function in the manner intended by Congress.274 Accordingly, all other
reforms Congress enacted in the ACA remain “‘fully operative as a law.’”275
2.

The Ginsburg Opinion

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented from the
plurality’s coercion decision, except with respect to the prescribed remedy.276
Justice Ginsburg recognized that “there are federalism-based limits on the use
of Congress’ conditional spending power” but pointed out that “[t]he Court in
Dole mentioned, but did not adopt, a further limitation” centered on “the

[Chief Justice Roberts] that the Medicaid Act’s severability clause determines the
appropriate remedy.”); see also infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Ginsburg opinion).
270 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006)).
271 Id. (recognizing that the Secretary, pursuant to the existing, pre-ACA Medicaid Act
was authorized to withhold federal funding to noncompliant states (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1396c)).
272 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
273 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1303) (holding that
severability “fully remedies the constitutional violation . . . identified,” and that § 1303
“confirm[s] that we need go no further”); see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at
53; Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 39.
274 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality opinion) (opining that “States [] may voluntarily
sign up, finding the idea of expanding Medicaid coverage attractive,” and that “[t]he other
reforms Congress enacted . . . will still function in a way ‘consistent with Congress’ basic
objectives in enacting the statute’” (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259
(2005))).
275 Id. (quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932)).
276 Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding no
constitutional violation of the Spending Clause but, given the plurality’s holding, agreeing
that “the ACA’s authorization of funds to finance the expansion remains intact, and the
Secretary’s authority to withhold funds for reasons other than noncompliance with the
expansion remains unaffected”).
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indistinct line between temptation and coercion.”277 Justice Ginsburg observed
that the concerns that caused the Court to consider the coercion doctrine in
Dole were not present in this case.278 First, the condition of expanded
eligibility “relates solely to the federally funded Medicaid program.”279 By
contrast, in Dole, the minimum-drinking-age condition related only indirectly
to highway construction.280 Second, Congress has clear authority to directly
enact the same Medicaid policy, as Congress could simply make Medicaid a
fully national program like Medicare. By contrast, in Dole, it was an “open
question” whether Congress had power to enact a nationwide minimum
drinking age.281 Thus, in Dole, it was plausible that the Spending Clause was
being used to regulate activity beyond Congress’s enumerated powers. Similar
factors suggestive of coercion were not present with the Medicaid expansion.
Justice Ginsburg recognized the importance of Chief Justice Roberts’ claim
that the ACA created a “new” Medicaid program. She stated that, like the
original Medicaid Act, the expansion “enable[s] States to provide medical
assistance to needy persons” and “leaves unchanged the vast majority” of
provisions governing Medicaid.282 Characterizing Title II of the ACA as an
entirely new program ignored the “large measure of respect” that the courts
should give to Congress’s description of its own law and created an ill-defined
question of “[a]t what point does an extension become so large that it
‘transforms’ the basic law?”283 She queried why the most recent Medicaid
expansion constitutes “a shift in kind, not merely degree,” when prior statutory
expansions did not284 and charged the plurality with rewriting the 1965
Medicaid Act “to countenance only the ‘right to alter somewhat,’ or ‘amend,
but not too much.’”285
Justice Ginsburg directly challenged Chief Justice Roberts’ reliance on
features of the Medicaid expansion that he used to characterize it as a “new”
program. First, to the Chief Justice’s suggestion that “unlike pre-ACA
Medicaid, [the Medicaid expansion] does not ‘care for the neediest among
us,’”286 Justice Ginsburg responded: “What makes that so? Single adults
earning no more than $14,856 per year – 133% of the current federal poverty

277

Id. at 2634.
Id.
279 Id.
280 Id. (“In Dole, the condition – set 21 as the minimum drinking age – did not tell the
States how to use funds Congress provided for highway construction.”).
281 Id.
282 Id. at 2635 (internal quotation marks omitted).
283 Id. at 2636.
284 Id. at 2639 (“But why was Medicaid altered only in degree, not in kind, when
Congress required States to cover millions of children and pregnant women?”).
285 Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006)).
286 Id. at 2636 (quoting id. at 2606 (plurality opinion)).
278
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level – surely rank among the Nation’s poor.”287 She also rebutted the
suggestion that the ACA’s package of Medicaid benefits for newly eligible
beneficiaries is “new,” noting that the ACA did not create the definitions of
“benchmark” and “benchmark equivalent coverage” but expressly incorporated
these definitions from the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.288 Regarding the
Chief Justice’s suggestion that the ACA’s more generous federal match
evidenced a “new” program, Justice Ginsburg questioned the constitutional
significance of the increased funding. Tracking Solicitor General Verrilli’s
argument, she asked, “is it not passing strange to suggest that the purported
incursion on state sovereignty might have been averted, or at least mitigated,
had Congress offered States less money to carry out the same obligations?”289
Justice Ginsburg also observed that nothing would stop Congress from simply
repealing the Medicaid Act and then replacing it with “Medicaid II, a new
program combining the pre-2010 coverage with the expanded coverage
required by the ACA.”290
Regarding the contract analogy, Justice Ginsburg precedent that caselaw
required only that “conditions on federal funds be unambiguously clear at the
time a State receives and uses the money.”291 That moment would begin in
2014, giving states more than three years to understand what was required of
them.292 But if clear notice is required at the very beginning of the program,
then Medicaid surely qualified in 1965 as well because Congress explicitly
retained the right to amend or alter the program from the beginning.293 Relying
on Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment,294
Justice Ginsburg argued that states have no lawful basis to complain about the
expansion of Medicaid, even if it represents a significant change in the
program.295 In Bowen, the State of California and its public agencies
challenged congressional amendments to the SSA’s old age, survivors, and
disability insurance-benefits program that restricted the ability of states to
terminate their agreements with the federal government.296 The Court rejected

287

Id.
Id. at 2636 n.20 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(k), 1396u-7 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
289 Id. at 2636.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 2638.
292 Id. at 2637 (“Section 2001 does not take effect until 2014. The ACA makes perfectly
clear what will be required of States that accept Medicaid funding after that date.”).
293 Id. at 2638 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006)).
294 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
295 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2638-39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 44-46, 48-53).
296 Bowen, 477 U.S. at 49-50 (“The State claimed that the federal defendants had . . .
violated the Tenth Amendment by impairing the State’s ‘ability . . . to structure its
relationships with its employees.’”).
288
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the challenge, relying on § 1304 (Congress’s express reservation of the right to
“alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the Act).297
Justice Ginsburg also expressed serious concern about the Court’s failure to
“‘fix the outermost line’” at which “‘persuasion gives way to coercion.’”298
She stated that the Court failed to answer a variety of questions, including
whether courts measure coercion by the amount offered to the states by the
federal government, the percentage of the state’s budget affected, what effects
on what states should figure into the constitutional analysis, and the combined
effect of all plaintiff states refusing the spending conditions.299 Echoing
Solicitor General Verrilli’s argument once again, Justice Ginsburg worried that
“political judgments that defy judicial calculation” will become the business of
courts.300
Only Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Ginsburg in concluding that the
Medicaid expansion was constitutional. The seven other Justices signed two
opinions holding the Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutionally coercive.
The remainder of the ACA was saved only on severability grounds. Justice
Ginsburg agreed that § 1303 and judicial precedent required the Court to
“conserve, not destroy” the statute’s purpose.301 Here, Congress’s “objective
was to increase access to health care for the poor by increasing” state
funding.302 That objective was best implemented not by jettisoning the ACA
altogether, but by keeping in place as much of the law as possible.303 In the
context of Medicaid, that meant allowing states the option to accept additional
federal funds for Medicaid expansion without facing potential withdrawal of
existing funds.
3.

The Joint Dissent

The remaining four Justices filed a joint dissent signed in order of
seniority.304 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined no part of the
Court’s opinion despite substantially agreeing with the coercion holding, if not
the reasoning. The joint dissent would have held the Medicaid expansion
unconstitutional on broader grounds and would have refused to sever the
application of § 1396c.305 According to the joint dissent, the constitutional
flaws in the Medicaid expansion required striking down the entire ACA.306
297

Id. at 51-52.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting id. at 2606 (plurality opinion); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis 301 U.S. 548, 591
(1937)).
299 Id. at 2640-41.
300 Id. at 2641.
301 Id. at 2642.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
305 Id. at 2667 (“We should not accept the Government’s invitation to attempt to solve a
298
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The joint dissent observed that “[t]he power to make any expenditure that
furthers ‘the general welfare’” is an extensive power given to the federal
government that includes “attach[ing] conditions” to funds disbursed to the
states.307 Left unchecked, however, such a power “would present a grave threat
to [our] system of federalism”308 and would allow Congress “‘to tear down the
barriers . . . and to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no
restrictions save such as are self-imposed.’”309 The joint dissent shared the
political accountability concern articulated in the States’ Brief regarding the
ability of federal officials to “‘remain insulated from the electoral ramifications
of their decision.’”310 In order to protect the “‘unique role of the States in our
system,’”311 the dissent urged that the Court must enforce the coercion doctrine
as a limit on Congress’s spending power.
Like the Roberts plurality, the joint dissent determined that unconstitutional
coercion depends on whether the states can voluntarily accept or decline an
offer. Both opinions resisted defining the line beyond which the spending
power becomes coercive. The joint dissent suggested that freedom to accept or
decline the Medicaid expansion “as a matter of law” was insufficient to render
constitutional the use of the spending power, as it ignored the “practical
matter” of whether states can effectively create an alternative.312
For the joint dissent, there was “no doubt” that the Medicaid expansion was
unconstitutional.313 The states have independent power to tax and spend and
could theoretically create a new healthcare program, but “the sheer size” of
Medicaid means that states would have to contribute up to “an additional 33%
of all [] state expenditures to fund an equivalent state program.”314 The dissent
constitutional problem by rewriting the Medicaid Expansion so as to allow States that reject
it to retain their pre-existing Medicaid funds.”); id. at 2671 (discussing the non-severability
of the rest of the ACA from the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion).
306 Id. at 2668-69 (describing the severability inquiry as “whether the now truncated
statute will operate in the manner Congress intended” and whether “Congress would have
enacted [the remaining provisions] standing alone and without the unconstitutional
portion”).
307 Id. at 2658.
308 Id. at 2659.
309 Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
310 Id. at 2660 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992)).
311 Id. (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 685 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
312 Id. at 2661 (internal quotation marks omitted).
313 Id. at 2662 (“[T]here can be no doubt [that the legislation is unconstitutional]. In
structuring the ACA, Congress unambiguously signaled its belief that every State would
have no real choice.”).
314 Id. at 2663 (citing Arizona as an example, highlighting that the state “commits 12% of
its state expenditures to Medicaid, and relies on the Federal Government to provide the rest:
$5.6 billion, equaling roughly one-third of Arizona’s annual state expenditures of $17
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also suggested that states that opt out of Medicaid could further face the loss of
TANF funds because participation in that program is premised on participation
in Medicaid.315 Meanwhile, local hospitals and healthcare providers would be
forced to bear the unfunded requirement to treat patients under the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, without the assurance of
Medicaid reimbursement.316
Finally, the anticipated success of the inducement was a strike against it.
The joint dissent agreed with the States’ argument that no one expected states
to refuse the Medicaid expansion.317 Under the joint dissent’s reasoning,
Congress’s failure to provide backup coverage for those below the poverty
line, in contrast to other new ACA programs that provide alternatives to state
participation, demonstrated that “Congress well understood that refusal was
not a practical option.”318 To the joint dissent, the exceedingly generous federal
match, which no state was expected to decline, was therefore further evidence
of coercion.319
On the question whether Medicaid expansion operates as unconstitutional
coercion, seven Justices agreed. But the joint dissent and the Court parted ways
primarily on the issue of remedy and severability for several reasons. First, the
dissent maintained that “the ACA depends on States’ having no choice” as
many individuals subject to the individual mandate cannot afford insurance
outside of Medicaid.320 Put another way, the ACA was structurally dependent
upon the Medicaid expansion. Second, if a state opted out, its citizens would
still pay federal taxes to support the Medicaid expansion in other states that
opted in.321 The joint dissent warned that the Court should not create this

billion”).
315 Id. at 2664 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3) (2006)).
316 Id. See generally Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act of 1986 § 912(b), 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd. The joint dissent referred to this statute by its old title, the “Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.” The word “Active” was removed from the
statute’s name in 1989. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101239, § 6211(h)(2), 103 Stat. 2016, 2245-49.
317 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“In
crafting the ACA, Congress clearly expressed its informed view that no State could possibly
refuse the offer that the ACA extends.”).
318 Id. at 2665 (suggesting that federal health insurance exchanges should have been an
alternative to state-based exchanges, or there should have been an option to cover lawful
permanent residents through state Medicaid programs or federal insurance subsidies).
319 Id. at 2665-66 (suggesting disparagingly that the federal government considers itself a
“generous benefactor who offers $1 million with few strings attached to 50 randomly
selected individuals” but arguing that this “offer” actually includes implicit threats and will
lead states to incur “substantial costs”).
320 Id. at 2667.
321 Id. (“States must choose between expanding Medicaid or paying huge tax sums to the
federal fisc for the sole benefit of expanding Medicaid in other states.”).
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“divisive dynamic” but should leave such a design to “conscious congressional
choice.”322
The joint dissent agreed with the Court that § 1303 required the
unconstitutional application of § 1396c, authorizing the Secretary to withhold
all Medicaid funding for states that did not implement Medicaid expansion, to
be severed from the rest of the Act.323 But the joint dissent did not read § 1303
to authorize the Court to rewrite the statute to cure its unconstitutionality.324 By
reading the ACA Medicaid expansion as optional, rather than voluntary, the
Court made “‘a new law’” rather than “‘enforc[ing] an old one.’”325 Rather, the
joint dissent, upon finding the Medicaid expansion unconstitutionally coercive,
would have struck down the entire ACA.
III. COERCION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION
The Court has now decisively determined, through a three-Justice plurality
and a four-Justice joint dissent, that the anti-coercion principle operates as a
limit on Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare when conditions
are placed on states’ acceptance of that spending. The Court has previously
recognized structural limits on other federal powers,326 but NFIB was the first
clear articulation of a federalism-based limit on Congress’s spending power.
The courthouse doors have now been thrown open to challengers seeking to
explore the contours of the coercion doctrine.327 This Part focuses attention on
this new judicially enforceable limit. It begins by placing NFIB in context as a

322

Id.
Id. (“[T]hat clause tells us only that other provisions in Chapter 7 should not be
invalidated if § 1396c, the authorization for the cut-off of all Medicaid funds, is
unconstitutional.”).
324 Id. (asserting that the severability clause “does not tell us that § 1396c can be
judicially revised to say what it does not say”).
325 Id. (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879)).
326 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (describing how
separation between the federal government and the states protects state executive actors
from federal overreaching); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-83 (1992)
(applying the Tenth Amendment as a structural limit on Congress’s commerce power);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (extolling, in one of the first Rehnquist
Court cases to consider the issue, the virtues of federalism as a structural limitation on
federal power).
327 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). The plurality wrote:
The Court in Steward Machine did not attempt to “fix the outermost line” where
persuasion gives way to coercion. The Court found it “[e]nough for present purposes
that wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.” We have no need to fix a line
either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely
beyond it.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). At oral arguments, Justice Alito proffered a
question about coercion in the context of federal education programs. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 131, at 45-47; see also Pasachoff, supra note 24.
323
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continuation of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution. Next, it explores
three key coercion issues. First, it evaluates the Court’s reliance on, and
potential modifications to, the Dole test, including the clear-notice and
relatedness restrictions set forth in that case. Second, it considers the nature of
coercion, including how coercion is quantified, how it relates to political
accountability, and what constitutes “coercion in fact.” Third, it investigates
the question of severability for future conditional spending challenges.
A.

Continuing the Federalism Revolution

The Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution, which otherwise recognized
a Tenth Amendment limit on various exercises of federal power, notably
excluded the spending power.328 Justices329 and commentators330 interested in
advancing the Federalism Revolution found the exclusion of the spending
power to be a fissure in the project, as demonstrated by the dissent in Davis v.
328 The Rehnquist Natural Court struck down all or part of federal legislation by
judicially enforcing the Tenth Amendment in four cases tied, at least in part, to the
commerce power. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (striking down
the Violence Against Women Act because Congress lacked the authority to enact its civil
remedy); Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (holding the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act to
be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
567-68 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 beyond Congress’s
commerce power); New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (“We conclude that while Congress has
substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal
of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not confer
upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so.”).
329 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the need for federalism-based limits on spending).
Even before Davis, Justice Kennedy seemed interested in limiting the spending power.
Professor Baker reported in 1998 that Justice Kennedy was concerned that “conditional
federal spending . . . is the major states’ rights issue facing the country today.” Lynn A.
Baker, The Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 95, 102-03 (1998). It seems from her dissent in Dole that Justice O’Connor
would have taken the Dole test a step further by fortifying the germaneness element. See
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212-18 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Congress . .
. is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or
change regulations in other areas of the State’s social and economic life because of an
attenuated or tangential relationship to highway use or safety.”).
330 See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1911 (1995) (advocating for stronger federalism-based limits on the spending
power); Baker, supra note 329 (advocating a “revival of states’ rights” by strengthening
Dole’s conditional spending analysis); James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care
Reform Through Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a
Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125 (2000) (describing the perceived problem of state “lock
in,” and accusing the federal government of passing mandatory Medicaid amendments once
states could not leave the program); Cohen & Blumstein, supra note 14 (suggesting the
Court should adopt a stronger coercion approach).
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Monroe County Board of Education.331 The Rehnquist Court bypassed several
opportunities to recognize a Tenth Amendment limit in direct Spending Clause
challenges such as Dole332 and New York v. United States,333 and in other cases
such as Pierce County v. Guillen,334 a commerce power case that also
presented a spending power issue in the lower court.335 Accordingly, the
Roberts Court’s keenness to revisit federalism through the vehicle of Medicaid
in NFIB was not surprising. As a former clerk of then-Justice Rehnquist, Chief
Justice Roberts may well have been oriented to this issue by his mentor.
Opinions penned by other members of the Roberts Court also suggested a
desire to revive the Federalism Revolution. Those seeds sprung to life in the
NFIB plurality and joint dissent.
Indeed, several members of the Roberts Court had recently hinted at a desire
to revisit conditional spending doctrine as well as other federalism-based
protections for the states. For example, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
331

See Davis, 526 U.S. at 654-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy’s dissent,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, began with the following
observation:
The Court has held that Congress’ power “‘to authorize expenditure of public
moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power
found in the Constitution.’” As a consequence, Congress can use its Spending Clause
power to pursue objectives outside of “Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’” by
attaching conditions to the grant of federal funds. So understood, the Spending Clause
power, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has the potential to
obliterate distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power by
permitting the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of
traditional state concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside its reach.
Id. at 654-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Dole, 482 U.S. at 207); see also
Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (observing that the power to spend was overlooked in the
“Rehnquist Revolution”).
332 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (“We have also held that a perceived Tenth Amendment
limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range
of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.” (citing Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947))).
333 New York, 505 U.S. 144. The majority approved of federal spending as an appropriate
method of influencing state policymaking. Id. at 166-67 (“Our cases have identified a
variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt
a legislative program consistent with federal interests.”). Additionally, the Court held that
grants to states for radioactive waste disposal were “well within the authority of Congress
under the Commerce and Spending Clauses . . . [and thus] not inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment.” Id. at 173.
334 537 U.S. 129, 147-48 (2003) (holding that federal regulation of information about
highway failures collected by states for federal funding purposes was a proper exercise of
commerce authority).
335 Guillen v. Pierce Cnty., 31 P.3d 628, 651 (Wash. 2001) (holding that the federal
regulation of state highway-safety regulation was not a valid federal interest and thus not a
proper exercise of the spending power), rev’d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
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United States v. Comstock stated: “The limits upon the spending power have
not been much discussed, but if the relevant standard is parallel to the
Commerce Clause cases, then the limits and the analytic approach in those
precedents should be respected.”336 Justice Kennedy was clearly asserting that
the Tenth Amendment should drive judicially enforced limits on the spending
power, as it has given rise to limits on the Commerce Clause in cases such as
United States v. Lopez337 and United States v. Morrison.338 Moreover, Justice
Kennedy articulated skepticism about the very source of the spending power in
his Comstock concurrence, writing: “It should be remembered, moreover, that
the spending power is not designated as such in the Constitution but rather is
implied from the power to lay and collect taxes . . . .”339
Likewise, the Court’s 2011 decision in Bond v. United States was rich with
federalism observations that were harbingers of NFIB.340 Bond could have
produced a brief decision to the effect that a criminal defendant can always
defend herself based upon the constitutionality of the law under which she is
charged, as demonstrated by Justice Ginsburg’s two-page concurrence.341 But
because Ms. Bond defended herself by asserting a Tenth Amendment issue,
Justice Kennedy wrote at length about the nature and value of federalism and
the role of divided government in protecting individuals.342 Bond contains
language the States echoed in their brief343 and was reiterated by the NFIB
plurality.344
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United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the proper balance
that should be struck to respect the boundaries of federalism).
338 529 U.S. 598, 600, 626-27 (2000) (striking down portions of the Violence Against
Women Act as violating the Tenth Amendment in a majority opinion joined by Justice
Kennedy).
339 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
340 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364-66 (2011) (outlining the multiple
benefits achieved through careful attention to federalism-based interests).
341 Id. at 2367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Bond, like any other defendant, has a personal
right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law.”).
342
Id. at 2364-66 (majority opinion).
343 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 24-25 (“That core limitation
on Congress’ power is a necessary reflection of the fact that ‘the preservation of the States .
. . are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the
Union . . . .’” (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868))).
344 See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The independent
power of the States also serves as a check on the power of the Federal Government: ‘By
denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life,
federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.’” (quoting Bond, 131
S. Ct. at 2364)); id. at 2602 (“‘[F]reedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments,
not one.’” (quoting Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364)).
337
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In addition, Justice Alito crafted his 2006 opinion in Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v. Murphy345 as a spending power decision
rather than a statutory interpretation decision, producing a narrower clearstatement rule for the unambiguous-conditions element of the Dole test.346
Arlington was also indicative of things to come, as the clear-statement rule the
Court introduced in that case proved to be a step toward the now-stronger
judicial limits on congressional spending laid down in NFIB.
NFIB advances the Federalism Revolution as the first decision by any
federal court to hold Spending Clause legislation to be unconstitutionally
coercive. Proponents of broad federal power will no doubt claim that the
decision is sui generis and limited to its particular facts. But both the result and
the rhetoric in NFIB suggest that it is a launch, not a landing.
B.

Unresolved Coercion Questions After NFIB
1.

Stealth Application of Dole

The four-part test articulated in Dole has long been the definitive test for
determining whether conditions placed on federal spending are
constitutional.347 Justice Ginsburg summarized the test thus:
[C]onditions placed on federal grants to States must (a) promote the
“general welfare,” (b) “unambiguously” inform States what is demanded
of them, (c) be germane “to the federal interest in particular national
projects or programs,” and (d) not “induce the States to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”348
Unfortunately, the manner in which the plurality addressed the four-part
Dole test is both unclear and disorganized.349 The NFIB opinions relied

345

548 U.S. 291 (2006).
Huberfeld, Clear Notice, supra note 14, at 452-65 (tracing the concurrences and
dissents that led to the stricter clear-notice standard in Arlington). Arlington involved the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, which provides for the recovery of attorneys’
fees by parents who successfully challenge inadequate education plans. Arlington, 548 U.S.
at 293. At issue in the case was whether this reimbursement scheme also included
reimbursing expert (non-attorney) fees. Id. The Court held that expert fees could not be
reimbursed because the state did not have clear notice of this funding requirement. Id. at
298.
347 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
348 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08, 210).
349 Professor Samuel Bagenstos writes that this disjointed opinion should be read in the
frame of an “anti-leveraging principle” and argues that the Roberts opinion requires that
three factors exist for coercion to be found: that the conditions be “attached to large amounts
of federal money, change the terms of participation in entrenched cooperative programs, or
tie together separate programs into a package deal.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, The AntiLeveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Apr.
346
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heavily, but indirectly, on the elements of the Dole test, even though those
elements were not argued or relied on in the decisions below. District Judge
Vinson cited the Dole test and noted that “[t]he plaintiffs do not appear to
dispute that the Act meets these restrictions.”350 The Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged the same concession, with a footnote clarifying that the
plaintiffs’ claims were not based on the germaneness requirement of Dole.351
At oral argument, Solicitor General Verrilli said the Medicaid expansion
“complies with all of the limits set forth in this Court’s decision in Dole, and
the States do not contend otherwise.”352 Justice Ginsburg noted the same point
in her opinion.353
Even so, elements of the Dole test feature prominently in the plurality
opinion,354 though not identified as such. The Dole test was effectively waived
below and not adequately briefed, but at least two parts of the test were
reanimated, potentially modified, and ambiguously incorporated into the
Court’s coercion analysis.355 With irony that the plurality surely did not intend,
the first such part concerned “clear notice.”
a.

Clear Notice

When exercising authority under the Spending Clause, Congress must
clearly express any conditions it attaches to federal funds.356 The Court first
articulated this legislative clear-statement rule in Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman,357 authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, who later
2013) (manuscript at 3).
350 Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d
1120, 1157 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
351 Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1263 & n.63 (11th Cir. 2011).
352 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 40.
353 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 n.18 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Although the plaintiffs, in the proceedings below, did not contest the ACA’s satisfaction
of these criteria, [Chief Justice Roberts] appears to rely heavily on the second criterion.”
(citation omitted)).
354 See id. at 2601-08 (plurality opinion). These issues were discussed during oral
argument as well. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 41-42, 44 (discussing
Dole’s conditions and their potential applicability to the Medicaid expansion in question).
355 Perhaps the NFIB coercion analysis could be considered entirely separate from the
four-factor test in Dole, limited only to cases (like NFIB) where Dole was satisfied or
waived. But if that were the Court’s intention, then the plurality opinion should have
explained how clear notice and relatedness were satisfied for the Dole test, but not for
purposes of the plurality’s coercion analysis. Instead, we have reanimation, potential
modification, and ambiguous incorporation of the old test.
356 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (“Congress must
express clearly its intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States
can knowingly decide whether or not to accept those funds.”).
357 Id. at 25 (“The crucial inquiry, however, is not whether a State would knowingly

52

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

incorporated it into the Dole test as an “unambiguous conditions”
requirement.358 This requirement was later given a tightened definition by
Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Arlington, which announced that “clear
notice” is required, not mere unambiguity or “adequate” notice.359 The
Arlington Court stated that its task was to discern whether a state would have
understood, at the outset of its decision to accept federal funding, all of the
conditions attached to that funding.360
The clear-notice requirement is closely linked to the Court’s view of
conditional spending programs as “much in the nature of a contract.”361 The
theory is that a state cannot understand the terms of the “contract” if they are
not “clear.” Accordingly, the clear-notice requirement protects states from
conditions that may be unanticipated. As Justice Rehnquist wrote in Pennhurst,
the “crucial inquiry [] is not whether a State would knowingly undertake that
obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that
the State could make an informed choice.”362
The connections between conditional spending power, clear notice, and
federalism are direct. State autonomy is preserved by ensuring that states
knowingly and voluntarily enter into cooperative arrangements with the federal
government. But it now appears that clear notice and coercion are also linked
because the Court’s coercion reasoning was based, in part, on what it deemed
inadequate notice to the states of the new conditions on federal Medicaid
dollars. Because the Court did not evaluate the Dole test systematically, it is
unclear as to whether the Court intended this result. The plurality and the joint
dissent both suggested that states in a program as longstanding as Medicaid
cannot possibly have clear notice of a dramatic new condition on the funding

undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that
the State could make an informed choice.”). Pennhurst involved the requirements of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, in particular the so-called Bill
of Rights section, and whether the Bill of Rights created mandatory or hortatory conditions
for state compliance. Id. at 8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1)-(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The
Court held that conditions on the grant of federal monies must be “unambiguous” so that
states may “exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences” of complying
with federally imposed conditions. Id. at 17. Because the states could not have known the
particular provision at issue would be a requirement, the Court refused to enforce it against
them retroactively. Id. at 25.
358 Huberfeld, Clear Notice, supra note 14, at 446-52 (describing the progression from
Pennhurst to Dole).
359 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); see
also Huberfeld, Clear Notice, supra note 14, at 465-72 (describing the deliberate movement
to “clear” notice in Arlington).
360 Arlington, 548 U.S. at 296, 304.
361 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; see also Blumstein Brief, supra note 246 (developing
further the contract analogy for the Medicaid coercion argument). The common law
contractual defense of duress seems applicable here but was not discussed by the Court.
362 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25.
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for that program, despite Congress’s express reservation of the right to amend,
revise, and thereby, implicitly, to impose new conditions on the program.363
That interpretation would seem to ossify federal programs. The resulting
question is whether Congress could have avoided the Court’s coercion holding
in NFIB if it had given clearer notice: for example, by stating expressly that it
reserved the power to impose radically new conditions on which all Medicaid
funding could and would be conditioned. Whether the Court meant to endorse
such a “clearer-statement” approach to congressional drafting we cannot
know.364 Future Congresses could certainly repeal Medicaid entirely, as Justice
Ginsburg observed,365 with grudging agreement from Chief Justice Roberts on
this specific point.366
The reasoning of the plurality and the joint dissent also suggest that timing
matters for clear notice, but the Court addressed timing in a haphazard manner.
For the contract analogy, the time that matters is the moment of contract
formation. At that moment, states must clearly understand the conditions that
attach to the federal funding. Only Justice Ginsburg explored the question of
exactly when cooperative-federalism contracts are formed. To Justice
Ginsburg, they are formed and reformed each and every fiscal year, as
Congress offers money and states accept it. This is the true import of her
statement that Congress could completely eliminate Medicaid and then reenact it.367 According to this view, the relevant moment is March 23, 2010 (the
date of the ACA’s enactment), and the question is whether states have a clear
understanding of their obligations under Medicaid as of January 1, 2014 (the
date of the Medicaid expansion’s applicability). This is a question that is easily
answered in the affirmative. Unlike the concerns in Pennhurst over
retroactivity, the Medicaid expansion effectively provides six years of advance
notice – four years until the expansion takes effect and two more years of
363

See supra Part II.D.1, .3.
EMILY W. PARENTO & LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, O’NEILL INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 7,
THE SUPREME COURT’S LANDMARK DECISION ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: HEALTHCARE
REFORM’S ULTIMATE FATE REMAINS UNCERTAIN 6-7 (2012).
365 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2636 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
366 Id. at 2606 n.14 (plurality opinion). The hypothetical was suggested prior to NFIB by
Glenn Cohen and Jim Blumstein in the New England Journal of Medicine. Cohen &
Blumstein, supra note 14, at 104. While acknowledging this hypothetical was legally
correct, Justice Roberts dismissed it as politically impractical. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 n.14
(plurality opinion); see also Cohen & Blumstein, supra note 14, at 104 (discussing the
political impracticability of the Medicaid unilateral amendment provision). It is not clear
why this would be politically impracticable, as Congress could have just added a phrase to
Title II of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act announcing repeal and reenactment. Chief Justice Roberts does not describe why this would have changed a single
vote in Congress or why we should require Congress to discern magic phrases that the Court
will later require in legislation.
367 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
364
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100% federal funding. In Pennhurst, the Court cautioned: “Though Congress’
power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it does not include
surprising participating States with post acceptance or ‘retroactive’
conditions.”368 The Pennhurst Court was concerned that states agreed to accept
federal educational funds only to learn, through litigation several years later,
that hortatory obligations were mandatory and had retroactive effect.369 Here,
states have several years to decide whether to accept the conditions before
agreeing to participate in the Medicaid expansion.
The lack of notice in Arlington is similarly distinguishable from the present
case.370 In NFIB, the states fully understood the federal offer of the Medicaid
expansion well in advance of the effective date. Indeed, the states’ immediate
request for judicial relief from the Medicaid expansion indicates a very clear
understanding of the law and ample time to challenge it. The notice was clear
and prospective; some states just did not like the offer.
In the opinions and briefs in NFIB, much ink was spilled over whether
Congress gave clear notice in 1965. But surely this is the wrong question. The
original 1965 Medicaid statute included language originally enacted in the
SSA of 1935: “The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter
is hereby reserved to the Congress.”371 The plurality and the joint dissent
simultaneously made too much and too little of this provision. Too much,
because it goes without saying that Congress retains the right to amend federal
laws, assuming the votes exist. The 89th Congress, which created the Medicaid
Act in 1965, cannot and did not bind subsequent Congresses; nor did any
Congress need this clause to authorize the right to amend Medicaid in the
future. Too little, because, if anything, this provision disclaims the contractual
analogy applied by the Court. An explicit provision permitting unilateral
amendment, after all, is a stranger to contract law.372 Thus Congress included a
provision that was substantively superfluous, but only served to emphasize that
Medicaid was not a contract. The Court entirely neglected to discuss this point.

368

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
Id. at 22-25 (rejecting the argument that states were given ample notice that their
receipt of funds attached conditions for the provision of mental health services and
treatment).
370 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(asserting that a state must have clear notice of conditions and not learn of them post hoc,
through piecemeal litigation).
371 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (originally enacted as Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L.
No. 74-271, § 1104, 49 Stat. 620, 648).
372 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a (1981); see also Cohen, supra
note 32, at 14-16 (discussing the doctrine of illusory promise in this precise context). For
further scholarly discussion of the contract analogy, clear-notice requirement, and the
relevant statutory “contract” dates animating the NFIB opinion, see generally Copeland,
supra note 14.
369
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When discussing the question of clear notice, it is important to remember
that the Court did not declare any provision of the ACA to be unconstitutional.
The only federal law affected by NFIB is § 1396c, which authorized the
Secretary to limit federal funds for noncompliance. But § 1396c was not added
by the ACA; it also has been part of the Medicaid Act since 1965 and
analogous language has been part of the SSA since 1935. And surely Congress
could cut off future funds to states through legislation repealing, no longer
funding, or otherwise amending the Medicaid Act. The Tenth Amendment
gives no textual hint of this clear-notice rule, nor does the Court elucidate any
precedent or theory supporting this approach.
b.

Relatedness

The linchpin of the plurality’s opinion is the artificial distinction it forges
between “old” and “new” Medicaid. This factually incorrect and atheoretical
assessment facilitated the conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was
unconstitutionally coercive. It also may have modified the “germaneness”
prong of the Dole test.373 Until now, the Court had not enforced relatedness in
this context. But after NFIB, we will undoubtedly see many cases attempting to
apply this new concept, especially to determine exactly how “related” the
condition must be to the existing program.374
A major error that facilitated this mischaracterization of “old” and “new”
Medicaid was the plurality’s description of Medicaid eligibility, which
portrayed historical coverage categories as if they had constitutional
significance.375 This is far from the truth. As described in Part II, in 1965
Medicaid was limited to covering the “deserving” poor,376 but that is
attributable to the historical precedent created by the Elizabethan Poor Laws.

373

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-09 (1987). The Court called this aspect of
the limitations on conditional spending “relatedness” and “germaneness” interchangeably.
374 KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42367, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V.
SEBELIUS 10 (2012) (“Justice Roberts’ decision in NFIB appears to contemplate that when a
court evaluates a grant condition, it must determine the relationship between that grant
condition and the underlying grant program.”). As the Congressional Research Service
described it, this transformation created an entirely new category for constitutionalcondition cases. Id. at 11 (“However, if the grant condition is for a new and independent
program; the government threatens the funding of an existing program; and the withholding
of federal funding represents a significant portion of a state’s budget, then the condition
would be coercive under the Tenth Amendment.”).
375 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2636 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing the plurality’s focus on past eligibility categories as determinative of future
eligibility).
376 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 14, at 436-49 (providing a history of
Medicaid to explain why the program has persistently limited eligibility to the deserving
poor and focused on states’ autonomy).
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The limited categories of Medicaid eligibility were not conceived of as a hardwired, constitutional mechanism for protecting states from federal conditions.
Chief Justice Roberts suggested that individuals below 133% FPL but above
the pre-expansion Medicaid eligibility levels are not “the neediest among
us.”377 He was egregiously incorrect. As Justice Ginsburg described, the
Medicaid expansion income levels under the ACA are quite modest,378
especially given the lack of protection from medical bankruptcy.379 The
plurality failed to explain, for example, why a sixty-five-year-old person with
income below $15,000 per year qualifies as the “neediest among us” but a
sixty-four-year-old with the same income does not. The Medicaid expansion
simply replaces the anachronistic categories of “deserving” poor with an
across-the-board, nondiscriminatory income test. Nonetheless, Chief Justice
Roberts attributed constitutional significance to the level of poverty and
deployed the Tenth Amendment to protect states from any change in the
historical coverage categories.
Here the actual history of Medicaid presses for attention. Since 1965, the
federal government has expanded Medicaid mandatory coverage many times.
Contrary to the plurality’s assertion that this expansion was a “shift in kind, not
merely degree,”380 extending eligibility by eliminating the categorical
characterizations of poverty was entirely consistent with federal control of a
program that exists to mainstream the poor into the healthcare system.381 The
plurality rejected the idea that Congress could “style” the “new” expansion as
part of “old” Medicaid simply by calling it such.382 But the Medicaid
expansion is not merely an issue of style. It is a modernization of the Medicaid
program compatible with prior expansions.383
377

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Single adults
earning no more than $14,856 per year – 133% of the current federal poverty level – surely
rank among the Nation’s poor.”).
379 David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results
of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 745 (2009) (describing legal changes which have
made medical bankruptcy difficult and expensive to obtain).
380 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
381 Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the
purpose and history of Medicaid, including its expansions).
382 Id. at 2605-06 (plurality opinion) (“Indeed, the manner in which the expansion is
structured indicates that while Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of
existing Medicaid, it recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program.”).
But see at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress styled
and clearly viewed the Medicaid expansion as an amendment to the Medicaid Act, not as a
‘new’ healthcare program.”).
383 The alternative-benefits package for the Medicaid-expansion population is also not
new; it was introduced as an element of flexibility for states in the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6044, 120 Stat. 4, 88 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1) (2006)) (giving states the option of providing only “benchmark
378
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The characterization of “new Medicaid” is dangerous because it denies
deference to Congress when it sets the parameters for both new and amended
conditional spending programs. The federal government has always established
the baselines of Medicaid, one of which is eligibility. The federal requirements
operate as a floor, according states flexibility to increase coverage but not
decrease it. The plurality failed to appreciate that eligibility for a federal
program is a key element of “preserv[ing] control over the use of federal
funds.”384 If eligibility for federal funding is beyond the federal government’s
control, then NFIB truly opens the floodgates for litigation.
Putting aside this Article’s critiques of relatedness, on this issue the views of
the joint dissent and the Roberts plurality merge, suggesting a line of argument
likely to garner the support of a majority of Justices in future cases. They
appear willing to carefully scrutinize the relatedness of conditions on federal
programs, regardless of the way in which Congress structures those programs
or describes their germaneness. Thus, it appears that Justice O’Connor’s Dole
dissent, which similarly would have given prominence to germaneness under
the Dole test, will now surely operate in future coercion analyses.385
Based on its assessment of the Medicaid expansion as a “new” program, the
plurality wrote:

benefits” to certain populations). For further description of the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005 and ACA amendments incorporating the EHB package as defined by ACA section
2001(c)(3), see supra notes 150-66 and accompanying text. It is ironic that the states now
point to this option as coercion, when it was originally written to benefit them and provide
them more flexibility.
384 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (plurality opinion).
385 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213-18 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O’Connor wrote:
There is a clear place at which the Court can draw the line between permissible and
impermissible conditions on federal grants. It is the line identified in the Brief for the
National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae:
“Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it has the power to
legislate only for delegated purposes . . . .
“The appropriate inquiry, then, is whether the spending requirement or prohibition
is a condition on a grant or whether it is regulation. The difference turns on whether
the requirement specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so that
Congress’ intent in making the grant will be effectuated. Congress has no power
under the Spending Clause to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond
specifying how the money should be spent. A requirement that is not such a
specification is not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid only if it falls within
one of Congress’ delegated regulatory powers.”
This approach harks back to United States v. Butler, the last case in which this Court
struck down an Act of Congress as beyond the authority granted by the Spending
Clause.
Id. at 215-16 (citations omitted) (quoting Brief of the National Conference of State
Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-20, Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(No. 86-260)).
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Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds [] cannot be
justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions take the form
of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the
conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to
accept policy changes.386
For the plurality, “old” Medicaid was a “significant independent grant” which
could not be conditioned on states agreeing to accept “new” Medicaid
conditions. The suggested line of attack for future challenges, therefore, is that
conditions unrelated to the program for which funding is offered should be
deemed non-germane, and therefore coercive, depending on the amount and
percentage of funding at stake.387
Both the plurality and the joint dissent were opaque in their application of
the four Dole factors, purporting instead to base their opinions on the
analytically distinct coercion dicta. But the opinions’ inspection of the
“relatedness” of the condition to the purpose of the program suggests a new
judicial approach to Medicaid and other Spending Clause cases.388 NFIB plows
new ground: first, by giving teeth to Dole’s germaneness limit, and, second, by
injecting two Dole factors, relatedness and clear notice, into the coercion
analysis. Federal modifications of established conditional spending programs
that impose new requirements on states will now be vulnerable to
constitutional challenges for violating one or both of these limits. Moreover,
federal conditions that were previously found not to be coercive may be
exposed to new challenges after NFIB. Two examples follow.
First, in Kansas v. United States Kansas challenged conditions imposed on
states that accepted federal funds under TANF and related programs after the
1996 welfare reform.389 The challenged federal law called on states to adopt
386

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
Because the majority in Dole had found the conditions sufficiently related to spending
for the general welfare, the opinion dispensed with consideration of the third prong. Dole,
483 U.S. at 211 (“When we consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if she
adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds
otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion
is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.”).
388 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged “federalism-based limits” on Congress’s power to
spend. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She
rejected, however, the plurality’s assessment that it was constitutionally significant that the
states lacked notice concerning the Medicaid expansion. Id. at 2630. Further, in a clear
reference to the plurality’s focus on Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Dole (which she did not
cite), Justice Ginsburg distinguished the germaneness concerns in Dole from the expansion
of funding in NFIB. Justice Ginsburg noted that the condition on the spending is for the
program, Medicaid, and not for anything else; therefore, the Dole coercion concerns were
not viable. Id. at 2634.
389 Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). President Clinton
promised to “end welfare as we know it” during his 1992 campaign and fulfilled that
promise with “workfare” in 1996. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Op-Ed, End Welfare Lite
387
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uniform national child-support laws and procedures, including the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).390 More specifically, Congress
required all fifty states to adopt this precise legal text or else suffer loss of all
TANF funds.391 States were also subjected to an MOE provision akin to that
found in many amendments to the SSA.392 Although not articulating
“relatedness” as a constitutional test, the Tenth Circuit had little trouble finding
an acceptable relationship between TANF funding and the UIFSA condition.
The two were “clearly related,” based on the program’s goals, legislative
history, and the “interrelationship” between welfare and child support.393
Arguably, TANF, a program designed to help needy families achieve selfsufficiency through job preparation, work, and marriage, and the UIFSA, a
model act regarding enforcement of child-support obligations, are less related
than “old” and “new” Medicaid, which involve the same program of health
insurance benefits for individuals in financial need. Conceivably, the Roberts
plurality may invite a renewed coercion challenge to these programs. The
Kansas court buttressed its relatedness analysis with statutory construction,
noting that both programs were codified in the same chapter of the SSA.394
This, however, is precisely the type of evidence Chief Justice Roberts slighted
in his NFIB opinion.395
Second, in Oklahoma v. Schweiker eleven states challenged the 1976 SSA
amendments on coercion grounds.396 These amendments conditioned the
receipt of all Medicaid funds upon a new requirement: agreeing to pass
through to SSI recipients all of the annual federal cost-of-living adjustments.397
as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A19 (describing the many changes attributed
to the workfare law, and highlighting the impact of a strong economy on reducing welfare
rolls).
390 See Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1198.
391 Id. (“If a state’s child support enforcement program fails to conform . . . the state risks
the denial of . . . its TANF funding.”).
392 Id. at 1197 (“A state that elects to receive the federal block grant under the TANF
program, however, must operate a child support enforcement program that meets [the
litigated program’s] requirements.”).
393 Id. at 1200 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1356, at 49-50 (1974)).
394 Id. (“It is no coincidence that the AFDC/TANF and the child support programs are
both set forth in the same subchapter of the Social Security Act, which bears the heading
‘Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children and for ChildWelfare Services.’”).
395 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 n.13 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Nor, of course, can the
number of pages the amendment occupies, or the extent to which the change preserves and
works within the existing program, be dispositive.”).
396 Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 402 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (listing the
appellants as eleven states and noting that two additional states, Colorado and Michigan,
were parties before the district court but did not join the appeal).
397 Id. at 408 (“In order to induce the states to pass cost-of-living increases on to aid
recipients, Congress deemed it necessary to attach the pass-through condition to the
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The D.C. Circuit Court found this threat – the loss of all Medicaid funds –
permissible because it was sufficiently related to SSI:
Indeed, SSI and Medicaid are two interrelated components of the
comprehensive federal effort to aid the aged, the blind, and the disabled.
Both programs are aimed at the same target population – in fact,
eligibility for SSI payments automatically entitles one to Medicaid
benefits in most states – but each focuses on satisfying a particular
need.398
NFIB’s relatedness-infused coercion analysis now suggests a potentially
different outcome in Oklahoma v. Schweiker. First, the Court might find SSI
and Medicaid not sufficiently related as they seem even more clearly different
programs than “old” and “new” Medicaid.399 Then, it might find that
conditioning states’ Medicaid funds on their agreement to apply the cost-ofliving adjustments to SSI recipients would be unconstitutionally coercive.
Additional examples abound and are likely to arise in the near future. Indeed,
at oral arguments Mr. Clement discussed CHIP and Medicaid as if they were
sufficiently unrelated to be vulnerable to a coercion claim.400
Thus, it appears germaneness is no longer a silent element of the Dole test,
though the manner in which the concept was incorporated into the plurality’s
coercion analysis differs from Justice O’Connor’s conception of relatedness, as
expressed by her dissent in Dole.401 While it seems correct that Congress
cannot condition federal funding on participation in unrelated programs, the
deep problem with the plurality’s analysis is that Medicaid is just one program,
thus germaneness/relatedness is inapposite. Nevertheless, the Court has now
created precedent that connects germaneness to coercion, which arguably
expands the reach of the coercion doctrine invented by NFIB.

Medicaid provisions of the Act, under which funds are disbursed to the states.”).
398 Id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
399 See id. at 410 (“The legislative history of the Social Security Act and of its
amendments therefore refutes appellants’ suggestion that the requirement that states pass
through SSI cost-of-living increases is unrelated to the purposes of the Medicaid program.
On the contrary, the relevant committee reports, the evolution of the Act’s structure, and
other conditions set by Congress all indicate that Medicaid funds and SSI benefits are two
elements of one scheme with a single aim. We find nothing impermissible in Congress’
conditioning a state’s receipt of Medicaid funds on its compliance with section 1618’s
mandate regarding the use of SSI funds.”).
400 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 16-17.
401 Justice O’Connor perceived a plain germaneness problem in Dole; the federal
highway funding was not rationally related to liquor regulation. South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203, 212-18 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Failure to Define Coercion

In the absence of caselaw defining and applying the coercion doctrine, the
States instead asked the Court to “fashion” a coercion doctrine.402 And
“fashion” the Court did, though the rules for unconstitutional coercion in
exercises of spending power have pointedly not been supplied.403 Nevertheless,
at least three possible coercion rubrics can be gleaned from NFIB: a
quantitative analysis focused on financial figures, the more qualitative concept
of political accountability, and the joint dissent’s concept of “coercion in fact.”
a.

Quantitative Coercion

Dole’s coercion analysis was open-ended and could have been interpreted to
mean either that Congress offered states too much money or that Congress
threatened to take too much money away.404 NFIB settled on the latter. The
plurality in NFIB expressly affirmed that the amount of money being offered
was not an issue, writing: “Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from
offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of
health care . . . .”405 The conclusion then must be that the coercion question
does not hinge, at least directly, on the amount being offered to the states but
rather on the money that can be taken away for failure to comply with
conditions on spending. But the amount offered seems relevant inasmuch as
the overall size of a federal program, whether measured by total federal
spending on the program or the size of the federal grants to states, was central
to the Court’s coercion analysis of the Medicaid expansion.
In reviewing the size of the “threat,” the Court was attuned to both the raw
dollar amount and the percentage of funding that the federal government could
take away.406 Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion echoed a point he made during

402 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 28-29 (“[I]t is incumbent on
this Court to fashion judicially enforceable outer limits on the [spending] power that will
ensure preservation of the federal balance and the Constitution’s broad reservation of
powers to the States.” (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X)).
403 Though the plurality used words like “transform” to describe the effect of the
Medicaid expansion, finding it coercive and dividing it from the existing Medicaid program
based on this perceived extent of change, it is hard to extrapolate a rule from the Court’s
characterization of the expansion other than perhaps to look for characteristics of a new
program. It also seems fairly clear that not every amendment is transformative.
404 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (acknowledging the possibility that conditions imposed on
federal funds could acquire a “coercive nature,” but finding that on the facts presented “the
argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact”).
405 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (plurality opinion). The plurality continued this
thought: “What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate
in th[e] new [Medicaid] program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.” Id.
406 The plurality wrote as if this were clear from Dole, but the interpretation is clearer
than its source. Id. at 2604 (“By ‘financial inducement’ the Court meant the threat of losing
five percent of highway funds; no new money was offered to the States to raise their
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oral arguments:407 “[The] financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much
more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’ – it is a gun to the head. . . . A State
that opts out of the Affordable Care Act’s expansion . . . stands to lose not
merely ‘a relatively small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all
of it.”408
The Court’s quantitative analysis was not limited to the portion or overall
amount of Medicaid funding at issue, in the abstract, but in relation to several
other financial measures: the percentage of states’ budgets dedicated to
Medicaid, the federal government’s expenditures on Medicaid, and the
legislative and executive actions (especially funding) taken by states in
pursuance of the federal program over the years. These factors in their totality
supported the plurality’s determination that states are effectively “locked in” to
Medicaid.409 But the conflation of financial and other considerations muddles
the coercion analysis; the Court failed to indicate which of these factors is
decisive for a law’s constitutional status.410
NFIB’s coercion analysis suggests that some subset of federal laws may now
be unconstitutionally coercive, but the quantitative analysis was heavily fact
dependent.411 According at least to the Roberts plurality, we know that offering
a large sum of money is a permissible exercise of the spending power.412 But
threatening to take away an equally large sum or a large percentage of already
allotted money is potentially a prohibited exercise of the spending power. We
do not know how much is too much or what lies between the permitted large
offer and prohibited large withdrawal alternatives. NFIB did not provide
examples of offers that would be prohibited, but simply declared that if the

drinking ages.”).
407 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 54 (describing the threat of losing
federal funds as “the gun to your head”).
408 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
409 See Blumstein Brief, supra note 246, at 26 (describing the political problem of state
lock-in).
410 But see Bagenstos, supra note 349 (manuscript at 7-12) (discerning a three-part test
from the plurality’s opinion).
411 Justice Ginsburg found the concept of coercion too ethereal to be judicially
administrable. Though not using the words “political question,” she invoked Baker v. Carr
to emphasize that courts cannot determine when states “have no choice” but to accept
federal funds. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The coercion inquiry, therefore, appears to involve political judgments that defy
judicial calculation.” (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). Nevertheless,
because she agreed that the penalty for non-compliance was severable, Justice Ginsburg
(and Justice Sotomayor) joined the Roberts plurality to uphold the Medicaid expansion but
to limit the remedy available to the Secretary for noncompliance.
412 Justice Ginsburg confirmed this reading of the plurality opinion. See Id. at 2630-31
(differentiating between the constitutionally permissible making of federal grants to states
and the constitutionally problematic withholding of federal funding from states).
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states have “no real choice”413 then Congress has acted impermissibly. This
“choice” language comes dangerously close to Justice Stewart’s “I know it
when I see it” test,414 and it does nothing to define the spectrum of coercive
funding conditions.
Even so, it is tempting to divine a rule from the figures and percentages that
the Court referenced. For instance, the plurality’s reasoning suggests that if the
federal funding constitutes more than 10% of a state’s budget (that is, 50%
federal funding of a typical state’s 20% budget for Medicaid), it must be
coercive.415 By way of contrast, the plurality noted that the federal funds being
offered in Dole “constituted less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s
budget at that time.”416 Another way of thinking about state expenditures on
Medicaid, however, is based on the CBO’s estimate that compliance with the
Medicaid expansion would increase state spending less than 3% over the
amount states would spend absent the expansion.417 Thus, any rule for
evaluating coercion based on quantitative figures is highly malleable,
depending on which figures are presented as well as the ways in which states
can manipulate their own contributions to such spending programs. As
previously noted, a large percentage of the cost of Medicaid is due to states
choosing to exercise their options within Medicaid.418 Moreover, even the
CBO’s 3% figure was likely overstated when offset against other expected
state and local savings in healthcare spending for the uninsured under the
ACA.419 And states could inflate the impact of the loss of federal funds by, for
example, eliminating state income tax, thereby decreasing state revenue and
increasing the proportion of the federal spending program in question within
the state’s budget. These examples underscore the lack of certainty with a
413

See, e.g., id. at 2630.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart
famously wrote that pornography was hard to define but that he knew it when he saw it (and
the movie at issue was not pornography). Id. He later seemed to recognize that this standard
was unworkable, joining the dissent in Miller v. California. See Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 16, 37, 43-44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with a criminal sentence
imposed under “standards defining obscenity which until today’s decision were never the
part of any law” and remarking that “[t]o send men to jail for violating standards they
cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do”).
415 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2581-82 (plurality opinion) (“Federal funds received through the
Medicaid program have become a substantial part of state budgets, now constituting over 10
percent of most States’ total revenue. . . . If a State does not comply with the Act’s new
coverage requirements, it may lose not only the federal funding for those requirements, but
all of its federal Medical funds.”).
416 Id. at 2604.
417 See JANUARY ANGELES, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, HOW HEALTH
REFORM’S MEDICAID EXPANSION WILL IMPACT STATE BUDGETS 9 (2012), available at http://
www.cbpp.org/files/7-12-12health.pdf.
418
See supra Part I.B.2.
419 ANGELES, supra note 417, at 1-2; HOLOHAN ET AL., supra note 170, at 6-7.
414
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quantitative approach to defining coercion, as well as the gaming that can
easily occur.
The joint dissent’s focus on approximated figures, like the plurality’s
attention to financial statistics, suggested a brighter-line coercion rule than the
Court actually announced. Like the plurality, the joint dissent focused on
various quantitative measures, including the amount of money the federal
government offers, the amount of money the states stand to lose, and the
percentage of funding that is at stake. The dissent also pondered the proportion
of states’ budgets that would be affected by creating state-financed Medicaidequivalent programs420 and the percentage of total state expenditures that
amount would represent.421 The dissent concluded, without explaining its
calculations, that “the annual federal Medicaid subsidy is equal to more than
one-fifth of the State’s expenditures” and based the remainder of its coercion
analysis on that figure.422 Further, the dissent noted that this amount would be
in addition to the federal taxes that state citizens have to pay to support
Medicaid programs in other states.423 The analysis has a quantitative veneer,
but neither Congress nor a lower court could possibly glean from either the
plurality or the joint dissent which numbers actually point to unconstitutional
coercion. Because Marks v. United States tells us that the narrowest rule is the
precedent that should be followed from a plurality opinion,424 the additional
quantitative factors from the dissent should be ignored. But future cases may
bring the plurality and dissent back into alignment, forcing consideration of the
broader view in the dissent.
b.

Qualitative Coercion: Political Accountability

Another way of articulating NFIB’s coercion discussion is to consider the
federalism value of political accountability. The coercion discussion was a
striking continuation of the Federalism Revolution. Analogizing to New York
and Printz, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “Permitting the Federal Government
to force the States to implement a federal program would threaten the political

420

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2657 & n.7 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2664 (“[T]he Federal Government has threatened to withhold 42.3% of all
federal outlays to the states, or approximately $233 billion.”).
422
Id. at 2657.
423 Id. (“A State forced out of the program would not only lose this huge sum but would
almost certainly find it necessary to increase its own health-care expenditures substantially,
requiring either a drastic reduction in funding for other programs or a large increase in state
taxes. And these new taxes would come on top of the federal taxes already paid by the
State’s citizens to fund the Medicaid program in other States.”).
424 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976))).
421
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accountability key to our federal system.”425 He added that when states have a
real choice about whether to accept federal conditional funding, state officials
may fairly be held politically accountable for their decisions.426 But when there
is no choice, the federal government accomplishes its policy objectives without
being held politically accountable.427
Political accountability has been a remarkably consistent and central concept
in decisions limiting congressional authority under the Tenth Amendment.428
Neither the phrase “political accountability” nor prior decisions advancing that
theme, however, provide a framework for understanding how future coercion
claims might play out.429 It is not a coherent federalism principle, and despite
articulating a reason to avoid coercion, it creates no cognizable rule for lower
federal courts, let alone Congress, to follow.430 The fact that “political
accountability” is often used interchangeably with “local democracy” further
increases the confusion as “local democracy” is not a legal concept but a
425

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602-03 (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen the State has no choice, the
Federal Government can achieve its objectives without accountability, just as in New York
and Printz.”). See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). Quoting New York, the plurality continued:
“‘[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision.’” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (plurality opinion) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at
169).
426 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602-03 (plurality opinion). The joint dissent also adopted this
reasoning. See id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Where all
Congress has done is to ‘encourag[e] state regulation rather than compe[l] it, state
governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials remain
accountable to the people. . . .’” (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 168)).
427 Id. at 2603 (plurality opinion).
428 Curiously, the plurality did not cite the Tenth Amendment except to introduce the
discussion of congressional authority, even though it relied heavily on precedent that
enforced the Tenth Amendment as a limit on congressional authority. Chief Justice Roberts
paradoxically wrote: “The States are separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they
have to act like it.” Id. This almost sounds like Chief Justice Roberts is unwilling to mediate
between the federal government and the states except in certain circumstances.
429 See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775-97
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying in part on “political
accountability” to argue that the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act should have been
held unconstitutional in part). Foreshadowing New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor
wrote: “Congressional compulsion of state agencies, unlike preemption, blurs the lines of
political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are no longer
responsive to local needs.” Id. at 787.
430 For a deconstruction of judicially enforced federalism, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 139-43 (2008)
(observing “sources of incoherence” in the Court’s “commandeering doctrine and Tenth
Amendment cases”).
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political one.431 While it is important for voters to know which level of
government is responsible for both popular and unpopular policy, this does not
inform which level of government is responsible for creating or maintaining a
particular policy, which is the real question for federalism purposes.
The political accountability trope contains two glaring problems,
represented by the political climate surrounding passage of the ACA and the
remedy adopted by the Court. First, the political accountability narrative is not
borne out by these facts. If Congress was attempting to shield itself and force
states to take responsibility for Medicaid expansion, then 100% federal funding
through “ObamaCare” would seem to be an odd way to hide from voters. By
fully funding the Medicaid expansion in the most visible health-policy
legislation in a generation, the federal government took complete leadership
responsibility. As Justice Ginsburg noted with substantial understatement, the
federal role in Medicaid is “hardly hidden from view.”432
Second, the political-accountability narrative does not resonate in the
ultimate remedy of allowing states to opt in or out of Medicaid expansion. In
the States’ Brief and the joint dissent, much was made of the “divisive
dynamic”433 that would occur if citizens in opting-out states paid federal taxes
to support Medicaid expansion for citizens in opting-in states.434 The argument
hinges on the fact that all state citizens are necessarily federal taxpayers and
the implicit assumption that citizens should garner some direct benefit from the
amount of taxes they pay.435 The point was raised in the context of coercion,436

431 Political accountability has been described as the “‘answerability’ of representatives
to the represented.” D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political
Process – The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 557,
640 (1985). It has also been defined as the ability of constituents “to influence the political
process that produces their representatives and governing legislation,” which depends upon
the “‘connection between the representative and the represented.’” Robert A. Hammeke,
Note, State Autonomy Implications for Congressional Conditional Spending, 24 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 349, 355 (1999) (quoting Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 856 (1979)).
432 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2633 n.17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
433 Id. at 2667 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at 2657
(plurality opinion) (concluding that a state that chooses to opt out of the Medicaid expansion
would be forced to greatly increase state taxes to supplement lost federal funding even as
state citizens were still forced to pay federal taxes to support the expansion in other states).
434 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 43 (“Were a State to refuse
to comply with Congress’ conditions, ‘federal taxpayers in [that State] would be deprived of
the benefits of a return from the federal government to the state of a significant amount of
the federal tax monies collected.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jim C. v. United States,
235 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2000))).
435 See generally Brian Galle, Does Federal Spending “Coerce” States?: Evidence from
State Budgets, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (providing empirical evidence
disproving that federal taxation crowds-out states’ ability to tax their citizens).
436 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 43 (“[The] practical ability

2013]

PLUNGING INTO ENDLESS DIFFICULTIES

67

but is arguably relevant to political accountability as well. At oral argument,
Justice Kagan asked Mr. Clement whether it would be coercive if the federal
government offered to pay for 100% of the costs to expand Medicaid.437 He
insisted it would be,438 for one reason: federal taxes are raised from a state’s
own citizens.439 Mr. Clement’s suggestion was that putting states to the
difficult choice of having their citizens pay federal taxes to support Medicaid,
while garnering a benefit to the state in terms of federal Medicaid dollars,
versus paying the same taxes and receiving nothing in return, was
unconstitutionally coercive. This linking of taxation and benefit evokes a
political-accountability theme, and a line of argument that the States did not
pursue. First, the States failed to acknowledge the controlling force of the
Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes the federal income tax on individual
citizens of states.440 Second, the argument would prove too much, suggesting
that any federally funded conditional spending program that gives states a
choice to participate or not would be coercive. Third, NFIB allowed states to
opt out of the Medicaid expansion, with the clear consequences of that option
being loss of national redistribution of federal taxes and local responsibility for
medical welfare.441 The states become politically accountable for their own
taxation policy choices, but this is not what “political accountability” generally
means in the federalism context.

to ask residents, already taxed by the federal government to provide health insurance
elsewhere, to contribute additional taxes to supplant the declined federal program is all but
nil.”); Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 1-2, Florida v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400) (“Nor does the federal government
even try to explain how a State could possibly reject new terms attached to billions of
dollars of pre-existing funds . . . particularly when that would mean forfeiting not only all of
the tax dollars already being collected from its residents to fund Medicaid, but also billions
in new federal spending that the ACA creates. . . . If the federal government can coerce
States to administer federal programs, by threatening to withhold billions of dollars
extracted from in-State taxpayers, then very little is left of the anti-commandeering
doctrine.”).
437 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 3-6. Justice Alito questioned
Solicitor General Verrilli on similar grounds. Id. at 45-47.
438 Id. at 3-6.
439 Id. at 5-6. Actually, federal taxes are raised from citizens of the United States, who
also happen to be citizens or residents of various states.
440 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. At oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor asked whether this
line of argument was a limit on the federal power to tax. Mr. Clement conceded that it was
not. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 6-7.
441 Justice Sotomayor noted at oral arguments that Florida, the lead plaintiff, receives
more in federal benefits than its residents pay in federal taxes. Mr. Clement responded:
“Well, then I’ll make that argument on behalf of Texas.” Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 131, at 36.
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Coercion in Fact

The joint dissent’s spending-power analysis helps only slightly in
deciphering coercion, and it was more extreme in its views than the plurality.
At the outset, the joint dissent questioned the long-settled decision in Butler,
which interpreted the Spending Clause as a source of federal authority separate
from Congress’s other enumerated powers. Grudgingly, however, the dissent
accepted that the Hamiltonian view, as espoused in Butler, was settled law.442
The joint dissent also relied heavily on Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education, a 1999 decision in which Kennedy
articulated a desire to limit congressional spending by using federalism
principles.443 The NFIB joint dissent’s reliance on a prior dissent amounts to
double dicta – a non-binding opinion citing another non-binding opinion. Still,
it provides insight into the direction the Court may take in cases involving the
spending power and the coercion doctrine.
Like the plurality, the joint dissent refused to create a rule for coercion,
instead simply concluding that “Congress effectively engages in this
impermissible compulsion when state participation in a federal spending
program is coerced, so that the States’ choice whether to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program is rendered illusory.”444 The dissent seems to have
satisfied itself by declaring that a law must be “coercive in fact” (as opposed to
in theory).445 But the distinction between fact and theory is meaningless if
coercion remains undefined.446 The joint dissent acknowledged that it
effectively created no standard for courts to follow, writing: “The question
whether a law enacted under the spending power is coercive in fact will
sometimes be difficult, but where Congress has plainly ‘crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion,’ a federal program that coopts
the States’ political processes must be declared unconstitutional.”447
The greatest irony of the dissent’s “coercion in fact” analysis is how badly
wrong it got the facts on Medicaid.448 Despite that fundamental

442 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2657-58 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1937)).
443 See id. at 2659 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
444 Id. at 2660.
445 Id. at 2661.
446 Id. at 2661 (“Once it is recognized that spending power legislation cannot coerce state
participation, two questions remain: (1) What is the meaning of coercion in this context? (2)
Is the ACA’s expanded coverage coercive?”). For an attempt to define coercion in ethical
theory, see Cohen, supra note 32.
447 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992)).
448 For a factual discussion of Medicaid’s history, see supra Part I. The joint dissent
reiterated its proposed non-rule only a page after articulating it, writing: “Whether federal
spending legislation crosses the line from enticement to coercion is often difficult to
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misunderstanding of the program, the joint dissent suggests a preference for
case-by-case resolution of coercion challenges; in essence, as-applied rather
than facial challenges. Under this approach, the Court should recognize that
each state has different financial circumstances and priorities, which Medicaid
amply illustrates. Accordingly, a federal spending program deemed coercive in
Mississippi perhaps could be perfectly acceptable in Massachusetts. Of course,
politicians within a state may disagree as to whether a particular piece of
spending legislation is beneficial or coercive; this conflict was seen in the
amicus briefs submitted on the Medicaid expansion.449 But seven members of
the Court were unwilling to wait for an as-applied challenge, instead hearing a
facial challenge to a statute that would not take effect until January 1, 2014.
This anomaly between the dissent’s stated preference for as-applied challenges
and the Court’s willingness to hear a facial challenge to Medicaid expansion
was never explained. Moreover, the Court provided no theory, test, or set of
factors to guide lower courts hearing either facial or as-applied challenges to
exercises of the spending power.
The difficulty distinguishing between as-applied and facial challenges to
federal spending programs is more than merely hypothetical. Lower courts
have previously struggled with this precise issue in the context of § 1396c and
Medicaid. For example, in West Virginia v. United States Department of
Health & Human Services, the State challenged new cost-recovery provisions
in Medicaid, claiming, “thirty years later [] Congress changed the rules of the
game.”450 The State asserted that loss of Medicaid funds would have caused
West Virginia’s healthcare system to “effectively collapse.”451 But the Fourth
Circuit found no unconstitutional coercion. The key point was § 1396c, which
grants discretion to the Secretary for dealing with state noncompliance with
federal Medicaid rules by withholding all, or some unspecified portion, of
federal funding.452 In the view of the Fourth Circuit, “[t]his small difference in
language makes all the difference in our analysis.”453 Because the federal
government had not threatened to withhold all funding, the penalty was merely

determine, and courts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this ground
unless the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
449 See, e.g., Brief of the State of Oregon et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9-30, Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(No. 11-400) (explaining the benefit of the Medicaid expansion to the states and
representing differences of opinion within some states).
450 West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir.
2002).
451 Id.
452 Id. at 292 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006)).
453 Id.

70

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

“hypothetical,” leading the Court to conclude that West Virginia was
“mounting a facial challenge to the constitutionality” of the statute.454
The danger of the judicially enforced, fact-specific coercion theory is not
only that it may affect a host of established cooperative-federalism programs
for education, welfare, environmental protection, and highway infrastructure,
to name a few, but also that we still do not know what coercion is. NFIB,
which applied the coercion doctrine to a set of facts, provides no greater clarity
than Butler and Dole, which flagged coercion as an issue but declined to apply
it to the facts at hand. Both the Roberts plurality and the joint dissent expressly
declined to articulate any sort of test, instead merely providing nomenclature:
the “anticoercion rule.”455 The dissent’s formula was simply: “[I]f States really
have no choice other than to accept the package, the offer is coercive, and the
conditions cannot be sustained under the spending power.”456 Perhaps the
dissent acknowledged the ambiguity in its invitation for coercion litigation by
stating, at least twice, that determining the difference between influence and
coercion is “difficult.”457
In lieu of a satisfactory test for “coercion in fact,” the plurality and joint
dissent offered alarmist slogans. Chief Justice Roberts described the Medicaid
expansion vividly as “a gun to the head” and “economic dragooning,”458
continuing the bizarre references to “dragooning” that began with Printz.459
Both phrases are inappropriately incendiary. Historically, “dragoons” were
French monarchist cavalry units460 who destroyed Huguenot churches and
closed Protestant schools, leading to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in
October 1685.461 Dragoons destroyed religious freedom and drove hundreds of
454

Id.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting). While not using the same nomenclature, the plurality affirmed the same idea,
insisting there was “no need to fix a line” defining coercion. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
456 Id. at 2661 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
457 Id. at 2661-62.
458 Id. at 2604-05 (plurality opinion).
459 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (adopting the rhetoric of dragooning
from a dissenting opinion in the court below and using it to describe the federal
government’s perceived derogation of state autonomy, forcing states to “adminster[] federal
law”).
460 Keith P. Luria, Conversion and Coercion: Personal Conscience and Political
Conformity in Early Modern France, 12 MEDIEVAL HIST. J. 221, 224-25 (2009)
(“[Dragoons] were lodged in Huguenot houses and given free rein to brutalise their hosts
into submission. Huguenots who did not convert had to pay heavy taxes and faced financial
ruin. The dragoons worked in tandem with the Catholic clergy, who received the
beleaguered neophytes’ abjurations.”)
461 Id. at 225 (“In 1685, the royal government unleashed a new and more widespread
dragonnade . . . . By October 1685, [King] Louis could claim so many Huguenots had
converted that their community had essentially ceased to exist and the Edict of Nantes was
no longer necessary. He revoked it . . . .”). The Edict of Nantes had been promulgated in
455
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thousands of religious dissenters from France, without democratic legitimacy
or due process of law.462 Comparing the Medicaid expansion to “dragooning”
demonstrates either an ignorance of the historical context from which the term
arises or a profound misunderstanding of the program, neither of which
contributes to clear constitutional guidelines. As for the “gun to the head,” this
image casts the federal government as a violent criminal, threatening coldly to
“shoot” unless the state/victim complies.463 Ironically, the only lives actually
threatened will be those cut off from Medicaid as a result of choices made by
states.
3.

Severability After Unconstitutional Coercion

For the Minimum Coverage Provision, severability was a major issue
briefed and decided in the courts below, with splits among the circuits. The
Court gave the issue prominence, with separate time for oral arguments and
Court-appointed amici. By comparison, the question of Medicaid severability
appears to have caught nearly everyone by surprise.464 No court below had
found the Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutional, so there was no prior
decision on the remedial issue. Even when the Court granted certiorari, the
question presented on severability focused exclusively on the Minimum
Coverage Provision.465
The first substantive discussion of Medicaid severability appeared in a
single paragraph in the United States’ brief,466 filed on February 10, 2012,
followed by more robust discussion in amicus briefs filed a week later.467 The
1598 to ensure religious freedom for the Protestant Huguenots in Catholic France. Id. at
224.
462 Id. at 225 (stating that more than 39,000 Huguenots abjured their Protestant beliefs
based on the dragoons’ persecution).
463 For another, similar analogy from the oral argument, see Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 131, at 31-32 (Justice Scalia comparing “your money or your life”
with “your life or your wife’s”).
464 Except, that is, for those of us following the issue closely. See, e.g., Health Law Brief,
supra note 14, at 38-41.
465 Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2012) (mem.). Counsel
for Respondents’ amici informally discussed whether it was even proper to raise the issue,
given the language of the Court’s order granting certiorari.
466 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 52-53 (“There is no basis to believe that
Congress would have preferred no Medicaid eligibility extension at all to an eligibility
extension that applies only to consenting States.”).
467 See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae American Medical Student Association et al. in
Support of the United States on Severability at 16-19, Florida v. HHS, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No.
11-400) (“Because Congress expressly stated which provisions it might not have enacted if
it could not have also enacted a minimum coverage provision, that express statement of
legislative intent must define the outer limits of this Court’s severability inquiry.”); Health
Law Brief, supra note 14, at 29-41 (analyzing petitioners’ arguments concerning the
Medicaid Amendments); National Health Law Brief, supra note 130, at 4-34 (discussing
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Court ultimately adopted these points as the basis of their formal decision on
Medicaid severability. By contrast, the States’ briefs and their amici had little
to say on the subject, other than a passing mention in a footnote.468 But at the
end of the oral arguments, after the allotted time had expired, Justice Ginsburg
posed a remarkable question to Mr. Clement, proposing to preserve the
Medicaid expansion by giving states the choice to opt out.469 Clement was
amenable to the suggestion, agreeing that his clients would be “certainly
happy” with that result.470 Five Justices, including Justice Ginsburg and Chief
Justice Roberts, ultimately adopted this approach.
But we cannot expect and, for reasons explained below, might not welcome
similar concessions in future litigation. The narrow remedy adopted by the
Roberts plurality and the Ginsburg opinion creates a host of unintended
consequences for Medicaid and ACA implementation.471 First, this Article
offers some preliminary thoughts on the effect of severability after a finding of
unconstitutional coercion under the spending power. Second, it describes two
of the many implementation challenges the Court’s severability decision
creates.
In many respects, the narrow remedy adopted by the five Justices reflects
the particular context of NFIB, which was a pathbreaking case that carried
significant political baggage. These features may have induced the majority to

whether the Medicaid Provision impermissibly coerces states into a Medicaid partnership).
468 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 54 n.18. This was due, in
part, to how the Court structured the briefing and oral arguments, giving prominence to the
severability issue under the Commerce Clause challenge, but failing to mention it in the
context of Medicaid coercion.
469 The exchange was as follows:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Clement, may I ask one question about the bottom line
in this case? It sounds to me like everything you said would be to the effect of, if
Congress continued to do things on a voluntary basis, so we are getting these new
eligibles, and say, States, you can have it or not, you can preserve the program as it
existed before, you can opt into this.
But you are not asking the Court as relief to say . . . that’s how we cure the
constitutional infirmity; we say this has to be on a voluntary basis. . . .
MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Ginsburg, if we can start with the common ground
that there is a need for repair because there is a coercion doctrine and this statute is
coercion, then we are into the question of remedy. And . . . we do take the position that
you describe in the remedy, but we would be certainly happy if we got something here,
and we got a recognition that the coercion doctrine exists; this is coercive; and we get
the remedy that you suggest in the alternative.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 84-85.
470 Id. at 85.
471 For a review of the ACA implementation challenges in the states before the NFIB
decision, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-281, MEDICAID EXPANSION:
STATES’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 17-27
(2012) (describing how states are addressing changes that must be made to their existing
Medicaid programs and dealing with “implementation challenges”).
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choose a more conciliatory approach when it came to the remedy. One
commentator has gone so far as to call this decision a “Marbury for our
time.”472 Chief Justice Roberts’ severability analysis, like his salvaging of the
Minimum Coverage Provision under the taxing power, suggests a political
judgment regarding the case, asserting that “[w]e are confident that Congress
would have wanted to preserve the rest of the Act.”473 This assessment notably
conflicts with the plurality’s lack of deference to Congress elsewhere in the
opinion, including the Court’s conclusion that the ACA did not simply amend
Medicaid but created an entirely new conditional spending program.474 The
Court similarly refused to give controlling weight to Congress’s
characterization of the individual mandate as a penalty, not a tax.475 The
compulsion to preserve the ACA, it seems, was more a perception of political
will than a judicial finding.
Other lines of reasoning underlying the plurality’s severability analysis are
specific to the facts of the case, suggesting that the decision was influenced by
the political context, rather than more generally applicable legal reasoning. For
example, the plurality relied on § 1303, the severability clause present in the
SSA since 1935, but was unclear as to whether § 1303 was determinative of, or
merely helpful to, the ultimate decision. Congress surely did not include a
severability clause in the SSA for the purpose of providing a remedy for
successful coercion challenges to spending power programs. But it is not
difficult to imagine future decisions in which the Court holds Congress to a
legislative drafting standard that could not have been known at the time a law
was written.476
Ironically, the mischaracterization of Medicaid into “old” and “new”
programs helped preserve the ACA from being struck down in its entirety
because the severed provision, § 1396c, was part of the “old” Medicaid Act.
But as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court inexplicably deemed the
Medicaid expansion part of the Medicaid Act for the statutory severability
remedy, but not for purposes of the constitutionality of the Medicaid
expansion. This interpretive paradox is more baffling given that the plurality
expressly deferred to Congress in narrowly applying the severability remedy to
the Secretary’s authority in administering Medicaid but did not defer in

472

Brad Joondeph, A Marbury for Our Time, ACA LITIGATION BLOG (June 28, 2012,
10:04 AM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/marbury-for-our-time.html.
473 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (plurality opinion).
474 Id. at 2605 (rejecting the Government’s claim that “the Medicaid expansion is
properly viewed merely as a modification of the existing program”).
475 Id. at 2597 (dismissing the joint dissent’s argument that “we cannot uphold [the
individual mandate] as a tax because Congress did not ‘frame’ it as such”).
476 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-17 (2000) (holding elements
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) to be outside Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority as delineated in United States v. Lopez, a decision announced after VAWA was
passed).
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determining that “new” Medicaid was unconstitutionally coercive.477 Indeed,
the severability provision the Court relied on for the Medicaid remedy, § 1303,
dates to the original SSA and is even older than the Medicaid Act.
Additionally, the plurality opinion raised some troubling severability
questions external to the facts of this case. The first is the relationship between
severability jurisprudence generally and severability in the specific context of
unconstitutional coercion. While the severability issue was briefed and argued
extensively for the Minimum Coverage Provision challenge, the plurality’s
severability analysis for the Medicaid issue was relatively thin.478 We do not
know if the plurality’s decision establishes new standards for severability of
congressional statutes or a more limited holding specific to the issue of
coercion under conditional spending statutes.
Second, in our Brief of Amici Curiae Health Law & Policy Scholars and
Prescription Policy Choices in Support of Respondents on the Constitutional
Validity of the Medicaid Expansion in Florida v. Department of Health and
Human Services,479 we suggested a federalism rationale for a narrow view of
severability in the event the Court found unconstitutional coercion.480 As
observed, each state has different financial circumstances, so a federal
spending program deemed coercive in Mississippi could be perfectly
acceptable in Massachusetts.481 But as previously explained, that approach
seems consistent with the dissent’s preferred coercion-in-fact approach.482 Put
another way, why insist that all fifty states have been coerced when only
twenty-six chose to sue? If a state’s political leadership deems itself coerced,
the state can opt out. The narrow severability remedy bypasses subjective
judicial judgments and allows the revealed preferences of each state to
determine whether it has in fact felt coerced. By contrast, a holding that strikes
down a conditional spending program as unconstitutional mutes states’ ability
to express their support for, or objection to, the federal program. The Red State
Option might be federalism’s preferred remedy as opposed to mere political
expediency.
Third, the Court’s narrowly crafted remedy, as opposed to the joint dissent’s
argument to strike down the entire ACA, highlights the uncertainty over
whether NFIB was a facial challenge. The Roberts plurality ignored the issue
of facial versus as-applied challenges, despite briefing and oral arguments

477 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion) (“Our ‘touchstone for any decision
about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent
the intent of the legislature.’” (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546
U.S. 320, 330 (2006))).
478 For a summary of the severability briefs, see Outterson, supra note 14.
479 See Health Law Brief, supra note 14.
480 Id. at 38-41.
481 See, e.g., Brief of the State of Oregon et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 449, at 9-14.
482 See supra Part III.B.2.c.
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clarifying that the Secretary had not threatened to withhold all Medicaid
funding from any litigant state.483 Instead, at oral argument the Chief Justice
focused on the worst-case hypothetical, i.e., the Secretary directly threatening
to cut off all Medicaid funds, while Solicitor General Verrilli did little to
dissuade him.484 Justice Breyer tried to throw the Solicitor General a bone,
noting the Secretary’s administrative discretion under § 1396c and the
Administrative Procedure Act, but Solicitor General Verrilli did not pick it
up.485 Perhaps Justice Breyer was looking for a commitment that the Secretary
would never actually cut off all existing Medicaid funds, given the strong
commitment of the federal government to delivering health insurance and
health care to Americans in need.486 Alternatively, Justice Breyer suggested at
oral argument that the Administrative Procedure Act might cabin the
Secretary’s discretion and provide an avenue for judicial review.487 Justice

483

See, e.g., Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 21.
The discussion was as follows:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but that’s just saying that when, you know, the
analogy that has been used, the gun to your head, “your money or your life,” you say,
well, there’s no evidence that anyone has ever been shot.
GENERAL VERRILLI: But –
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it’s because you have to give up your wallet.
You don’t have a choice.
GENERAL VERRILLI: But that –
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And you cannot – you cannot represent that the
Secretary has never said: And if you don’t do it, we are going to take away all the
funds.
They cite the Arizona example; I suspect there are others, because that is the
leverage.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 54-55.
485 The discussion was as follows:
JUSTICE BREYER: I don't know if that’s so. And all I asked in my question was I
didn’t ask you to commit the Secretary to anything. I wanted to know what the facts
are.
GENERAL VERRILLI: I –
JUSTICE BREYER: I wanted to know what you found in researching this case. I
wanted you, in other words, to answer the question the Chief Justice has: Is it a
common thing, that that happens, that this unrelated threat is made? Or isn’t it?
GENERAL VERRILLI: It’s – my understanding is that these situations are usually
worked out back and forth between the States and the Federal Government. And I think
that most –
JUSTICE BREYER: And you are not privy to what those are.
GENERAL VERRILLI: And I’m not. But –
JUSTICE SCALIA: And who wins?
Id. at 55-56.
486 In the realm of politics, one can imagine the difficulties faced by any Secretary of
HHS who actually cut off all funds. Practically speaking, the Secretary would generally be
“coerced” into negotiating a settlement with a wayward state.
487 Transcript or Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 13-14.
484
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Scalia teased Justice Breyer about the suggestion,488 and no mention of these
ideas appears in the decision.
In the near future, a federal court may be called upon to consider
severability after deeming a congressional enactment unconstitutionally
coercive. If so, the foregoing discussion will hopefully provide a useful set of
proceed-with-caution signs through this novel territory, especially since the
Court has left so much of it unmarked.
IV. MEDICAID AND THE EXCHANGES AFTER NFIB
This final Part briefly explores challenges to the future of Medicaid which
have been created by the decision in NFIB. Even this exceedingly narrow
severability opinion left many unanswered Medicaid questions.489 Primarily,
two categories of questions arise: those concerning the uncertain scope of
Medicaid severability and those concerning tax credits in the exchanges
created pursuant to the ACA.
A.

The Uncertain Scope of Medicaid Severability

The severability holding seems straightforward: the Secretary simply cannot
use § 1396c to withhold existing Medicaid funds for a state’s failure to adopt
the Medicaid expansion. What is unclear, however, is the precise antecedent.
What exactly was the “Medicaid expansion” which is now optional?490 This
question is surprisingly difficult. This Article sorts all of the new Medicaid
provisions491 into three categories: (1) provisions clearly excluded from the
coercion analysis, and therefore still mandatory for all states; (2) provisions
clearly included in the coercion analysis, and therefore optional for any state;
and (3) other Medicaid provisions, for which it is contestable whether they are
now optional.

488

Id. at 62-63.
See Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 14, 1667-70 (describing the questions
surrounding application of the NFIB opinion and its impact on Medicaid).
490 This Article limits this analysis to the new provisions of Medicaid added by the ACA.
States are still responsible for following all pre-ACA requirements, such as due process
when coverage or care is denied. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2006); see also JANE PERKINS,
NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: THE SUPREME COURT’S ACA DECISION & ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID 8 (2012), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/images/stories
/ACA_July_2012_Fact_Sheet.pdf (“[B]eneficiaries covered through the Medicaid
expansion will be protected by provisions requiring medical assistance to be provided with
reasonable promptness and due process to be accorded where assistance is denied, reduced,
or terminated.” (citations omitted)).
491 The Eleventh Circuit opinion lists the Medicaid provisions relevant to the litigation.
See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1261
(11th Cir. 2011) (enumerating elements of Medicaid expansion under the ACA); id. at 136768 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). Most of these provisions
are never described as coercive by Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB.
489
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First, most of the new Medicaid provisions were never challenged in NFIB.
Examples include enhanced reimbursement for primary care doctors in
Medicaid,492 changes to the Medicaid drug-rebate rules for new formulations
of existing drugs,493 and expansion of Medicaid coverage starting in 2019 for
former foster-care children.494 Other new Medicaid provisions were discussed
by the States in their complaint and briefing or by their amici, but were entirely
absent from the Court’s coercion analysis. Examples include the five percent
“income disregard” adjustment to the calculation of “modified adjusted gross
income” for income eligibility purposes,495 and section 2304 of the ACA
(“Clarification of Definition of Medical Assistance”). Section 2304 was
attacked by the States in their initial brief,496 but this line of argument was
dropped from discussion after our Health Law and Policy Scholars’ brief
highlighted textual and factual errors in the States’ selective reading of the
statute.497 The great majority of the new Medicaid provisions fall into this
category of provisions unaffected by the Court’s coercion decision.
492 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1202(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1052-53 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13), (jj) (Supp. IV
2011)) (adding additional amendments and reconciliation provisions to § 1396a, as
previously amended by section 2303(a)(2) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act).
493 Id. § 1206 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(2)) (originally enacted as Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2501(d)).
494 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2004, 10201,
124 Stat. 119, 283, 917-23 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)) (adding a
ninth mandatory eligibility category, effective January 1, 2019).
495 Id. § 2002 (amending 42 U.S.C. 1396a(e) (2006)); see also Brief of State Petitioners
on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 7 (briefing the “income disregard” provisions as potentially
coercive). The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, writing as amici for the States, gave
the “income disregard” provision more prominence, attacking it as an example of “total
subversion.” Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence et al. in Support
of Petitioners (Medicaid Spending/Coercion Issue) at 6-7, Florida v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400). For an analysis concluding that the
income disregard was not affected by NFIB, see Memorandum from Kathleen S.
Swendiman, Legislative Att’y, & Evelyne B. Baumrucker, Analyst in Health Care
Financing, Cong. Research Serv., Selected Issues Related to the Effect of NFIB v. Sebelius
on the Medicaid Expansion Requirements in Section 2001 of the Affordable Care Act 5-7
(July 16, 2012) [hereinafter Swendiman & Baumrucker Memo] (on file with authors). For
another thoughtful analysis of the decision, see KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42367, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS (2012) (on file with authors). See also
Kevin Outterson, More Legal Analysis from CRS, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (July 20, 2012,
5:43 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/more-legal-analysis-from-crs/.
496 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 9 (“[Section 2304]
effectively exposes States to liability if the demand for services is greater than the supply of
hospitals and doctors willing to provide them.”).
497 See Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 36-38.

78

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

Second, two Medicaid provisions in the ACA were central to Chief Justice
Roberts’ coercion analysis: the addition of an eighth mandatory category of
adults eligible for Medicaid (otherwise ineligible adults under 133% FPL)498
and the enhanced federal matching rate, starting at 100% for the first three
years.499 Only the former bears directly on the coercion holding; thus, the latter
seems to operate unaffected. NFIB makes clear that if states fail to extend
eligibility to all adults under 133% FPL, the Secretary cannot use § 1396c to
cut off existing Medicaid funds. Although the plurality highlighted the
enhanced federal match in support of its characterization of the Medicaid
expansion as a “new” program, that very generous federal offer is not, in and
of itself, coercive. Accordingly, states that do elect to expand Medicaid would
seem entitled to the elevated federal match for the newly eligible population. In
other words, the enhanced federal match provision of the ACA is still fully
applicable to opting-in states.
The third category of Medicaid provisions offers a roadmap for future
litigation. The contestable provisions include: (1) the mandatory expansion of
coverage to children aged six to eighteen under 133% FPL;500 (2) the MOE
rules locking in previous state expansions while the ACA phases in;501 (3)
provisions defining the new “essential health benefits” package for the
expansion populations;502 and (4) partial or delayed Medicaid expansions for
adult populations under 133% FPL.503 It is not entirely clear from NFIB
whether states may choose to ignore these provisions, either individually or in
combination.504 This Article will briefly explore all four.

498

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The Medicaid provisions of
the [ACA] . . . require States to expand their Medicaid programs by 2014 to cover all
individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty
line.”); see also supra Parts II.B.1, III.B.1 and citations therein. This provision is found in
the opening paragraph of Title II, section 2001(a)(1) of the ACA. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
499 See supra Part I.D and citations therein. This provision is found in section 2001(a)(3)
of the ACA. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(3) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1396a).
500 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
1396a); id. §§ 2101-2102 (amending CHIP).
501 Id. § 2001(b) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a) (adding a new subsection, 1396a(gg),
defining MOE requirements).
502 Id. § 2001(a)(2) (amending 42 U.S.C § 1396a) (adding subsection 1396a(k)(1),
providing for minimum essential coverage); id. § 2001(c) (amending 42 U.S.C § 1396a)
(adding subsection 1396u-7(b)(5), setting the minimum standards for all benchmark benefit
packages).
503 Letter from Jane Perkins, Legal Dir., NHeLP, to Cindy Mann, Deputy Adm’r & Dir.,
Ctr. for Medicaid, CHIP, & Survey & Certification (Aug. 26, 2012) (on file with authors)
(arguing that NFIB did not permit partial expansions short of 133% FPL to 138% FPL after
the 5% income offset).
504 The National Health Law Project views the scope of the option very narrowly. See
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First, until the Medicaid expansion’s implementation in 2014, current law
requires that children up to five years old are covered up to 133% FPL. For
those between the ages of six to eighteen, current law mandates eligibility only
up to 100% FPL.505 The plurality’s reasoning focused almost entirely on the
novelty of the expansion of Medicaid to adults under 133% FPL but did not
discuss any relevant constitutional distinctions regarding expansion to 133%
FPL for children aged six to eighteen.506 Thus, the scope of the optional
expansion population is unclear. The HHS Secretary, for one, read the Court’s
coercion decision as limited to newly eligible adults.507 But the ACA’s new
catchall eighth category extends eligibility for everyone who is under sixtyfive earning 133% FPL. It is unclear whether Chief Justice Roberts believed
constitutional significance attaches to celebrating one’s sixth birthday with
family income between 100% and 133% FPL. If so, he did not explain why
this particular change for children aged six to eighteen was, or was not, a “shift
in kind.”508
Second, federal law frequently has resorted to mandatory MOE provisions
during transition periods.509 A challenge to the MOE provision of the ACA
was briefed510 and discussed at oral arguments,511 but was not included in the
NFIB opinions.512 A bill introduced in the 112th Congress, the State Flexibility
Act, would repeal the MOE requirements under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, CHIP, and the ACA.513 There is little or no basis

NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROJECT, THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S MEDICAID
EXPANSION (2012), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/images/stories/2012_07_23_NHe
LP_QA_1.pdf (stating that the coercion ruling in NFIB “only addresses . . . three ACA
Medicaid provisions” and affirmatively answering questions regarding the continued
applicability of other key provisions).
505 See supra Part I.D.
506 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581-82, 2601 (2012) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
effects of Medicaid expansion on adults); see also Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 30-31
(arguing that Medicaid expansion to women and children is constitutional).
507 See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., to State
Governors (July 10, 2012) (“The Supreme Court held that, if a state chooses not to
participate in this expansion of Medicaid eligibility for low-income adults, the state may not,
as a consequence, lose federal funding for its existing Medicaid program.” (emphasis
added)), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/files/2012/07/Secreta
ry-Sebelius-Letter-to-the-Governors-071012.pdf.
508 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
509 See supra Part I.D.
510 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 196, at 6, 8-9, 45 n.17; Brief for
Respondents, supra note 129, at 30-31; see also Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 34-36.
511 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 131, at 51, 72.
512 There was also no substantive discussion in the Eleventh Circuit decision. See Florida
ex rel. Att’y Gen., v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (2011).
513 H.R. 1683, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 868, 112th Cong. (2011).
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for a state to conclude the MOE provision does not apply,514 and yet the
National Association of Medicaid Directors, in a letter issued shortly after
NFIB was handed down, asked if states are “still subject to the MOE
requirements” and what “penalty is there for non-compliance?”515 Notably, the
Congressional Research Service concluded that NFIB did not affect the MOE
requirement.516 Nevertheless, the State of Maine promptly filed suit in the First
Circuit, claiming that NFIB also struck down the MOE requirement as
unconstitutionally coercive.517 While the claim was quickly dismissed on
procedural grounds, it is likely to reappear.518 Given the briefing on the MOE
issue and the Court’s complete silence, it is clear that NFIB did not strike down
the MOE requirement along with mandatory Medicaid expansion. But that will
not prevent states from making the argument and asking federal courts to
expand the coercion analyses in NFIB to also strike down the MOE provision.
Third, the definition of the Medicaid package of benefits remains an open
question.519 The ACA modified the mandatory Medicaid benefits package by

514

NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 504, at 4; PERKINS, supra note 490, at 9
(“Whether or not a State implements the mandatory Medicaid expansion, the ACA’s
maintenance of effort (MOE) provision will continue to apply.”). But see Matthew Stone,
Can Maine Cut Medicaid? Depends on How Broadly You Read the Supreme Court Ruling,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2012, 4:51 PM), https://bangordailynews.com/2012/08/10/h
ealth/can-maine-cut-medicaid-depends-on-how-broadly-you-read-the-supreme-court-ruling/
(explaining that the gubernatorial administration of Maine interpreted the Medicaid coercion
ruling in NFIB to mean “it could make cuts to its existing Medicaid program through a
routine process” without concern for MOE requirements).
515 NAT’L ASS’N OF MEDICAID DIRS., NAMD’S SCOTUS QUESTIONS 2 (2012), available
at http://www.leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/2011-2012/Children-Family/Topics/
Medicaid%20Monitoring/aug2012-namd-scotus-questions.pdf. Recently, the Obama
Administration made clear that Maine was subject to these MOE requirements and could not
make cuts to coverage. See Kevin Outterson, Maintenance of Effort in Maine, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Jan. 9, 2013, 12:20 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/mainten
ance-of-effort-in-maine/.
516 Swendiman & Baumrucker Memo, supra note 495, at 5-7 (“A careful reading of the
Court’s holding supports the conclusion that [the MOE provision is] unaffected by the
Supreme Court’s ruling . . . .”); see also Outterson, supra note 23.
517 Mayhew v. Sebelius, No. 12-2059 (1st Cir. Sept. 13, 2012) (dismissing Maine’s
request for review of its claim that HHS failed to consider its proposed State Plan
Amendment in a timely manner); see also; Glenn Adams, Federal Officials Ponder Maine’s
Medicaid Request, YAHOO! FIN. (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.finance.yahoo.com/n
ews/federal-officials-ponder-maines-medicaid-request-135925254--finance.html;
Kevin
Outterson, MOE Lawsuit, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Sept. 12, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://theincid
entaleconomist.com/wordpress/moe-lawsuit/ (“Maine is claiming that the Obamacare case
also struck down the maintenance-of-effort (MOE) provisions . . . .”).
518 Kevin Outterson, Maine, Dismissed (for Now), INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Sept. 17,
2012, 9:33 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/maine-dismissed-for-now/.
519 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a)(2)(A),
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reference to the EHB provision also applicable to private health insurance
plans under the ACA.520 HHS has authority to further define the ten categories
of services included in EHB,521 and has exercised its discretion by partially
delegating the task of defining EHB to the states, through a process which is
still being worked out.522 In assessing the effect of the Court’s coercion
decision, the Congressional Research Service did not include the EHB on its
list of optional Medicaid provisions,523 but the National Health Law Program
did.524 Thus, it remains unclear whether states that opt into Medicaid expansion
must provide EHB or whether the package of benefits they provide to the
newly eligible population can be negotiated with the HHS. The National
Health Law Project strongly opposes partial expansions and modifications by
some states, unless the state plan qualifies for a demonstration waiver under
SSA section 1115.525
Despite that uncertainty, the EHB provision is an unlikely trigger for a
Tenth Amendment challenge. Of all the Medicaid provisions discussed in this
Part, the EHB is by far the most flexible from a federalism perspective, giving
each individual state significant room to follow the characteristics of their local
commercial health insurance markets.526 It would be difficult to find coercion

124 Stat. 119, 271 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(1) (Supp. IV 2011)); id. §
2001(c) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b) (2006)) (adding subsection 1396u-7(b)(5) which
specifies Medicaid benchmark benefits).
520 Id. § 2001(c) (requiring all benchmark benefit packages to offer, at a minimum,
coverage for essential health benefits as defined by the ACA).
521 Id. § 1302(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 18022(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2011)) (providing that
“the Secretary shall define the essential health benefits” but requiring the inclusion of, at a
minimum, the ten categories of coverage defined in the ACA).
522 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS to Give States More
Flexibility to Implement Health Reform (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/n
ews/press/2011pres/12/20111216c.html (allowing states to select a plan to count as their
Essential Health Benefits Package and to make modifications to that plan so long as such
modifications are consistent with the ten defined coverage categories in the ACA).
523 Swendiman & Baumrucker Memo, supra note 495, at 5-7 (discussing a variety of
Medicaid-expansion provisions as either mandatory or voluntary, but not including a
discussion of EHB).
524
See NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 504, at 1.
525 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006) (providing states a process to waive some Medicaid
requirements for “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s]”); Letter from Jane
Perkins to Cindy Mann, supra note 503, at 1-2 (stating that demonstration waivers must be
budget neutral and should only be granted where the requesting state proves a valid,
demonstrative purpose).
526 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,893 (July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 155-56) (announcing regulations granting states “significant flexibility” in
determining how to apply standards for qualified health plans to the ACA’s required health
exchanges); Health Law Brief, supra note 14, at 33 (“[T]he federal government has, in the
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in the EHB’s application to Medicaid, as benchmark and benchmarkequivalent coverage were created to be less restrictive than previous Medicaid
benefits standards. Chief Justice Roberts mentioned EHB only in passing,
erroneously suggesting that Medicaid expansion is a “new” program because it
offers a different set of benefits, even though states have had the option to offer
benchmark plans since 2005.527 But he did not discuss the provision in any
detail or suggest that this change to the Medicaid benefits package would be
“unrelated” to the historical program, thus rendering it unconstitutionally
coercive.
Finally, some states were exploring partial or delayed Medicaid expansions
after NFIB. Soon after the NFIB decision, the National Governors
Association,528 the Republican Governors Association,529 and the National
Association of Medicaid Directors530 peppered the Administration with
questions, seeking guidance. On July 10, 2012, Secretary Sebelius wrote back
to the governors, promising to provide “as much flexibility as we can.”531 But
in that letter, she phrased the antecedent very narrowly:
As you know, beginning in 2014, the Affordable Care Act provides for
the expansion of Medicaid eligibility to those adults under the age of 65
with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level who were not
previously eligible for Medicaid. The Supreme Court held that, if a state
chooses not to participate in this expansion of Medicaid eligibility for
low-income adults, the state may not, as a consequence, lose federal
funding for its existing Medicaid program. The Court’s decision did not
affect other provisions of the law. For example, the decision did not
change the fact that the federal government will completely pay for
coverage under the eligibility expansion in 2014-2016, and for at least 90

case of the EHB, indicated an intention to delegate to the States authority to define the
details of the EHB.”); CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFORMATION & INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL
HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 4-5 (2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/File
s2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf (discussing variances in coverage across
markets); INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST
21-22 (Cheryl Ulmer et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the level of flexibility in the EHB
provision, as well as the ability for stakeholders, including state governments, to shape the
EHB requirement’s final scope).
527 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (plurality opinion).
528 Letter from Dan Crippen, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Governors Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius,
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (July 2, 2012), available at http://www.nga.org/cms/home/
federal-relations/nga-letters/executive-committee-letters/col2-content/main-content-list/july2-2012-letter---affordable.html.
529 Letter from Governor Bob McDonnell, Chairman, Republican Governors Ass’n, to
President Barack Obama (July 10, 2012), available at http://rgppc.com/medicaid-and-excha
nge-letter-2/.
530 NAT’L ASS’N OF MEDICAID DIRS., supra note 515.
531 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius to State Governors, supra note 507, at 1.
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percent of such costs thereafter, or that states have flexibility to design the
benefit package for the individuals covered.532
The Secretary apparently does not consider the eligibility expansion to children
or the EHB to be made optional by NFIB.533 For the adult population below
133% FPL, the Obama Administration initially hinted at providing flexibility
even beyond what the NFIB opinion requires, although reelection may have
strengthened the Administration’s position and tempered its desire to negotiate
with states. In fact, HHS has recently indicated that partial expansion is not
possible under the terms of ACA.534 Nevertheless, the level of voluntary
flexibility promised has been extraordinary and, to some observers,
surprising.535 States have been promised the ability to expand now and contract
later, or miss the January 2014 deadline and join when they are ready. It also
appears that states will be permitted to expand and contract piecemeal, which
is not clearly supported by either the text of the ACA, including the MOE
provision,536 or the Court’s opinion. In effect, the Administration has read
532

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). The letter also promises to aggressively protect otherwise
eligible adults in opt-out states from the individual mandate penalty. Id. at 2.
533 See Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 14, at 1668 (reasoning that “[Chief
Justice Roberts] clearly emphasized that the transformative dimension of the Affordable
Care Act was the extension of coverage to ‘childless adults’” and that the extension to lowincome children was thus excluded from NFIB’s remedial holding).
534 Memorandum from the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Exchanges and Market
Reforms: State-based Exchanges and State Partnership Exchanges 12 (Dec. 10, 2012),
available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf (informing
states that the ACA does not permit partial coverage expansions).
535 See Michael Bologna, CMS Points to New Flexibility for States Under Health
Reform’s Medicaid Expansion, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.bna.com/cmspoints-new-n12884911073/; Nicole Huberfeld, The Trope of Flexibility, HEALTHLAWPROF
BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog/2012/08/nothin
g-short-of-block-grants-will-do.html; Kevin Outterson, CMS Interpreting the Red State
Option After NFIB, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Aug. 7, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://theincidentalec
onomist.com/wordpress/cms-interpreting-the-red-state-option-after-nfib/; Sara Rosenbaum
& Timothy Westmoreland, CBO’s Updated Affordable Care Act Estimates: Resting on
Shaky Assumptions?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 31, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/
07/31/cbos-updated-affordable-care-act-estimates-resting-on-shaky-assumptions/;
Dylan
Scott, CMS: States Could Adopt Medicaid Expansion, Then Drop It, GOVERNING STS. &
LOCALITIES (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.governing.com/news/federal/gov-cms-nodeadline-for-state-decisions-on-medicaid-expansion.html.
536 PERKINS, supra note 490, at 7 (“[T]he new decision . . . curb[s] the power of the
federal government to enforce the Medicaid expansion but maintains the ACA and the
Medicaid Act in all other respects.”); Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 14, at 1669
(“[T]reating the expansion group as an option and then beginning to disassemble and
reassemble it would cross the line between reasonable ‘interpretation’ of the Affordable
Care Act and a wholesale revision of the statute’s definition of the expansion group.”);
Letter from Jane Perkins to Cindy Mann, supra note 503; Rosenbaum & Westmoreland,
supra note 535; see also MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A GUIDE TO THE
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NFIB as establishing an opening bid, from which states can bargain with the
Secretary about the timing, covered population, and benefits package for
Medicaid expansion within their individual states. But this is not a gardenvariety expansion of the administrative state; the Court set the stage itself
through the imprecise language in NFIB. At least until Congress can revisit the
issue, the Court has given the Administration nearly carte blanche authority, de
facto if not de jure, to cut Medicaid deals with the states.
B.

Tax Credits in the Exchanges

A second major implementation question raised by NFIB concerns the
premium assistance tax credits in the exchanges. For legal residents with
incomes between 100% and 400% FPL, the Affordable Care Act provides tax
credits to subsidize the purchase of private health insurance in the exchanges.
The mechanism is § 36B of the Internal Revenue Code.
The ACA encourages states to create their own exchanges, but the federal
government will create backup federal exchanges for states that fail to do so.537
According to the text of the statute, the tax credits are available only to people
who are enrolled in a qualified health plan purchased “through an Exchange
established by the State under [section] 1311” of the ACA.538 This was inartful
wording, as it has led Michael Cannon of the Cato Institute and Jonathan Adler
from Case Western Reserve University to allege that tax credits will not be
available for otherwise eligible lawful residents in the backup federal
exchanges because these exchanges were not “established by the State.”539 The
textual argument is fairly straightforward.
The IRS was aware of the issue more than a year ago and issued proposed
tax regulations on August 17, 2011 that broadened the definition of
“exchange” to include both state and federal backup exchanges.540 A public

SUPREME COURT’S AFFORDABLE CARE ACT DECISION 7 (2012), available at http://www.kff.o
rg/healthreform/upload/8332.pdf; MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
IMPLEMENTING THE ACA’S MEDICAID-RELATED HEALTH REFORM PROVISIONS AFTER THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 2-3 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/uploa
d/8348.pdf.
537 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (Supp. IV
2011).
538 I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2011).
539 Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The
Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 22 HEALTH MATRIX
(forthcoming 2013).
540 The mechanism is to define “exchange” by reference to 45 C.F.R. 155.20. See Health
Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,387 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602). The Code of Federal Regulations defines an exchange as “a
governmental agency or non-profit entity that meets the applicable standards of this part and
makes [Qualified Health Plans] available to qualified individuals and qualified employers”
and specifies that “[u]nless otherwise identified, this term refers to State Exchanges,
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hearing was held on November 17, 2011, and the regulations were finalized on
May 23, 2012.541 Congress clearly intended for the tax credits to be available
to people in all fifty states, irrespective of whether the exchanges are state,
federal, or multi-state operations.542
This issue has gained additional political salience after the NFIB decision.
As written, the ACA provided Medicaid for individuals up to 133% FPL, and
eligibility for tax credits in the exchanges for individuals between 100% and
400% FPL. The policy design was that very low-income individuals would
receive full public assistance while less-impoverished individuals would
purchase private insurance with some government assistance. For individuals
above 400% FPL, the employer mandate, insurance market reforms, the
individual mandate, and other provisions kick in to make coverage more
readily available. In states that exercise their NFIB Red State Option to not
expand adult eligibility to 133% FPL, we have a new healthcare “donut
hole.”543 The poorest adults will still have Medicaid under current law, but to
widely varying levels of eligibility. In some states, for example, unemployed
regional Exchanges, subsidiary Exchanges, and a Federally-facilitated Exchange.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 155.20 (2012).
541 See 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,377 (publishing, on May 23, 2012, a final regulation related to
the health insurance premium tax credit that was finalized pursuant to a November 17, 2011,
public hearing). But see Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Op-Ed, Another
ObamaCare Glitch, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052970203687504577006322431330662.html (opining, in an op-ed published the day
before the IRS’s public hearing, that “the law has a major glitch that threatens its basic
functioning,” and further that “states that refuse to create an exchange can block much of
ObamaCare’s spending and practically force Congress to reopen the law for revisions”).
542 See JUDITH SOLOMON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, HEALTH REFORM LAW
MAKES CLEAR THAT SUBSIDIES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN STATES WITH FEDERALLY OPERATED
EXCHANGES 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-16-12health.pdf (“The
argument that premium credits are not available to purchase coverage offered through a
federally operated exchange rests on a distorted and incorrect reading of the ACA.”);
Timothy Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with the
Affordable Care Act’s Language and History, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 18, 2012), http://hea
lthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-in-federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-consistentwith-the-affordable-care-acts-language-and-history/. But see Michael Cannon & Jonathan
Adler, The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA: A Response to
Timothy Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 1, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/08/01/th
e-illegal-irs-rule-to-expand-tax-credits-under-the-ppaca-a-response-to-timothy-jost/; Sarah
Kliff, Could One Word Take Down Obamacare?, WASH. POST (July 16, 2012, 4:56 PM), htt
p://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/16/could-a-missing-word-take-d
own-obamacare/ (quoting an interview with Professor Kevin Outterson on the ambiguity of
the state exchange language in the ACA).
543 The “old” healthcare donut hole is the out-of-pocket payments in Medicare Part D,
which is addressed over time by the ACA. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3301, 124 Stat. 119, 461-68 (2010) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w101, 102, 153 (2006)).
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adults are covered only up to 17% FPL while other states already opt to cover
adults up to 133% FPL and beyond.544 Slightly less-impoverished people will
have tax credits in the exchanges, that is, from 100% to 400% FPL. People in
the middle will be left out, with neither a government healthcare program nor
government assistance to purchase private health insurance.
If Cannon and Adler’s interpretation of the non-availability of tax credits in
federally operated exchanges is correct, then low-income individuals in
Medicaid opt-out states with federal exchanges will be even more exposed.
Citizens understandably may hold their state-elected officials politically
accountable for these anomalies, even though it was Congress that drafted the
ambiguous provision. One apparent political goal of the tax-credit challenge is
to deny coverage to millions of additional people, while laying the blame for
ACA’s failures on the federal tax code rather than state officials who opt out of
Medicaid expansion or a state exchange. Federalism’s political accountability
would thereby be further confused and muddled.
One further wrinkle is that the operative language – an exchange
“established by the state” – is also used to terminate the MOE requirement.545
Most people speak of the MOE requirement terminating in 2014 when each
state will have either a state or federal exchange. But if the stricter
interpretation is correct, any state that failed to create an exchange would
continue to be subject to the MOE requirement indefinitely.546
We are skeptical of this tax challenge on substantive and procedural
grounds. Substantively, the IRS has significant discretion, especially when it is
arguably being too generous to taxpayers.547 Procedurally, states would not
have standing to bring this suit and the Anti-Injunction Act should delay suit in
any event until no earlier than 2015.548 The Congressional Budget Office

544 Adult Income Eligibility Limits at Application as a Percent of the Federal Poverty
Level (FPL), January 2013, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparer
eport.jsp?rep=130&cat=4 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
545 I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2011).
546 See Sam Baker, GOP Attacks on Health Law’s Subsidies Could Backfire on
Medicaid, HILL HEALTHWATCH (July 18, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwat
ch/health-reform-implementation/238569-gop-attacks-on-health-laws-subsidies-could-backf
ire-on-medicaid.
547 See Kevin Outterson, The Rest of the Story, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (July 16, 2012,
8:34 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-rest-of-the-story/ (discussing
I.R.C. § 36B and remarking that the “IRS has broad regulatory authority, which they
exercised in the proposed rule, defining Exchange in a [] broad[] way”).
548 See Kevin Outterson, Cato Recycles an Attack on the Employer Mandate in Federal
Exchange States, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (July 17, 2012, 6:50 AM), http://theincidentaleco
nomist.com/wordpress/procedural-tax-issues-with-the-new-employer-mandate-potential-law
suit/ (stating that a large employer in a federal exchange state cannot file suit “until some
employer pays the mandate penalty in the federal exchange state – spring 2015 at the
earliest”).
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generally concurs549 as does the Congressional Research Service,550 Professor
Timothy Jost,551 and Judith Solomon from the Center for Budget and Policy
Priorities.552 But this issue need not be resolved for the purposes of this Article.
It is sufficient to note that no federalism or coercion issue is present. The
creation of tax credits under § 36B of the Internal Revenue Code is clearly a
permissible exercise of the taxing power. The only question is whether the
statute and regulations will be interpreted to maximize access to health
insurance, which was the clear purpose of the ACA.
CONCLUSION
Of the four discrete questions presented to the Court, the Medicaid
expansion issue offered the greatest potential for destabilization from both a
statutory and a constitutional perspective. As this Article reveals, NFIB stands
precipitously to fulfill that promise. The NFIB decision cut many corners on
the actual history and facts of the Medicaid program, pounding many a square
peg into round holes in order to fit a narrative of coercion. This Article has
highlighted many of these missteps lest future decisions simply parrot the
factual inaccuracies promulgated by the Court.
Doctrinally, the Roberts Court blazed a long-desired trail in the Federalism
Revolution. The Court implicitly incorporated, seemingly modified, and
reinvigorated two elements of the Dole test for conditional spending, infusing
them into the coercion decision of first impression. The Court intertwined the
Dole/Pennhurst clear-notice requirement with a beefed-up version of the Dole
germaneness limit in order to artificially divide Medicaid in two parts: “old”
and “new” Medicaid. Thus divided, the Court then concluded that the coercion
doctrine barred Congress from conditioning federal funding for an “old”
549

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 7 n.14 (2012),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012CoverageEstimates.pdf (“CBO and [the Joint Committee on Taxation] expect that subsidies
will be available to people in exchanges run entirely by states, exchanges run entirely by the
federal government, and exchanges run together by states and the federal government.”).
550 Memorandum from Jennifer Staman & Todd Garvey, Legislative Att’ys, Cong.
Research Serv., Legal Analysis of Availability of Premium Tax Credits in State and
Federally Created Exchanges Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act 9-10 (July 23, 2012)
(“Thus, if a reviewing court determines that there is ambiguity surrounding the issue of
whether premium credits are available in federal exchanges and reaches step two of the
Chevron analysis with respect to the regulations issued under § 36B, the regulations will
very likely be considered a reasonable agency interpretation on the statute and accorded
deference by the court.”).
551 Jost, supra note 542 (“Employers . . . would be barred from [bringing suit] by the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act . . . probably until 2015.”).
552 SOLOMON, supra note 542, at 1-4 (presenting arguments against a reading of
“exchange” that would leave supplements unavailable in states that choose not to adopt the
Medicaid expansion).

88

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

program on states’ agreement to participation in a “new” conditional spending
program. Although the Court has consistently enforced the Dole clear-notice
requirement for conditions placed on federal spending, this was the first time
the Court drew upon the relatedness prong of the Dole factors. Clear notice and
relatedness now appear to be folded into the newly fashioned, yet undefined,
coercion doctrine.
The Court left unanswered not only how those elements will operate in
future cases but, even more fundamentally, what coercion means. Selfconsciously avoiding any definable test, the Court instead relied on
problematic quantitative as well as qualitative analyses to determine that the
Medicaid expansion excessively invaded states’ prerogatives. The joint dissent
relied heavily on facts specific to the litigant States such as their current
budgets, Medicaid funding levels, and federal expenditures on Medicaid. The
Roberts plurality rested on colorful analogies: “economic dragooning” and “a
gun to the head.” Both opinions invoked familiar federalism principles,
including political accountability, but the reasoning was muddled and failed to
clarify the constitutional significance of those themes in the coercion context.
With no further guidance, we can only hope that we will know a “gun to the
head” when we see it. But we can be sure there will be many future challenges
to a host of federal spending power programs alleging just that.
This fractured, obliquely reasoned decision leaves open a host of additional
questions. Not only do we not know the meaning of coercion but also the
extent to which the Court will apply NFIB’s unique severability analysis in
future disputes. The Court’s novel remedy of turning a conditional spending
program into an optional provision which states are free to adopt or not could
be limited to coercion challenges or could signal a new approach to
severability more generally. Many questions also remain unanswered with
respect to severability of other ACA Medicaid provisions and implementation
of the Medicaid expansion within the larger scheme of the ACA. Judicial
dockets and academic debates are already reverberating with these open
questions.
Thanks to their success before the Court, the states are now facing a
decision whether to exercise the Red State Option to accept or decline
unprecedentedly generous federal funding for previously uninsured residents.
States are no longer plaintiffs claiming coercion, powerless with a “gun to the
head.” Perhaps they had hoped for a different result in the 2012 Presidential
election. But they must now make difficult political choices upon which the
lives of some of their most medically fragile, disenfranchised citizens will rely.
The effect of these decisions on the political dance between federal and state
authorities to cast blame and claim credit for healthcare reform will play out
over the next several years as the ACA is fully implemented. Both legally and
politically, we have plunged into the “endless difficulties” that Justice Cardozo
so rightly feared.

